مفهوم الأمن الإسرائيلي والمؤسسة العسكرية الاسرائيلية بين عامي (2000-2015)وتداعيات استراتيجية الجيش الاسرائيلي (وثيقة ايزنكوت) عليهما.
Date
2020-01-06
Authors
معاذ طلال ابراهيم هريني
moath talal ibrahem horine
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
جامعة القدس
al-quds university
al-quds university
Abstract
The current study examines the role of the Israeli security establishment
and Eisenkot's document in Israeli political decision-making during 2000-
2015. During those years, many changes took place, including the
changes on political and security levels, such as the outbreak of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada or Uprising, the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon
in 2000, and the implementation of the Disengagement Plan from the
Gaza Strip in 2005, in addition to the recommendations made by the
Israeli security establishment to the then Prime Minister Sharon in mid-
September 2000 not to assassinate Yasser Arafat, and the 2006 Lebanon
War, and the Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008 , 2009, 2012 and 2014.
The study sheds light on the concept of strategies and security
establishment in Israel according to its various divisions and the degree of
their influence on political decision-making. It showed the role of the
Eisenkot's document in the security and political establishment, taking
into consideration its impact and control on the political action and
operations room during wars. The study demonstrates the military's
intended developments according to the vision of the Eisenkot's
document.
Since security is his interested field, the researcher confirmed through his
own justifications his interest in the security system and the Israeli
strategies during the study period. The justifications for the objective
study are related to clarifying the extent of overlapping roles between the
security and political establishment with regard to the political decision.
The security establishment maintains military superiority and
monopolizes the power of nuclear deterrence in light of an Arab
environment hostile to Israel.
The study problem showed an existence of a conflict between the
government and the security establishment over adopting political
decisions , although there is a consensus among them towards addressing
external threats. The researcher used the descriptive method in studying
the phenomenon, relying on many different and translated sources.
د
The study is divided into four chapters . In Chapter One , the researcher
presented the general framework of the study. Chapter Two, discusses
security theory and the security establishment in Israel before 2015 as a
theoretical framework and previous studies . Chapter Three is about
Eisenkot's strategy and its implications for the security theory and the
Israeli security establishment, whereas Chapter Four and fiv shows the
role of Eisenkot's document and the security establishment in political
decision-making.
The study reached several results, the most important of which are :
The security establishment has a prominent role in political
decision-making.
The personality of the Prime Minister plays an important role in
implementing decisions.
Eisenkot ignored the Minister of Defense and the Basic Law in
imposing a document according to his vision without paying any
attention to his partners in the security establishment (such as
young women and the Mossad)
Intelligence miscalculation leads to a failure in the political
decision-making process.
The absence of a third party other than the government and the
security services, contributes to assessing the political situation.
leaving room for the security services to directly interfere in the
political decision-making process.