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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

Internal Management Control in Governmental Institutions and its Role in Improving Work Performance from the Point of View the State Audit and Palestinian Administrative Control Bureau

Supervisor : Dr. Fath Allah Ghanem

Student : Ashraf Atatrh

Abstract

The aim of this study is to identify the reality of the internal administrative control in governmental institutions, based on organizational structure, integrated accounting system, internal oversight unit, internal monitoring, qualified staff section, performance norms and standard, effective communication systems, control methods and tools, and its role in improving work performance. The study has been done from the point of view of the state audit and Palestinian administrative control bureau, and identification of their relationship as well as detection whether there are differences in the average responses of respondents about the reality of internal administrative control in governmental institutions depending on its dimensions, in the light of each variant (qualifications, specialization, experience, age and sector), and the justification of this study lies in the researcher's observations during field visits and interviews of some of the problems and impediments in the oversight units of Internal governmental institutions, and exploring views of the Office of oversight of internal oversight role in Palestinian governmental institutions in improving the performance of work.

The study was conducted during the period of October 2010 to May 2012. The study population consisted of all auditors in Palestinian financial and administrative control who were (50) auditor. The researcher took all members of society with a comprehensive survey method due to its small size. (40) questionnaires suitable for statistical analysis were recovered and were considered as a representative sample of the population, the descriptive and analytical method were used, data were analyzed and conclusions were drawn. The researcher developed a questionnaire which was consisted of (87) items that enjoyed a degree of validity and constancy of (95%) which was good and fulfilling the purposes of study.

The results of the study showed that the sample responses from the auditors about the reality of the internal oversight in governmental institutions averaged (3.21) significantly and in response reached (64.2%) distributed by the questionnaire's main topics at the level of the existence of sound effective organizational structure with the statistical average (3.02), and on the sound accounting system level that fits the overall oversight requirements with an average of (4.09), and in the internal control systems with an average of (3.26), and in the selection of qualified staff with an average of (3.26), and in the norms and standards of the performance with an average of (2.68), and at the level of the regulatory methods and tools an average of (3.01), and in the effective communication systems with an average of (3.18), and the total focus on means of improving the performance in governmental institutions with an average of (2.77) with little response. The study also showed that there were no statistically significant differences at the level of statistical significance ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) between responses of respondents in the fact of internal management oversight and its role in improving the performance of work in governmental

institutions according to its dimensions and the total degree of the variables of qualification, experience and sector; while there were statistically significant differences in the variables of specialization and age. The results showed that there was no statistical significant correlation between internal administrative control and improving performance in governmental institutions

The study also showed the most important constraints represented by the internal control in the presence of plans unenforceable, and lack of administrative regulations in accordance with modern management concepts, and the absence of clear reference of powers and responsibilities. The study proposed to establish an internal oversight units in governmental institutions, and adopting the principle of objectivity in regulatory reports, and consistency between management oversight and financial control.

Finally, based on the results of the study, the researcher recommends the need for strengthening the role of the organizational structures and flexibility in governmental institutions to facilitate the observation process, and to develop effective performance evaluation models by establishing specific criteria for the assessment of the performance, and giving more attention to complaints as an instrument of control that detects any deficiencies in work, and working to convince senior management of the importance of oversight and support by all methods, particularly with regard to the observations and the recommendations that are mentioned in regulatory reports.

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%80.2

(%95)

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(6)

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:(Margret A. Abernetthy, 2003)

(Swanson, Richard W 2002

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:(Biers Taker, 2004)

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1.3

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(2011)

4.3

(40)

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:1.3

92.5	37	
2.5	1	
5.0	2	
100.0	40	

%92.5

(1.3)

%2.5

%5

()

%98

(2004)

(2010)

%80

:2.3

15.0	6	
60.0	24	
5.0	2	
20.0	8	
100.0	40	

%60 (2.3)
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:3.3

67.5	27	5
32.5	13	10-5
100.0	40	

5 %67.5 (3.3)
 .(2004) 10-5 %32.5

:4.3

%5.0	2	25
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(25) %5 %90 (4.3)
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15.0	6	
17.5	7	
22.5	9	
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%17.5 %22.5 (5.3)
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(SPSS)

(One Way ANOVA)
($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
(0.05)

(t-test)
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(Scheffe)



1.4

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.1.1.4

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1	2	3	4	5	
1-1.99	2-2.99	3	3.01-3.99	4-4.99	

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:1.4

	0.62161	3.0225		1
	0.62999	4.0917		2
	0.65874	3.2687		3
	0.72032	3.2611		4
	0.70268	2.6861		5
	0.69524	3.0150		
	0.68029	3.1864		6
	0.52553	3.2188		

(1.4)

:

(3.02)

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(2.68)

(3.01)

(3.21)

(3.18)

%64.2

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:2.4

	0.98677	3.2750		1
	0.93883	2.8750		2
	0.99195	2.8750		3
	0.80224	3.1500		4
	0.93918	2.8000		5
	1.09515	2.9250		6
	1.11373	3.1250		7
	0.90263	3.1750		8
	1.04973	2.9750		9
	1.08486	3.0500		10
	0.62161	3.0225		

(5)

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(2.4)

(10-1)

"

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(3.27)

"

(2.80)

"

%60.4

(3.02)

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:3.4

	.74722	4.1750		1
	.69982	3.8500		2
	.65584	3.9250		3
	.84694	3.7250		4
	.72986	3.9250		5
	.79097	3.7000		6
	.81296	3.5750		7
	.77418	3.3750		8
	.87669	3.4750		9
	.92819	3.1000		10
	.62999	4.0917		

(3.4)

(10-1)

(4.17)

(3.4)

(4.09)

%81.8

(4.09)

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:4.4

	1.0974 9	2.7750		1
	1.1668 5	2.8500		2
	0.8589 6	3.3250		3
	1.1021 5	3.3750		4
	1.0315 5	3.2500		5
	0.9523 9	3.3750		6
	0.9114 7	3.7000		7
	0.9607 7	3.5000		8
	.65874	3.2687		

(5)

(4.4)

(8-1)

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(3.70)

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(2.77)

%65.2

(3.26)

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(5.4)

(9-1)

:5.4

	1.20256	3.2000		1
	0.81610	3.7250		2
	0.98058	3.2500		3
	0.72324	3.7000	()	4
	1.03155	3.2500		5
	1.05733	3.1000		6
	1.02250	2.9250		7
	1.20229	2.8750		8
	1.11832	3.3250		9
	0.72032	3.2611		

(5)

"

(3.72)

"

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(2.87)

(5.4)

"

%65.2

(3.26)

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: -6.4

	1.15886	2.8750		1
	1.03651	2.5500		2
	1.05125	2.6500	.()	3
	1.07387	2.7750		4
	1.07537	2.8500		5
	1.11373	2.8750		6
	1.21924	2.7250		7

: -6.4

	0.94868	2.3500		8
	0.93336	2.5250		9
	0.70268	2.6861		

(5)

(6.4)

.(9-1)

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" "

(2.87)

""

"

(6.4)

"

(2.35)

%53.6

(2.68)

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: -7.4

	1.07387	2.9750		1
	0.88289	2.7000		2
	1.09515	2.6750		3
	1.03775	3.0000	()	4
	1.13652	3.1250		5
	1.19829	3.0000		6
	1.01242	3.4750		7

: -7.4

	1.30850	3.3250		8
	1.22762	3.0750		9
	1.26491	2.8000		10
	0.69524	3.0150		

(7.4)

.(10-1)

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(3.32)

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(7.4)

"
(2.67)

%60.2

(3.01)

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:8.4

	0.98058	3.2500		1
	1.07148	3.0750		2
	1.01779	3.2000		3
	0.96044	3.2750		4
	1.06096	3.0500		5
	1.00766	3.4000		6
	1.17424	3.1750		7
	1.15470	3.0000		8
	1.04268	3.2000		9
	0.88831	3.3250		10
	1.05733	3.1000		11
	0.68029	3.1864		

(8.4)

%63.6

(3.18)

(10)

:9.4

	1.02767	3.4878		6	.1
	1.02529	3.2683		13	.2
	1.11585	3.1707		5	.3
	1.23268	3.0732		11	.4
	1.11803	3.0000		14	.5
	1.06037	2.9756		17	.6
	1.19143	2.9268		15	.7
	1.17909	2.9024		17	.8
	1.26876	2.8780		10	.9
	1.22922	2.8049		9	.10

(9.4)

(3.48)

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	0.95342	2.7756	

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$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

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(One way- ANOVA)

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: -11.4

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3.5500	2.9757	3.7000	
4.0000	4.0901	4.3333	

: -11.4

			:
3.8125	3.2365	3.3750	
3.8889	3.2192	3.5556	
3.3333	2.6366	3.2222	
3.6000	2.9784	3.2000	
3.5455	3.1622	3.3636	
3.6757	3.1855	3.5357	

(Oneway-ANOVA)

: 12.4

	F							
0.247	1.452	0.378	37	13.973	0.548	2	1.097	
0.914	.090	0.416	37	15.403	0.038	2	0.075	
0.489	.728	0.440	37	16.282	0.321	2	0.641	
0.415	.901	0.522	37	19.296	0.470	2	0.940	
0.299	1.247	0.488	37	18.041	0.608	2	1.216	
0.463	.786	0.489	37	18.083	0.384	2	0.768	
0.725	.324	0.479	37	17.738	0.155	2	0.311	
0.373	1.013	0.276	37	10.212	0.279	2	0.559	

(12.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(0.247)

(0.489)

(0.299)

(0.725)

(0.914)

(0.415)

(0.463)

$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

(One way-ANOVA)

:

: 13.4

2.5000	3.0000	3.2208	2.9333	
4.1528	4.5000	4.0648	3.9815	
3.1719	3.1250	3.2969	3.3333	
2.9306	2.8333	3.4028	3.2778	
2.1944	2.0000	2.8657	2.8519	
3.0500	3.1958	2.9500	2.6861	
2.7841	3.7273	3.3409	2.9242	
2.8923	3.1765	3.3411	3.1789	

(Oneway-ANOVA)

: -14.4

	F							
*0.035	3.205	0.330	36	11.893	1.059	3	3.177	
0.781	0.362	0.417	36	15.025	.151	3	0.453	
0.951	0.115	0.466	36	16.763	.053	3	0.160	
0.355	1.117	0.514	36	18.512	.574	3	1.723	
*0.045	2.964	0.429	36	15.442	1.272	3	3.815	
0.114	2.122	0.445	36	16.018	.944	3	2.833	

(Oneway-ANOVA)

: -14.4

	F							
0.098	2.264	0.422	36	15.184	.955	3	2.865	
0.221	1.540	.265	36	9.546	.408	3	1.225	

(14.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(*0.035)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(*0.045)

(16.4) (15.4)

(0.781)

(0.114)

(0.355)

(0.951)

(0.098)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(Scheffe)

(Scheffe) :15.4

(2.50)	(3.00)	(3.22)	(2.93)	
.43333	-.06667-	-.28750-	----	(2.93)
.72083*	.22083	----	----	(3.22)
.50000	----	----	----	(3.00)
----	----	----	----	(2.50)

(Scheffe) (15.4)

.(3.22)

(Scheffe)

:16.4

(2.19)	(2.00)	(2.88)	(2.85)	
.65741	.85185	-.01389-	----	(2.85)
.67130*	.86574	----	----	(2.88)
-.19444-	----	----	----	(2.00)
----	----	----	----	(2.19)

(Scheffe)

(16.4)

.(2.88)

(t-test) ()

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(T-Test) ()

: -17.4

0.072	1.851-	38	2.9000	27	5	
		38	3.2769	13	10 - 5	
0.356	.935	38	4.1564	27	5	
		38	3.9573	13	10 - 5	
0.205	1.289	38	3.3611	27	5	
		38	3.0769	13	10 - 5	
0.629	-.487-	38	3.2222	27	5	
		38	3.3419	13	10 - 5	

:

(T-Test) ()

: -17.4

0.970	-.038-	38	2.6831	27	5	
		38	2.6923	13	10 - 5	
0.888	.141	38	3.0259	27	5	
			2.9923	13	10 - 5	
0.160	- 1.433-	38	3.0808	27	5	
			3.4056	13	10 - 5	
0.804	-.249-	38	3.2042	27	5	

(17.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(0.888) (0.205) (0.072) (0.356)
 (0.970) (0.629)
 (0.160)
 . $\alpha \leq 0.05$

(10-5) (5)

(One way-ANOVA)

:18.4

45-36	35-25	25	
3.6000	3.0278	2.3500	
4.3889	4.1142	3.3889	
3.8125	3.2674	2.7500	
3.7222	3.2809	2.4444	
3.1111	2.7191	1.6667	
3.2000	3.0722	1.8000	
2.9091	3.2854	1.6818	
3.5348	3.2524	2.2974	

(Oneway-ANOVA)

: 19.4

	F							
0.130	2.155	0.365	37	13.497	0.786	2	1.573	
0.230	1.531	0.386	37	14.296	0.591	2	1.183	
0.279	1.323	0.427	37	15.794	0.565	2	1.130	
0.183	1.777	0.499	37	18.463	0.887	2	1.773	
0.078	3.139	0.53	37	16.777	1.240	2	2.479	
*0.034	3.696	0.425	37	15.712	1.569	2	3.139	
*0.002	7.155	0.352	37	13.015	2.517	2	5.034	
*0.025	4.060	0.239	37	8.833	.969	2	1.938	

(19.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(*0.034)

(0.025*)

(*0.002)

(21.4) (20.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(22.4)

(0.130)

(0.279)

(0.230)

(0.078)

(0.183)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(Scheffe)

(Scheffe)

:20.4

45-36 (3.20)	35-25 (3.07)	25 (1.80)	
-1.40000-	-1.27222-*	----	(1.80) 25
-.12778-	----	----	(3.07) 35-25
----	----	----	(3.20) 45-36

(Scheffe) (20.4)

(35-25) (25)
. (3.07)

(35-25)

(Scheffe) :21.4

45-36 (2.90)	35-25 (3.28)	25 (1.68)	
-1.22727-	-1.60354-*	----	(1.68) 25
.37626	----	----	(3.28) 35-25
----	----	----	(2.90) 45-36

(Scheffe) (21.4)

(35-25) (25)
. (3.28)

(35-25)

(Scheffe) :22.4

45-36 (3.53)	35-25 (3.25)	25 (2.29)	
-1.23743-	-.95501-*	----	(2.29) 25
-.28241-	----	----	(3.25) 35-25
----	----	----	(3.53) 45-36

(Scheffe) (22.4)

(35-25) (25)

. (3.25)

(35-25)

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(One way- ANOVA)

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:23.4

3.2250	2.5000	3.3667	2.9167	2.6889	3.0429	3.3000	
3.9444	4.2222	4.4259	4.0185	3.9630	3.8413	4.3704	
3.0625	3.1875	3.6875	3.2917	3.0000	3.0893	3.6042	
3.5000	3.1667	3.6667	3.2037	2.8025	3.0952	3.6667	
2.6389	3.0000	2.9815	2.5741	2.4321	2.5873	2.9259	
3.0250	3.4500	3.3833	2.9833	2.5000	3.0000	3.3167	
3.5682	3.3182	3.1970	2.9394	2.9697	3.3766	3.2273	
3.2806	3.2635	3.5298	3.1325	2.9080	3.1475	3.4873	

(24.4)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

	F							
0.267	1.341	0.367	33	12.115	0.492	6	2.955	
0.607	0.759	0.412	33	13.601	0.313	6	1.877	
0.391	1.085	0.428	33	14.134	0.465	6	2.789	
0.210	1.495	0.482	33	15.910	0.721	6	4.325	
0.754	0.567	0.529	33	17.458	0.300	6	1.799	
0.195	1.545	0.446	33	14.718	0.689	6	4.134	
0.758	0.561	0.496	33	16.378	0.278	6	1.670	
0.312	1.240	0.266	33	8.789	0.330	6	1.982	

(0.267)
(0.391) (0.607)
(0.754) (0.210)
(0.758) (0.195)
($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

:25.4

	Pearson Correlation	
-.138-		
.395		
40		

**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

(25.4)

0.395

0.138



1.5

2.5


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35-25)

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					()	.32
						.33
						.34
						.35
						.36
						.37
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					()	.40
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						.42
						.43
						.44
						.45
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					()	.50
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					()	.68
						.69
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Reliability**Scale: ALL VARIABLES**

Case Processing Summary			
		N	%
Cases	Valid	40	100.0
	Excluded ^a	0	.0
	Total	40	100.0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.			

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.953	87

111	1.3
117	2.3
119	3.3

20	1.2
62	1.3
63	2.3
63	3.3
63	3.3
64	5.3
		1.4
70	
		2.4
71	
		3.4
73	..	
		4.4
75	
		5.4
77	
		6.4
78	
		7.4
80	
		8.4
83	
		9.4
85	...	

		10.4
86	
		11.4
86	
	(Oneway-ANOVA)	12.4
87	
		13.4
87	
	(Oneway-ANOVA)	14.4
89	
	(Scheffe)	15.4
91	
	(Scheffe)	16.4
92	
	(T-Test) ()	17.4
92	
		18.4
94	
	(Oneway-ANOVA)	19.4
95	
	(Scheffe)	20.4
96	
	(Scheffe)	21.4
97	
	(Scheffe)	22.4
97	
98		23.4

	
	(Oneway-ANOVA)	24.4
99	
		25.4
100	

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1 /	
1	1.1
3	2.1
4	3.1
41.3.1
42.3.1
53.3.1
5	4.1
6	5.1
61.5.1
62.5.1
7	6.1
8	7.1
81.7.1
82.7.1
8	8.1
8	9.1
9	10.1

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10	1.2
102.2
111.2.2
132.2.2
133.2.2
144.2.2
155.2.2
166.2.2
177.2.2
188.2.2
199.2.2
1910.2.2
2011.2.2
2112.2.2
2213.2.2
2314.2.2
2415.2.2
2616.2.2
2717.2.2
27 :	.1.17.2.2
28 :	.2.17.2.2
28 :	.3.17.2.2
30 :	.4.17.2.2
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30(
3218.2.2

3419.2.2
3420.2.2
3521.2.2
351.21.2.2
362.21.2.2
373.21.2.2
384.21.2.2
395.21.2.2
406.21.2.2
417.21.2.2
418.21.2.2
429.21.2.2
4322.2.2
441.22.2.2
442.22.2.2
443.22.2.2
454.22.2.2
455.22.2.2
456.22.2.2
467.22.2.2
468.22.2.2
463.2
47	:	.1.3.2
56	:	.2.3.3
583.3.2
584.3.2
59		5.3.2

60	/	
60		1.3
60		2.3
61		3.3
61		4.3
63		5.3
641.5.3
652.5.3
66		6.3
65		7.3
661.7.3
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67		8.3
68	/	
68		1.4
681.1.4
852.1.4
100	/	
100		1.5
100		2.5
102		3.5
104		4.5

105
119
121
123