

Abstract

This study aims at discovering the impact of the 1956 Sinai War on the development of the Israeli army . In order to achieve this aim, the study attempts to stabilize a structure of theoretical analysis that will enable us to understand :

First, the aspects that war may affect the army in general .The study finds out that there are two obvious aspects of influence. The war may affect the status of the military establishment within the political system and its impact on making the decisions of general politics. This we call (the descriptive impact level). The war may also affect the technical structure of the armed forces in the aspects of training, armament, military organization, and building forces.This we call (the technical impact level).

Second, the theoretical framework attempts to stabilize analytical instruments that will enable us to judge correctly the development of the army in the state through the descriptive and technical levels. Then, the study uses the instruments of theoretical analysis to observe the development of the Israeli army during the period from the end of the 1948 war and the beginning of the 1956 Sinai War. It notices that at the descriptive level, the structure of the Israeli army was characterized by playing a comprehensive role within the political Israeli system due to a number of reasons (which are shown in details in the study). As on the technical level, the Israeli leadership attempted to build an armored offensive army capable of determining the war in a short period of time, transferring the battlefield to the enemy's territories, executing the strategies of short war and indirect approach, through possessing qualitative arm power based on the dual tank and aircraft. However, the Israeli preparations to build the army in this direction had not been completed before the start of the 1956 Sinai War. Therefore, the Israeli Army was not strategically capable to determine the war on its own with the Arab armies. Although Egypt imposed military and economic pressure on Israel, the Israeli leadership was reluctant to involve the Israeli army alone in a lost war which might

Liquidate the existence of Hebrew State.

Israel exploited the Suez question between Egypt on the one hand and Britain and France on the other to participate in the aggression against Egypt. Because of the military forces the alliance used in the war, Israel benefited from these huge military capacities to compensate its defects; and this provided a perfect opportunity to defeat the Egyptian forces in Sinai.

The study notices that the Sinai war with its events and effects raised the Israeli preparations to build the army at the technical level so that the Israeli army capable of achieving the Israeli objectives of the war, that is, insuring the existence of the Hebrew State and paralyzing the Arab threat through possessing a developed arsenal of arms and raising the Israeli military capacities to the desired level.

At the descriptive level, the war did not affect the status of the military establishment and its role in decision-making because the Sinai War was a preventive war which raised the technical capacities of the Israeli army.