الطرف الثالث في المفاوضات دور الولايات المتحدة في رعاية مشاريع التسوية في الصراع الفلسطيني - الإسرائيلي كامب ديفيد 2000 نموذجا
رويد عادل محمد ابو عمشة
Rowaid Adel Mohammad Abu Amsha
This study examined the role of the third party in the negotiations and the role of the US as a peace process sponsor in the settlement proposals suggested for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. To this end, the study examined the Camp David Summit 2000 as a case in point. Therefore, it tackled, with some detail, the works of the summit, which brought together the parties to the conflict, namely the Palestinians and the Israelis, to conclude an agreement on the final settlement issues, and to put an end to the conflict between the two sides. However, the summit ended in total failure. Against this backdrop, the study began with a brief survey of the historical background of the American policy towards the Palestinians, as well as the backgrounds and foundations of this policy. The study traced the interest of the US in the Middle East from the outbreak of the First World War until the launching of the peace process between the two sides. It also surveyed briefly the peace process between the two sides which began at Madrid conference in 1991 which culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles agreement (Oslo Accords) in 1993 and the continuing of their bilateral negotiations and the American role in them. Further, the study investigated the local, regional and international political circumstances, which had paved the way for the Camp David Summit, and their impact on the summit s work and results. The study also dwelt on the Camp David Summit 2000 and the circumstances of its holding and the position of the two parties towards issues on the negotiating table and the role of the Americans in the summit and the extent of playing the role of an honest broker during the summit. The study finally shed light on the outstanding issues and the stance of each party in an attempt to explore the reasons for the summit s failure. The study s first hypothesis is that the absence American neutrality (impartiality) in sponsoring the peace and its clear bias with Israel are the two reasons for the failure of the Camp David Summit. The second hypothesis is that the Americans incompetent running of the summit agenda and lack of careful preparation are also another two reasons for the summit s failure. The study used two methods: the descriptive analytical method as well as the historical method. To these two ends, the researcher made an extensive review of relevant literature. After testing of the two hypotheses, it was found that the US has lost the most important characteristic of a third party in the negotiations: neutrality or honest broker. It has always adopted the Israeli position again and again and frankly. This US position has encouraged Israel to remain suborn. In addition, the lack of careful preparation for the Camp David Summit and the running of its work was also a reason for its failure. The US acceptance to make the summit without terms of reference (international community resolutions) for the two parties has helped the stronger party to try to impose its agenda. The Israeli party, naturally, was the qualified party to exercise this role. The most important implications, addressed to the Palestinian side, include the importance of studying and understanding well the implications of the Israeli-American relations as well the necessity of studying the American political system in terms of its structure and mechanism of decision making. Another implication is to cling to the international community resolutions as a reference for any future negotiations on condition that these negotiations begin from last square and be preceded by preliminary serious and intensive negotiations. The Palestinian side should also change the Palestinian delegation for the future negotiations and train the technical teams, supporting it in a professional manner and learning from past experiences.
الدراسات الاقليمية , Regional Studies