

-

2009 - 1430

:

-

-

. :

-

-

-

-

-



:
20510117 :

. :

2009/05/18 :

:

.....:	. :	1
.....:	. :	2
.....:	. :	3

-

.

.....:

2009 / / :

.(2007).

()

.(2006)

.(1996)

.(1994)

)

.(2007) .

(

) .

.(2006

.(2006) .

.(2006) .

.(2006).

(2006) .

:

.(1997) .

:

.(2007)

:

.(2007) .

:

.(2007)

:

.(2007) .

.2008

68

:

,

.

.

,

,

.

:

,

,

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

The role of financial and moral incentives in increasing qualifications of the employers at the banks in Bethlehem Governorate

Abstract

The current study aimed to recognize the role of financial and moral incentives in increasing qualifications of the employers at Bank in Bethlehem governorate. We adopt all the employer in Bethlehem's governorate Banks as the community of the study.

The study uses the sampling for all the Bank's employers in 9 Banks at Bethlehem governorate. The study included the Banks general, managers, sections chiefs, republic relationships worker, teller and the facilities sections workers.

The researcher created questioner as the study evidence. This questioner included 7 sections; the first one includes the comprehensive information related to the workers and the other 6 sections included 68 statements which came under 6 parts: First, the financial incentives offered from the Banks to the employer. Second, the role of the financial incentives in increasing the worker's qualifications. Third, the moral incentives offered from the Banks to the employer. Fourth, the role of the moral incentives in increasing the worker's qualifications. Fifth, the standards on which these incentives are given. Sixth, to evaluate the performance and the qualifications. We used the descriptive method for this studies which very suitable for such studies.

The results of the study showed that the workers of the Banks have a great deal of views for the role of moral and financial incentives in increasing their efficiency at work, the sample of the study was completely agree that these incentives increase their ability to work.

The study shows that the Bank administrations take care and are interested in offering financial incentives more than the moral ones. The answers of the employers were that they receive financial incentives more than moral ones. The study also shows the standards on upon which these incentives are given, which came as follows: Nepotism, doing hard works, achievements, new ideas, the relationship with chiefs, commitment, the experience and lastly the qualifications.

The study shows that there are no big statistical differences for the workers in their view to the role of the financial incentives in increasing their ability to work. The role of the financial incentives aren't affected by the employer's gender, martial status, the place where they live, the age, the scientific degree, the job title and the salary.

The study shows that there are no big statistical differences for the employers in their view to the role of the moral incentives in increasing their ability to work. The role of the financial incentives aren't affected by the employer's gender, martial status, the place where they live, the age, the scientific degree, the job title and the salary.

According to the results of the study, the researchers conclude some Recommendations: It is important to take the employer's points of view about the incentives systems for the Banks into consideration. The Bank's administrations must take into considerations the social and economical changes. Also, the salaries system must fit up well with these

changes. There is also a necessity to take into considerations the way on which the moral and financial incentive are given, and if these incentives are adequate to the employer's efforts. Also, the subjective ness in evaluating and giving these incentives and to avoid favoritism. The incentives, also, must be given in its time without delaying. Finally, there must be educational programs for all Banks' managers about the importance of the incentives and how to use it positively.



1.1

2.1

:

3.1

4.1

•
•
•

•
•

5.1

:

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

:

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha =0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

$\alpha=0.05$

•

6.1

:

•

•

•

•

•

•

7.1

2008\2007

8.1

77

118

:

•

•



1.2

: .1.1.2

.(2005) .

()

.(2007) .

: **.2.1.2**

:

-
-
-
-

.(2005) .

:

: : •

. : : •

. : : •

). .

.(1995

:

•

•

•

•

•

:

•

•

•

.(2005).

(motivation)

.(2003) .(move)

2.2

:

:

.1.2.2

:

Material Incentives

•

.(2007) .

:

:

:

○

:

■

()

()

.

:

■

: ■

: ■

: ■

: ■

(2006).

: : ○

: ■

: ■

: ■

: ■

: ■

: ■

.(2006)

Non Materail Incentives

.(2007)

.2.2.2

)

).(

.(2006

.3.2.2

(2006)

:

.4.2.2

:

Positive Incentives

(2007)

:

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

○

(2007)

○

.(2007).

Negative Incentives

●

.(2007)

:

:

○

.

○

.

○

.

○

.(2007) .

○

.(2007).

3.2

:

:

●

• :

• :
• :

•) (2007.

4.2

•

•

•

•
•
• (2004)

5.2

:

•

•

•

•

6.2

•

•

•

-
-
-
-
-

.(2004)

.(2000)

7.2

:

.()

-
-
-
-

.(2006) .

:

:

1.8.2

(2000))
(2003) .

(2005))



:1.2

(1.2)

(2000) .

:

:

•

).

.(2003

.(2003) .

.(2003) .

.2.8.2

:

:

:

:

•

.(2003) .

:

:

•

:

:

○

()

)

.(

: ○

()

: : ●

.(2003 ,) .

.(2003) .

.(2007) .

: **.3.8.2**

' .
' .
:

:() **.1.3.8.2**

.
:
:(x) •

:(y) •

:

).

.(2000

:()

.2.3.8.2

.(2000) .

.(2007) .

:

.3.3.8.2

:


-
-
-
-

(2.2)

:

-
-
-
-
-

(2000).



:2.2

'

:

•

'

'

.

'

.

•

•

.(2003 ,) .

:(/)

.4.3.8.2

.

•

.

•

.(2000) .

.

:

:

•

.

○

.

○

.

○

.

○

.

○

.(2003).

:

•

○

.

○

.

○

.

○

○

.(2003)

:() **.5.3.8.2**

:

-
-
-
-

.(2000).

:(A.R.G)

.6.3.8.2

.(1995)

()

:

•

•

•

•

•

.(2004)

:()

.7.3.8.2

:

-
-
-

.(2003,) .

: **.8.3.8.2**

.(1995) .

)

(

.(2003) .

: **.9.3.8.2**

:

.

:

.

.

.(2003) .

: **.10.3.8.2**

:

.

•

•

.

(2003).

•

: **.11.3.8.2**

: **9.2**

•

•

•

.(2005)

10.2

:

: **.1.10.2**

.(1997).

: **.2.10.2**

:

-
-
-
-
-
-

.(2003).

:

.3.10.2

:

-
-
-
-
-
-
-

.(2003).

: **.4.10.2**

:

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

:)
.(

.(2003).

: **.5.10.2**

:

•

•

•

•

•

•

:

•

•

•

•

.(2003)

•

:

.6.10.2

:

•

•

•

•

.(2003)

:

.7.10.2

•

:

○

○

:

■

■

■

■

■

■

:

•

:

:

○

○

○

-
-
-
-
-
-

.(2003).

: **.8.10.2**

:

●

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

●

:

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

○

:

●

:

-
-
-
-

.(1997).

:

.9.10.2

:

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

.(2005).

11.2

:

:(2005) .1.11.2

2005

:

-
-
-
-

:

:(2000) .2.11.2

:

.

.



1.3

2.3

()

)

(

3.3

, 3

4

5

T) : 0.05= α
 (one way anova) (test
 .(SPSS) (Cronbach alpha)

4.3

(118)
 (9)
 : . (4) (77)

: **5.3**

(-1.3 -1.3)

: -1.3

%68.5	50			1
%31.5	23			
%100	73			
%38.4	28	/		2
%61.6	45	/		
%100	73			
%72.6	53			3
%20.5	15			
%6.8	5			
%100	73			

:

: -1.3

%42.5	31	30-20	4
%57.5	42	50-31	
%0	0	51	
%100	73		
%12.3	9		5
%12.3	9		
%67.1	49		
%8.2	6		
%100	73		
%42.5	31		6
%18.8	13	9-5	
%39.7	29	10	
%100	73		
%27.4	20	()	7
%58.9	43	()	
%13.7	10		
%100	73		
%32.9	24	(2500)	8
%58.9	43	(5000-2501)	
%8.2	6	(5001)	
%100	73		

6.3

.(2.3) (Pearson Correlation)

(Pearson Correlation)

:2.3

	()			()	
0.000	0.26*	26	0.000	0.53*	1
0.000	0.17*	27	0.000	0.51*	2
0.000	0.01*	28	0.000	0.29*	3
0.000	0.01*	29	0.000	0.47*	4
0.000	0.01*	30	0.000	0.39*	5
0.000	0.06*	31	0.000	0.54*	6
0.000	0.16*	32	0.000	0.07*	7
0.000	0.14*	33	0.000	0.20*	8
0.000	0.16*	34	0.000	0.25*	9
0.000	0.13*	35	0.000	0.22*	10
0.000	0.026*	36	0.000	0.17*	11
0.000	0.10*	37	0.000	0.08*	12
0.000	0.19*	38	0.000	0.10*	13
0.000	0.157*	39	0.000	0.07*	14
0.000	0.15*	40	0.000	0.09*	15
0.001	0.16*	41	0.000	0.22*	16
0.000	0.24*	42	0.000	0.11*	17
0.000	0.29*	43	0.000	0.06*	18
0.000	0.37*	44	0.000	0.14*	19
0.000	0.17*	45	0.000	0.09*	20
0.000	0.20*	46	0.000	0.03*	21
0.000	0.29*	47	0.000	0.02*	22
0.000	0.20*	48	0.000	0.14*	23
0.000	0.20*	49	0.000	0.02*	24
0.000	0.52*	50	0.000	0.17*	25

(2.3)

7.3

.(3.3)

(Cronbach Alpha)

(Cronbach Alpha)

:3.3

0.871		1
0.881		2
0.934		3
0.942		4
0.933		5
0.938		

.0.938

8.3

:

: **.1.8.3**

:

.() : •
 .() : •
 .() : •
 .(51 50-31 30 -20) : •
) : •

9-5

) : •
 .(: •

.() (1
 .() (2
 . (3

: : •

(2500) (1
 (5000-2501) (2
 (5001) (3

: **.2.8.3**

:

•
 •



1.4

(1.4)

:

:1.4

2.49-1	
3.49-2.5	
5-3.5	

:

.1.1.4

"

.(2.4)

:2.4

	.88235	3.7379	1	
	.99561	3.6986	2	
	.99561	3.6986	2	
	1.05895	3.3562	3	
	1.21194	3.3151	4	
	1.08347	3.2740	5	
	1.09725	3.1781	6	
	1.48291	3.0959	7	
	1.37187	2.9178	8	
	1.29805	2.8082	9	
	1.14244	2.4384	10	
	1.17657	2.4110	11	
	.74695	3.1610		

(3.1610)

(0.74695)

(3) (2.4)

(7)

(3.7379)

"

(3.6986)

"

"

"

(3.6986)

"

"

"

(3.3562)

"

"

(3.3151)

"

"

(2.8082)

"

.(2.4110)

"

"

(2.4384)

:

.2.1.4

"

.(3.4)

:3.4

	.75424	4.2877	1	
	.67207	4.2740	2	
	.64076	4.2466	3	
	.85830	4.2329	4	
	.68051	4.1507	5	
	.76947	4.1370	6	
	.74075	4.0822	7	
	.76326	4.0274	8	
	.83242	3.8767	9	
	.84445	3.8493	10	
	.68023	3.8082	11	
	.78635	3.7260	12	
	.85586	3.6438	13	
	.49551	4.2118		

	(4.2118)			(49551.0)
	(3.4)		.	
		"	"	
(4.2740)	"	"	"	(4.2877)
"	(4.2466)	"	"	
"	(4.2329)	"	"	
"		(4.1507)	"	
"	"	(3.7260)	"	
			(3.6438)	
		:		.3.1.4
			"	
	(4.4)			
	(3.1610)		(4.4)	
				(0.74695)
			.	
(12)				
"	(3.6027)	"	"	
"		(3.4658)	"	"
"	"	(3.3973)	"	
"	"		(3.3425)	
"	"		(3.3425)	

(3.1096)

"

"

(3.1096)

.(3.0959)

"

"

:4.4

	.86184	3.6027	1	
	.85118	3.4658	2	
	.82898	3.3973	3	
	.86953	3.3425	4	
	1.00304	3.3425	4	
	1.06558	3.3151	5	
	.86405	3.3151	5	
	1.03091	3.2740	6	
	.93957	3.2466	7	
	.96869	3.2466	7	
	1.04830	3.1096	8	
	.99389	3.1096	8	
	1.12007	3.0959	9	
	.71753	3.2972		

:

.4.1.4

"

.(5,4)

:5.4

	.72175	4.0822	1	
	.74075	4.0822	1	
	.75348	4.0411	2	
	.72439	3.9452	3	
	.76972	3.9315	4	
	63089.0	3.9315	4	
	.76675	3.9041	5	
	.84264	3.8904	6	
	73118.0	3.7808	7	
	0 .73637	3.7671	8	
	.86074	3.7493	9	
	.93185	3.7260	10	
	.75424	3.7123	11	
	59091.0	3.8957		

(3.8957)

(5.4)

(0.59091)

(5.4)

(4.0822)

"

"

(4.0822)

"

"

"

(4.0411)

"

"

"

"

(3.9452)

"

" " (3.9315)
 (3.7260) " " (3.7123)

: .5.1.4

"

.(6.4)

:6.4

	.97163	3.4384	1	
	.98640	3.2603	2	
	1.00720	3.2329	3	
	1.02685	3.2055	4	
	1.12228	3.1781	5	
	1.06290	3.1507	6	
	.97651	3.0685	7	
	.97026	3.0548	8	
	1.03331	2.9589	9	
	.82278	3.1720		

(3.1720)

(.82278)

(6.4)

"

"

(3.4384)

"

"

(3.2603)

"

"

"

(3.2329)

"

"

"

(3.2055)

"

(3.1781)

"

(3.0548)

"

(2.9589)

"

:

.6.1.4

"

(7.4)

:7.4

5.6164	1	
5.4110	2	
4.6712	3	
4.5342	4	
4.3699	5	
3.9452	6	
3.2132	7	
2.9726	8	

" " (7.4)
 (5.4110) " " (5.6164)
 " " (4.6712) " "
 " " (4.5342)
 (3.9452) " " (4.3699)
 " " (3.2132) " "
 (2.9726)

: **2.4**

: **.1.2.4**

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(t-test) :8.4

	"t"				
0.125	1.552	0.41312	4.0862	50	
		0.61652	3.8963	23	

α) (0.125) (1.552) " " (8.4)

$(0.05 \geq$

:

.2.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(t-test)

:9.4

	"t"				
0.564	0.580	0.53349	4.0687	28	
		0.46531	4.0000	45	

α)

(0.564)

(0.580) " "

(9.4)

$(0.05 \geq$

:

.3.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(10.4)

(11.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:10.4

0.53772	4.0015	53	
0.23344	3.9949	15	
0.44853	4.3846	5	
0.49008	4.0263	73	

:11.4

	" "				
0.241	1.453	0.345	2	0.689	
		0.237	70	16.603	
			72	17.293	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.241)

(1.453)

:

.4.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(t-test) :12.4

	"t"				
0.723	0.355	0.53015	4.0025	31	30-20
		0.46408	4.0440	42	50-31

(0.723) (0.355) " " (12.4) (0.05 ≥ α)

: .5.2.4

≥ α) " (0.05

:13.4

0.57435	3.9231	9	
0.57435	3.9487	9	
0.46632	4.0220	49	
0.41472	4.3333	6	
0.49008	4.0263	73	

(13.4)

.(14.4) (one way ANOVA)

:14.4

	" "				
0.401	0.994	0.239	3	0.717	
		0.240	69	16.576	
			72	17.293	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.401)

(0.994)

:

.6.2.4

$\geq \alpha)$

"

(0.05

:15.4

0.47412	4.1191	31	5
0.48345	3.9231	13	9-5
0.50912	3.9735	29	10
0.49008	4.0263	73	

(15.4)

.(16.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:16.4

	" "				
0.368	1.013	0.243	2	0.486	
		0.240	70	16.806	
			72	17.293	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.368)

(1.013)

:

.7.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

"

:17.4

0.37569	4.0615	20	()
0.50256	4.0376	43	()
0.65251	3.9077	10	
0.49008	4.0263	73	

(17.4)

(18.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:18.4

	" "				
0.706	0.350	0.085	2	0.171	
		0.245	70	17.122	
			72	17.293	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.706)

(0.350)

:

.8.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

:19.4

0.56584	4.1346	24	(2500)
0.44551	3.9284	43	(5000-2501)
0.30544	4.2949	6	(5001)
0.49008	4.0263	73	

(19.4)

(20.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:20.4

	" "				
0.095	2.438	0.563	2	1.126	
		0.231	70	16.166	
			72	17.293	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.095)

(2.438)

:

.9.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(0.096)

(1.688) " "

(21.4)

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(t-test)

:21.4

	"t"				
0.096	1.688	0.42236	3.9738	50	
		0.83747	3.7258	23	

:

.10.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(t-test)

:22.4

	"t"				
0.757	0.311	0.71182	3.9231	28	
		0.50959	3.8786	45	

(0.757)

(0.311) " "

(22.4)

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

:

.11.2.4

$\geq \alpha)$

(0.05

:23.4

0.62954	3.8505	53	
0.33175	3.8615	15	
0.54229	4.4769	5	
0.59091	3.8957	73	

(23.4)

.(24.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:24.4

	" "				
0.073	2.723	0.907	2	1.815	
		0.333	70	23.326	
			72	25.140	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.073)

(2.723)

:

.12.2.4

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

()

(t-test) :25.4

	"t"				
0.880	0.152	0.64721	3.8834	31	30-20
		0.55361	3.9048	42	50-31

(0.880) (0.152) " " (25.4)

($0.05 \geq \alpha$)

(25.4)

: **.13.2.4**

$\geq \alpha$)

(0.05

:26.4

0.35040	3.8974	9	
0.90073	3.7778	9	
0.55091	3.8571	49	
0.54175	4.3846	6	
0.59091	3.8957	73	

(26.4)

.(27.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:27.4

	" "				
0.198	1.597	0.544	3	1.632	
		0.341	69	23.508	
			72	25.140	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.198)

(1.597)

:

.14.2.4

$\geq \alpha)$

(0.05

.(28.4)

:28.4

0.50024	3.9926	31	5
0.80809	3.7515	13	9-5
0.57296	3.8568	29	10
0.59091	3.8957	73	

:29.4

	" "				
0.426	0.863	0.303	2	0.605	
		0.351	70	24.535	
			72	25.140	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.426)

(0.863)

:

.15.2.4

$\geq \alpha$)

(0.05

:30.4

0.42754	4.0038	20	()
0.69957	3.8193	43	()
0.23626	4.0077	10	
0.59091	3.8957	73	

(30.4)

.(31.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:31.4

	" "				
0.423	0.871	0.305	2	0.610	
		0.350	70	24.530	
			72	25.140	

$\geq \alpha$ (0.423) (0.871) (0.05)

: **.16.2.4**

$\geq \alpha$ (0.05)

:32.4

0.51874	4.0929	24	(2500)
0.60661	3.7728	43	(5000-2501)
0.61040	3.9872	6	(5001)
0.59091	3.8957	73	

(32.4)

.(33.4)

(one way ANOVA)

:33.4

	" "				
0.095	2.432	0.817	2	1.633	
		0.336	70	23.507	
			72	25.140	

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

(0.095)

(2.432)

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

•

.

.

•

•

:

.

•

•

2.5

:

•

•

•

•

•

•

3.5

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

,

.

.

•

•

() : (2004). •

:(2002). •

() : (2003) . . •

() : (2004) . . •

:(2006). •

:(2006) . , •

:(2000). •

:(2007). •

:(2007). •

:(2001). , •

:(2000). •

() : (1994). •

:(1997). •

:(1997). •

:(2003). •

:(2007). •

- (2007).
- (2000).
- (1996).
- (2006).
- (2007).
- (2007).
- (2007).
- (1995).
- (2007).
- (2003).
- (2006).
- (2000).
- (2005).
- (2005).

:1.3

/		1
/		2
		3
		4
		5
/		6
		7
		8
/		9
/		10
/		11
/		12
/		13



. :

. (/)

/ - /

.

:3.3

:

.

.

	:	
	/	/
	(2	(1
/ (4	/ (3	/ (2
	(3	(2
	51 (3	50-31 (2
	(4	(3
	(3	(2
	(4	(3
	9-5 (2	(1
	10 (3	
	(2500)	(1
	(5000-2501)	(2
	(5001)	(3

/					x
					.1
					.2
					.3
					.4
					.5
					.6
					.7
					.8
					.9
					.10
					.11
					.12

/

x

)	
					: (
						.13
						.14
						.15
						.16
						.17
						.18
						.19
						.20
						.21
						.22
						.23
						.24
						.25

/

x

						.26
						.27
						.28
						.29
						.30
						.31
						.32
						.33
						.34
						.35

						.36
						.37
						.38

/ x

)	
					:	(
						.39
						.40
						.41
						.42
						.43
						.44
						.45
						.46
						.47
						.48
						.49
						.50
						.51

8) 1 / (8- 1 /) / (

(8-1)	()	
			.52
			.53
			.54
			.55

		.56
		.57
		.58
		.59

. / x

					()	
					-:	
						.60
						.61
						.62
						.63
						.64
						.65
						.66
						.67
						.68

77	1.3
78	2.3
79	3.3

18	1.2
24	2.2

43	-1.3
44	-1.3
45		2.3
	
46		3.3
	
48	1.4
49		2.4
	
50		3.4
	
52		4.4
	..	
53		5.4
	
54		6.4
	
55		7.4
	
56		8.4
		(t-test)
	
57		9.4
		(t-test)

58	10.4
58	11.4
59 ()	12.4
59	13.4
60 (One Way ANOVA)	14.4
60	15.4
61 (One Way ANOVA)	16.4
61	17.4
62 (One Way ANOVA)	18.4
62	19.4

63 (One Way ANOVA)	20.4
64 (t-test)	21.4
64 (t-test)	22.4
65	23.4
65 (One Way ANOVA)	24.4
66 (One Way ANOVA)	25.4
66	26.4
67 (One Way ANOVA)	27.4
67	28.4
68 (One Way ANOVA)	29.4

68	30.4
69 (One Way ANOVA)	31.4
69	32.4
70 (One Way ANOVA)	33.4
	

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

1	:	
1		1.1
2		2.1
2		3.1
2		4.1
3		5.1
4		6.1
5		7.1
5		8.1
6	:	
6		1.2
6		1.1.2
7		2.1.2
10		2.2

10	1.2.2
12	2.2.2
123.2.2
134.2.2
14	3.2
15	4.2
16	5.2
16	6.2
17	7.2
18	..	8.2
18	1.8.2
20	2.8.2
21	3.8.2
22()	.1.3.8.3
23()	.2.3.8.3
233.3.8.3
25)	.4.3.8.3
(/	
27()	.5.3.8.3
28(A.R.G)	.6.3.8.3
28)	.7.3.8.3
(
298.3.8.3
309.3.8.3
3010.3.8.3
3111.3.8.3
31	9.2
32	10.2
32	1.10.2
32	2.10.2

32	..	3.10.2
33	4.10.2
33	5.10.2
34		6.10.2
	
35	7.10.2
36	8.10.2
38	9.10.2
38	11.2
38(2005)	.1.11.2
39(2000)	.2.11.2
40(2006)	.3.11.2
40(2001)	.4.11.2
42	:
42	1.3
42	2.3
42	3.3
43	4.3
43	5.3
44	6.3
46	7.3
46	8.3
47	1.8.3
47	2.8.3

48	:	
		1.4
48		1.1.4
50		2.1.4
51		3.1.4
52		4.1.4
54		5.1.4
55		6.1.4
56		2.4
56			1.2.4
		
57			2.2.4
		
57			3.2.4
		
58			4.2.4
		
59			5.2.4
		
60			6.2.4
		
61			7.2.4
		
62			8.2.4
		
63			9.2.4
		
64			10.2.4
		

64		11.2.4
65	12.2.4
66	13.2.4
67	14.2.4
68	15.2.4
69	16.2.4
71		:
71	1.5
72	2.5
73	3.5
75	
84	
85	
86	
90	