

**Deanship of Graduate Studies
Al Quds University
American Studies Program**



**THE U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A CASE STUDY OF
THE CAMP DAVID SUMMITS OF 1979 AND 2000**

Khader Abd-El-Latif Mohammed Abu Alia

M.A. Thesis

**Jerusalem-Palestine
1431/2010**

**THE U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A CASE STUDY OF
THE CAMP DAVID SUMMITS OF 1979 AND 2000**

**Prepared By:
Khader Abd-El-Latif Mohammed Abu Alia**

**Supervised By:
Professor Mohammad S. Dajani**

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (American Studies program)

1431/2010

Al Quds University
Deanship of Graduate Studies
American Studies Program

Thesis Approval

THE U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A CASE STUDY OF
THE CAMP DAVID SUMMITS OF 1979 AND 2000

Author: Khader Abd-El-Latif Mohammed Abu Alia
Registration No: 20710002

Supervisor: Professor Mohammad S. Dajani

Master thesis discussed and accepted on 03/22/2010

The names and signatures of the examining committee are as follows:

Head of Committee: Professor Mohammad S. Dajani Signature:.....

Internal Examiner: Professor Munther S. Dajani Signature:.....

External Examiner: Dr. Daniel Moses Signature:.....

Jerusalem-Palestine
1431/2010

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the soul of my father who encouraged me to pursue higher learning and gave me lessons in how to be a tenacious person. I owe to him every success in my life.

God have mercy on his soul and may he rest in peace.

Khader Abd-El-Latif Mohammed Abu Alia

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts from the American Studies Program at Al Quds University is the result of my own research, except where otherwise acknowledged. I also certify that this particular topic, as far as I know, has not been submitted to any other university or any academic institution.

Signature:.....

Name: Khader Abd-El-Latif Mohammed Abu Alia

Date: 03/22/2010

Acknowledgments

To express my most sincere gratitude and thanks to Professor Mohammad S. Dajani only for his inspiring guidance would be unfair. My intellectual debt to him is greater. In 2005, I was fortunate to meet Professor Dajani in U.S.A. when he was working as a consultant for the Seeds of Peace organization. I attended his famous presentation (Big Dreams Small Hopes) at that time. Since then I have been learning from him the appropriate rhetoric and style for presenting the Palestinian case to the rest of the world. I learned the concept of “Conflict Resolution” from him in 2006 when I was working on my second master in Social Sciences and Humanitarian affairs. I have been fortunate to be with him in different international conferences where I have learnt profoundly about the factors behind the American role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I wish to express my appreciation to the Supervising Committee chaired by Professor Mohammad S. Dajani, Dr. Daniel N. Moses, and Professor Munther Dajani. I sincerely thank Dr. Abdul Rahman for his assistance and guidance in the preparation of this study. I also wish to thank Dr. Amneh Badran and Mathew Markman, for their useful editorial suggestions and comments.

Nevertheless, the opinions expressed in this thesis are my own and not the views of my supervisors or Al Quds University. I am responsible for the ideas, arguments, criticism, and for any mistakes that may appear due to the passage of time and the publication of memoirs may be revealed.

Abstract

This thesis is a comparative case study of Camp David (1979) and Camp David (2000), with a focus on the U.S. role as the main broker between Israel and Arabs. The study aims to understand what actually went wrong in the Camp David Summit of 2000, and it reveals the real factors behind such failure. It explains the reasons behind the different outcome of both summits, even though both were held under the patronage of the U.S. as the main mediator.

The objective of this research is to examine how the Palestinians can build a better relationship with the U.S. and how they can learn more about how the United States works, in order to influence U.S. policy, so that it takes better account of the Palestinian perspective and Palestinian needs. Such a change in U.S. policy is necessary for Palestinians to gain trust in the United States as a mediator in the conflict and perhaps, at a later stage, as an arbiter, too.

This study briefly discusses the main interest groups in the United States and their role in the creation of American policies that support Israel at the cost of the Palestinians. The study analyzes the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship in comparison with the U.S.-Palestinian relationship. It also discusses the use of U.S. foreign financial aid policy as an instrument in resolving conflicts, and it discusses mediation as a commonly used approach in conflict resolution.

The role of mediation has rapidly developed over the last four decades and has become a tool of increasing importance to resolve conflicts. The study analyzes the role of mediation in resolving disputes and explores whether mediation is sufficient for resolving complicated and very controversial cases, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Resolving such a conflict perhaps needs to shift at a later stage from mediation to arbitration. Palestinians and Israelis need outside help to overcome the conflict between them. The United States has the most potential as the mediator and as an arbiter. The study concludes that the U.S. has not acted as a professional and fair mediator, which has caused the Palestinians to feel that there is an absence of neutrality practiced by the U.S. Therefore, the chances of succeeding in brokering a final, just, and comprehensive peace agreement are very slim. The conclusion recommends

that Palestinians need to alter their approach to the United States in order to strengthen and improve relations; and ultimately moderate the role of the U.S. as a mediator in order to reach a just and permanent solution to the conflict with Israel.

Table of Contents

Declaration.....	i
Acknowledgments.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	v
Acronyms.....	viii
List of Personalities.....	ix
Definition of Terms.....	xi
Chapter One.....	1
Study's Background.....	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Research Objectives.....	3
1.3 Research Significance.....	4
1.4 Research Problem.....	4
1.5 Research Hypotheses.....	5
1.6 Research Methodology.....	6
1.7 Research Boundary.....	6
1.8 Research Limitations.....	7
1.9 Research Outline.....	7
1.9.1 Chapter Two:.....	7
1.9.2 Chapter Three:.....	8
1.9.3 Chapter Four:.....	8
1.9.4 Chapter Five:.....	9
1.9.5 Chapter Six:.....	9
1.9.6 Chapter Seven:.....	9
Chapter Two.....	10
Literature Review.....	10
2.1 Theoretical Framework.....	10
2.1.1. Violent vs. Peaceful Approaches of Conflict Resolution:.....	11
2.1.2. The Concept of Mediation:.....	12

2.1.3. Third Party:	15
2.2. Peaceful Approaches to Conflict Resolution	16
2.2.1. Definition and History of Mediation:	18
2.2.2. Mediator’s Competence:	20
2.2.3. Behavior and Style:	24
2.2.4. Successful Model (Qatar vs. Bahrain):.....	25
2.3 Literature Review.....	26
Chapter Three	30
U.S. Role in the Middle East	30
3.1 Introduction	30
3.2 History of American Diplomacy.....	31
3.3 U.S. Mediation between Israel and the Arabs.....	32
3.4 U.S. National interest in the Region	35
3.5 Foreign Assistance: Incentives and pressures	44
3.6 Analysis	48
Chapter Four	53
Case Study 1: Camp David Summit (1979).....	53
4.1 Introduction	53
4.2. Rogers Plan.....	53
4.3. October War (Yom Kippur War)	56
4.4 Kilometer 101 Agreement (1973).....	57
4.5 Geneva Convention.....	58
4.6 Disengagement and Separation of Forces (Sinai Agreement)	59
4.7 Step-by-Step Approach (Kissinger).....	60
4.8 Sadat Peace Initiative (NO More War).....	62
4.9 Official Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty	63
4.10 Conclusion.....	67
Chapter Five.....	68
Case Study 2: Camp David 2000.....	68
5.1 Introduction	68
5.2 1982 Lebanon war.....	69

5.3 Declaration of Independence Conference (Algiers Declaration) 1988.....	70
5.4 Gulf War (1990-1991)	71
5.5 Madrid Peace Conference 1991	73
5.6 Oslo Accords 1993.....	74
5.7 Wye River Memorandum of 1998	77
5.8. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999.....	79
5.9 Negotiations at Camp David (July 11-25, 2000)	80
Chapter Six.....	86
Analysis and Conclusions	86
6.1 Introduction	86
6.2 Analysis	86
Chapter Seven.....	98
The Study Analysis	98
7.1 Introduction	98
7.2 Concluding Remarks.....	100
7.3 Recommendations.....	103
Bibliography	106
I- Books:	106
II- Articles and Papers	109
III- Internet	109
IV- Reports	111
Arabic References.....	111
Appendix.....	113

Acronyms

AAI	Arab American Institute
AAADC	American-Arab Anti Discrimination Committee
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP	Declaration of Principles
ICJ	International Court of Justice
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NAAA	National Association of Arab Americans
PASSIA	Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PFLP	Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

List of Personalities

Abbas, Mahmoud: Born in Safad on March 26, 1935. He is the current President of the Palestinian National Authority. He was the general secretary of the executive committee of PLO when the Oslo Accords were signed. He was the first Palestinian Prime Minister in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and he is known as the mastermind of the first Israeli-Palestinian peaceful negotiations. (Source: PASSIA)

Arafat, Yassir: Born in 1929, he is the founder of *Fatah* movement in 1965. He became the second chief of PLO and remained so till his death. He was the leader of the Palestinian revolution for more than three decades. He signed the Oslo Accords with the Israelis in 1993 and was elected as the President of the Palestinian National Authority in 1996. He led the negotiations in Camp David summit 2000 (Free Encyclopedia, April, 2009)

Ben-Ami, Shlomo: Born in Morocco in 1943. He was elected to the Israeli Knesset in 1996. He served as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Foreign Service. He was a top Israeli negotiator during the July Camp David 2000. (Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Carter, Jimmy: 39th President of the United States (1977-1981); born on October, 1, 1924 in Plains, Georgia. In foreign affairs, Carter set his own style. In the Middle East, he helped bring truce between Egypt and Israel through the Camp David agreement of 1978. (Source: The Jimmy Carter library/ the Carter Center)

Clinton, Bill: 42nd President of the United States (1993-2001), was born on August 19, 1946 in Hope, Arkansas. He worked as a lawyer and a public official at the beginning of his career. He sponsored Camp David 2000 by mediating between the Israelis and the Palestinians. (<http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/clinton> March 01, 2009)

Miller, Aaron: Born March 25th, 1949. He is a Middle East analyst, author, and negotiator, and he is on the U.S. Advisory Council of the Israel Policy Forum. He served as an advisor to six Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations. He participated in American efforts to

broker agreements between Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians. Miller published his fourth book, *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace* in 2008. (Free Encyclopedia, 2009)

Mitchell, George: a former American senator from the state of Maine. Bill Clinton appointed him as an official mediator in the Northern Ireland case, which he described in his book (Making Peace) as the hardest mission he ever had in his entire life. President Barak Obama appointed Mitchell as his envoy to mediate between the Palestinians and the Israelis. (www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2A79D2FA-D225.htm February 02, 2009)

Qurei, Ahmed: Born in Abu Dies in 1936. He is one of the prominent Fatah leaders; he rose to prominence and was elected to the Fatah Central Committee in August 1989. He was the first Palestinian house speaker for PLC in 2006, and the second and the fourth prime minister. (Free Encyclopedia, March, 2009)

Sher, Gilad: Former Israeli Government Chief-of-Staff and Chief Negotiator. Gilad Sher served as Chief of Staff and Policy Coordinator under former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Ehud Barak. He headed talks at the Camp David Summit (2000) and Taba, Egypt (2001) as Co-Chief Negotiator. Sher was a delegation member to the Oslo Interim Accords under the late-PM Yitzchak Rabin. His book "*The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001: Within Reach*" was published by Routledge in 2006: (<http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/pp.aspx?c=hsJPKOPIJpH&b=3538661&printmode=1#Sher> April, 6, 2009)

Definition of Terms

Arbiter: starts indirectly as a negotiator who tries to mediate between the two disputed parties in order to reach a peaceful agreement between them. If he fails, he is entitled to give his final opinion, which is considered as a legal judgment. Both disputing parties are committed to enforce the judgment since both agreed officially on the arbiter and given him the power to resolve the dispute by imposing a solution.

Conflict: disagreement or dispute between two parties. The researcher defines conflict as the antonym of the word “agreement”; it is a state of opposition; however, it does not necessarily lead to a negative outcome.

Foreign Policy: approach used by any state in order to protect its political, economical, and cultural interests. Also, it is the policy that any state uses in order to defend its rights within the international arena and to improve its peaceful relations with other countries.

Foreign Aid: The economic, financial, technical and military help offered by rich countries to poorer countries in order to achieve/promote the goals of the donor country’s foreign policy.

Fourteen Points: Proposed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) in his speech presented before the Congress on January, 8th /1918. The main points included: self determination, military reduction, and the creation of international organization to insure peace in the world.

Hamas: Islamic Palestinian Resistance movement created in 1987 at the beginning of the first *Intifada* by *Sheikh Yassin*. *Hamas* was successful in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, taking 76 of the 132 seats.

Hudna (Truce): a term frequently used by Arab mediators while applying the (Tribal Law). Most Arabs use it to ease the tensions between the disputing parties. It has worked efficiently

in preventing more physical violence between parties in conflict and succeeded in stopping more bloodshed among Palestinians during both the Palestinian *Intifadas* (1987, 2000).

Intifada (Uprising): term commonly used to describe the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli Occupation .The first *Intifada* ended in 1994 after the Oslo Agreement, the second *intifada* began on September, 28, 2000.

Mediator: a skillful negotiator who brings two disputed parties or adversaries together to resolve their disputes; a third neutral and objective party who assists two parties (states, organizations, individuals) negotiate an agreement. The mediator's role is basically to facilitate the negotiations between the two parties in conflict, so that both can agree on a solution that meets their demands and interests.

Mossad: Hebrew word for institution, it refers to a branch of the Israeli government that deals with intelligence and special operations.

Negotiation: Negotiation is an approach blended in all approaches of conflict resolution (overlapped); mediators, negotiators, conciliators and arbiters naturally will have to use negotiation.

Chapter One

Study's Background

1.1 Introduction

The Palestinians are one of the few nations occupied in recent history whose case has not yet found a just and permanent solution by the international community. The Palestinian case is not about a minority group fighting for their civil rights or self governance (Autonomy) nor is it about a majority suffering from the rule of the minority (Autocracy). The protracted struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis is the result of social, political, geographical, historical, and cultural conflict; those factors have led to the continuation of the conflict and difficulty of its resolution. The conflict between both nations (Israelis and Palestinians) is about controlling the Palestinian land itself where both parties claim their “undisputed legitimate” rights and they demand that these rights be recognized and acknowledged by the international community. Many Israelis want all “Historic Palestine” suggesting that the Palestinians can leave the land and live abroad. David Ben-Gurion was very clear and precise about this issue when he said to the Jewish Agency Executive in June, 1938: “I am for compulsory transfer; I do not see anything immoral in it”⁽¹⁾.

The roots of the conflict originated in 1897 (Basel Conference) when Theodore Herzl opened the first Zionist Congress. The main purpose of the conference was to establish an organized process working towards free Jewish immigration to Palestine. Besides uniting Jews under Zionist leadership, the hidden paramount objective was establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine⁽²⁾.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is interconnected to the constant instability and developments that take place throughout the rest of the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1989, the international political system transformed from the politics of dual competing super powers into a sole super power system, with the United

⁽¹⁾ Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, (Oxford: One World Publications Limited, 2006), p.IX.

⁽²⁾ For roots of the problem, see Naomi W. Cohen. *The Americanization of Zionism 1897 - 1948*, (New England: Brandeis University Press, 2003), p.165.

States becoming the only dominant power leading the rest of the world. The drastic change in the international power balance has led the U.S. to reconsider its previous policies; it started reorganizing its strategies of the foreign policies for the sake of protecting its long-term national interests. Since the Middle East has always been a strategic region for the U.S., the American administration recently started to give the “Palestinian Case” more of its attention. The U.S. is being aware that the “Cause of Palestine” has a significant impact on the political systems in both the Arab and the Moslem worlds since the tragedy of the Palestinian people is a permanent source of crisis for the whole region.

Even though the U.S. has been keeping close diplomatic relations with the moderate Arab governments, it labels Arab regimes such as Syria as a country that belongs to the opposing camp. The U.S. has a tough stance against the “opposing camp” where it accuses countries in such a camp as evil countries since they harbor terrorist groups. In his book “Media Control” Noam Chomsky explains:

“The war on terrorism was not declared on September 11; rather it was declared, using the same rhetoric as the first declaration twenty years earlier. The Reagan administration, as you know, I’m sure, came into office announcing that a war on terrorism would be the core of U.S. foreign policy....The main focus was state-supported international terrorism in the Islamic world and at that time also in Central America. International terrorism was described as a plague spread by “depraved opponents of civilization itself, in a return to barbarism in the modern age”⁽¹⁾.

However, the Palestinian Authority realizes that only the U.S. can help in resolving the dilemma of their intractable and protracted injustice. The Palestinians are not in a position of equality vis a vis the Israelis in terms of military strength and economic power, so the Israelis are dictating their demands rather than negotiating them. In relation to this specific issue, Roger Fisher and William Ury raise two main questions: “Of what use is talking about interests, options, and standards if the other side has stronger bargaining position? What do you do if the other side is richer or better connected, or if they have a large staff or more powerful weapons?”⁽²⁾. The Israelis have been dealing with the Palestinians based on the concept of “might is right”; therefore, the results have not been satisfying to the

(1) Noam Chomsky. *Media Control*, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1991), pp.70-71.

(2) Roger Fisher and William Ury. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Group Inc, 1991), p. 95.

Palestinians. As long as this continues, the conflict will not be resolved with fairness and justice.

The PLO expressed readiness for direct negotiations mediated by the U.S. and their leadership has appeared eager to engage Washington directly in their conflict with Israel. The PLO had to renounce violence which was a previous means used by them for more than four decades in order to end their conflict with the Israelis. In 1988, Yasser Arafat renounced terrorism publicly and clearly as George Shultz (former U.S. Secretary of State) had demanded. The U.S. revived their diplomatic relations with PLO after a boycott that had lasted for 13 years (1975-1988). In other words, by renouncing violence, the Palestinians have expressed their desire for a genuine, neutral and objective involvement of the U.S. in resolving their conflict with the Israelis. This is why the current President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas is persistent and very determined that Palestinians do not have any other choice but to attain the satisfaction and the blessings of the U.S. administrations. Many European countries such as Norway, France, Spain, and Britain had mediated between the Israelis and the Palestinians but ended with failure; the only mediator who can really help in resolving this long complicated conflict is the United States of America.

1.2 Research Objectives

The main goal is to evaluate the role of the U.S. as the primary mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will compare between Camp David 1979 and Camp David 2000 as two case studies. The first (Camp David 1979) is considered as a good model of successful mediation, while the second “Camp David 2000” ended with terrible failure. The study will discuss the reasons behind the success of the first summit and the failure of the second.

Another objective of this research is to study to what extent a change in the Palestinian perception of the U.S. people and U.S. foreign policy would improve the chances of peace in the region. As part of this objective, the study will explore how Palestinians can better explain their perspectives and their national aspirations. The researcher hopes to provide realistic and reasonable suggestions that would improve and enhance the Palestinian-

American relationship. Earning the trust of the U.S. by Palestinians would inevitably lead to more hope in accepting the U.S. a successful mediator.

1.3 Research Significance

It is very important to study the policy of the U.S. in mediating between Israelis and the Palestinians. This super power with its enormous military and economic strength is the only country in the world that is capable of making, if not imposing, peace between the Israelis and the Arabs. When there is a deadlock in the negotiations, the U.S. can break the impasse by proposing its own creative solution. Even though the American positions are constantly biased in favor of the Israelis, the people of the region cannot exclude the U.S. role in imposing a just and lasting peace that helps in ending this long-running conflict. It is imperative to investigate the reasons behind the failure of the U.S. role in making peace and the factors that have influenced the U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is hoped that this research will contribute to a better understanding of the past and the future U.S. role in conflict mediation in the Middle East. The importance of this research lies in investigating the role of mediation as a peaceful approach in conflict resolution. The value of studying this approach is to investigate the effectiveness and the appropriateness in present conflict management and future resolution. Also, this study should be very beneficial for the general negotiators involved in resolving other disputes. Understanding the nature of the Israeli-American relationship helps explain the policy practiced by the U.S.

1.4 Research Problem

This study attempts to analyze why the Camp David Summit of 2000 failed and what Palestinians can do more in order to improve their relations with the United States. It also attempts to analyze whether a mediated approach to conflict resolution is applicable in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It seeks answers to the following questions:

1. What is the importance of a third party's role in conflict resolution?

2. How was the U.S. role of mediation employed in both Camp David Summits of 1979 and 2000 and why was it successful in the first but not in the second?

3. What role did U.S. support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians play in both summits?

4. What are the main factors that have negatively influenced the U.S.-Palestinian relationship in the negotiations at the summit of Camp David 2000?

5. What are the future prospects of the U.S. role in resolving the conflict as a third party?

6. Is mediation when used as the sole approach in conflict resolution doomed to fail when employed in controversial cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian case?

7. Will the chances of solving disputes in such a case be higher if the process shifts at a later stage from mediation to “mediation/arbitration” and the mediator himself becomes an arbiter?

In general, the research studies if there has been an absence of neutrality and objectivity of the United States as the main mediator (broker) in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

1.5 Research Hypotheses

The role of the mediator is very important; he is the main “administrator” who fosters communication and reconciliation between the disputing parties. If he does not maintain the trust of one of the parties, efforts will be exerted uselessly. His competence is a basic requirement for any successful mission; the mediator has to have all the skills required for this exhausting task. Above all, the objectivity of the mediator is what ultimately determines the direction and the final destination port of the sailing ship. The broker, who is involved as a mediator in the negotiations between the disputing parties, can be an important factor behind either the failure or the success of reaching a final agreement.

Palestinians do not trust the U.S. to be a fair and an honest mediator in the light of the fact that the U.S. has long been perceived as pro-Israel. The U.S. has to be a fair broker in order to be a successful mediator. The Palestinians and their supporters are not well enough familiarized with what influences positively the U.S. State Department’s foreign

policies. If the U.S. passes the stage of trust building with Palestinians, it can move forward to arbitrate between both disputing parties of the conflict.

As part of the hypothesis, the only possible way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be through adopting a “Mediation/Arbitration Approach”; the international community led by the U.S. will eventually have to impose a solution. This may function successfully as long as there is a mutual written consent in which both parties will abide by the outcome of the arbitration. The decision would be binding; it would be under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the possibility of being transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for enforcement. This approach would succeed if it is accompanied with the belief of, specifically the Palestinians, in the neutrality and the straightforwardness of the U.S. as the main “Mediator/Arbiter”. The U.S. tries to gain support of Palestinians through foreign aid, but this aid must be combined with real change in U.S. policy that will gain the Palestinians’ trust. The U.S. may gain the trust of the Palestinians if it takes a tougher stance toward Israel.

1.6 Research Methodology

The research methodology applied is composed mainly of a qualitative analysis of historical documents and of secondary literature which has tackled similar research questions. The historical analysis aims to identify structural components of U.S. policy which can be traced by means of a descriptive approach underlying U.S. policy on Palestine and Israel since 1967 until today. A broad range of secondary literature is examined, in order to assess the validity of the research hypotheses and explore the relevance of alternative approaches to mediation.

1.7 Research Boundary

The time boundary of the research is from the 1970’s till present. The geographic boundary in this study is the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

1.8 Research Limitations

The research is limited by the lack of available access to research material. It has been only nine years since Camp David 2000 took place, so there are limited resources available on this topic in the libraries of Palestinian universities. The research depends on several Western sources, and journals which had interviewed people involved in the negotiation from both sides (Israeli and Palestinian). The researcher is also limited by the lack of available funding resources to conduct field research and interview the different parties involved in both summits under study.

1.9 Research Outline

This research comprises seven chapters. The first chapter deals with the general concepts of the study; it discusses the research significance, boundaries, limitations, and methodology. Finally, it outlines the main content of each chapter. The last chapter consists of the final conclusions: analysis, results, and recommendations.

1.9.1 Chapter Two:

Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework and reviews some earlier studies on the topic to indicate how this research adds to the knowledge of the subject. In the theoretical framework, the chapter identifies the peaceful approaches to conflict resolution, and explains their methodologies. It specifically discusses negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and litigation. The main focus, however, is on mediation which is the most commonly used approach and as the core topic of this study. It focuses on the definition and the history of mediation as a peaceful approach to conflict resolution and investigates the range of its applicability in different regions among the world. Also, it discusses the shortcomings of such an approach and how sometimes it does not work efficiently if practiced by a biased mediator. The case of Qatar vs. Bahrain is used as a

relevant example that supports the hypothesis of combining mediation with arbitration as an effective approach in conflict resolution.

The second section of this chapter deals with some earlier studies related to both summits but mainly the summit of 2000. This section will focus mainly on what went wrong by exposing the readers to comprehensive analysis had been made by several political analysts from both sides: Israelis and Palestinians.

1.9.2 Chapter Three:

Chapter Three studies the history of the U.S. mediation in the Middle East. In addition, it discusses Rogers Peace Plan and the role of the main foreign policy strategists in the last forty years. It also discusses U.S.'s strategy in foreign assistance i.e. pressures and incentives, stick and carrots. It investigates and discusses USAID programs aiming to help the Palestinians. Furthermore, this chapter discusses both the American-Israeli relationship in comparison with American-Arab relationship. It also discusses whether the special American-Israeli relationship is strategic, or it is a result of pressure groups such as AIPAC.

The focus of this chapter is to reveal how (mediation) was practiced by the U.S. in building their diplomatic relations with Palestine and Israel since the end of the Second World War. It discusses mainly the other alternative peaceful approach in conflict resolution (U.S. Foreign financial Aid) and provides a brief history of U.S. diplomacy, particularly, the concept of their financial aids and the "hidden-agenda" behind such a policy. Finally, this chapter explores how the U.S. uses mediation as one of its main approaches to international conflict resolution.

1.9.3 Chapter Four:

This chapter discusses Camp David 1979. It discusses the situation of both Egypt and Israel before 1979 and points out the main political events that prepared the political environment to be ripe for a solution. The Rogers plan, October War, Kilometer 101

Agreement, Geneva Convention, Disengagement and Separation of Forces in Sinai Agreement, Kissinger's Step-by-Step approach, and Sadat Peace initiative.

1.9.4 Chapter Five:

Chapter five discusses the Camp David Summit of 2000. It outlines the main events that contributed to reaching advanced peaceful negotiations in the year of 2000 after a long period of violence and fighting between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The 1982 Lebanon War, Arafat's visit to Egypt in 1983, the 1988 declaration of independence and renouncing terrorism by Palestinians in Algeria Conference, the 1991 Gulf War, Madrid Peace Conference, and Oslo accords were main factors in transforming Palestinian attitudes toward reaching a negotiated solution. Consequently, this chapter which is based on the analysis of several political analysts and scholars reveals the reasons behind the failure of the summit of 2000 and who caused it.

1.9.5 Chapter Six:

Chapter six comprises the main results agreed upon by both sides (Egypt/ Israel) in Camp David 1979. Similarly, it presents the main points discussed at Camp David 2000. It recapitulates the major factors, including policy decisions, which have led to the failure of Camp David 2000 and the successes of Camp David 1979. A clear comparison between the competence and the behavior of the different administrations that handled the negotiations is identified. In short, both cases are examined as the main two case studies of this thesis.

1.9.6 Chapter Seven:

Chapter Seven shows the results of the research, and offers a set of relevant recommendations and suggestions for Arab and Palestinian policy makers, specifically for the Palestinian negotiating team, in addition to Palestinian scholars.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Conflict is a state of opposition. People deal with conflicts every day at work, home, in the car, and even within one's own self. Conflict may occur at a very low level when one is at odds within himself, or among different nations in the international arena. It may be transformed from a small trivial difference to a very big violent and aggressive conflict. In political terms, it refers to the feud or the state of ongoing hostility between two individuals, groups, communities, or states. When the two disputing parties who live in the same state or area are in a disagreement status where each party attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the others' claims, demands or goals, it would be called domestic conflict.

A regional conflict involves two states or more located in the same geographic area. International conflict involves many countries from different parts of the world such as the First and the Second World Wars. However, some political analysts define international conflict differently suggesting that international conflict is not always connoted with the disputes among different countries from different parts of the world; it may include other actors such as non-governmental organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Also, international conflict may apply to inter-group conflicts within the country itself where one ethnic group is fighting for civil rights, identity, or independence such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As for the inter-group conflicts, they can be very destructive and the struggle may lead to either success, failure, or a stalemate and deadlock. Ronald J. Fisher wrote:

“Groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other: over-simplified, inaccurate, rigid, and derogatory beliefs about the characteristics of the other group that are applied indiscriminately to all the individuals in that group.....Mutual stereotyping leads in part to a mirror image, in which each group sees the other negatively (as aggressive, untrustworthy, manipulative) and itself positively (as peaceful, trustworthy, cooperative)”⁽¹⁾.

(1) For more information see Ronald J. Fisher, "Intergroup Conflict" in: Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman. *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and practice*, (.San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc. , 2000), p. 171.

Finally, different factors may cause conflicts; most of the conflicts all over the world are caused by one of the following: aggression, conflict profiteers and distribution of wealth, hate crimes, identity, extremism, nationalism, poverty and dehumanization.

2.1.1. Violent vs. Peaceful Approaches of Conflict Resolution:

Conflict resolution can be achieved through two main approaches. First, people can resolve their disputes through violence and coercion; by military attacks or waging wars. Second, the disputes can be resolved by peaceful approaches. Conflict resolution through peaceful approaches has become one of the top priorities on the international agenda in modern times. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, military confrontations whether local or international have erupted; several terrorist attacks took place in Spain, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, and Jordan, and cultural clashes are spreading in different parts of the world. Also, the U.S. attacked and toppled the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, and the Saddam regime in Iraq. Many peace activists are deeply concerned with such escalation; they are exerting their best efforts to achieve a peaceful end to this “cancerous situation”. They believe that conflicts should not be resolved through violence since it simply breeds more violence. Therefore, the dire need for peaceful approaches has become the main concern of the people who join the peace camp.

On the other hand, conflicts do not always lead to confrontation or violence; they function as a stage where one can improve his bargaining position. Christopher W. Moore asserts that conflicts may lead to productive and positive changes or to the destruction and degradation of relationships. He suggests:

“A significant variable in the outcome of a dispute is the means that the participants use to resolve their differences. Now, more than ever before, there is a need for dispute resolution procedures that assist parties in meeting their needs, satisfying their interests, and reaching voluntary agreements that minimize physical and psychological harm”⁽¹⁾.

Beverly Potter asserts: “Conflict is not necessarily bad, and it doesn’t necessarily indicate a failed interaction. In fact, conflict can be a catalyst for creating interactions that

(1) Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.466.

are more satisfying. It can benefit people by pushing them to make needed change”⁽¹⁾. Conflicts may produce a better understanding of one’s self and more tolerance of the other’s needs and claims. For example, one of the primary events that created the pre-conditions for mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian dispute was the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

2.1.2. The Concept of Mediation:

The mediator who is, in theory, a third neutral party assists the two parties (states, sides, couples) to negotiate an agreement. His role is to facilitate negotiation between the two disputed parties with intent to reach an agreeable solution that meets their interests. The competence of the mediator is a basic requirement. The way he presents himself, his behavior, style and the impression about his personality that he marks in the adversaries’ minds usually is the main factor in gaining their trust.

Building trust from both parties is considered a major step toward progress of the whole case. Mediation is one of the main six peaceful approaches according to article (33) in the United Nation Charter: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, enquiry, and adjudication (litigation) ⁽²⁾. These approaches are all indirectly overlapped with each other. For instance; conciliation is the result of good mediation which will not be effective if the mediator is not a skillful negotiator.

Mediation efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has increased significantly in the aftermath of the 1967 June War. Moore writes that mediation has grown rapidly since the mid-1980; it has surpassed other methods of conflict resolution particularly arbitration as the method of choice. He stresses the importance of using a mediated approach while attempting to resolve conflicts. He adds: “Mediation must become more highly institutionalized and must be incorporated as a significant component of organizational dispute resolution systems at all levels of society”⁽³⁾.

(1) Dr. Beverly Potter, *From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute* (California: Ronin Publishing Inc. 1996), p.3.

(2) The United nation Charter (1945).

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 467.

The American diplomat George Mitchell who successfully brokered the “Good Friday Agreement” can be considered as best model of a skillful mediator. His work with the Protestants and the Catholics in Northern Ireland can be used as an example of successful mediation. His charismatic personality and his ways of showing respect to others have helped him enormously in gaining respect and esteem. The Good Friday Agreement signed on April 10, 1998 in Belfast shows the effectiveness of the mediation approach practiced by a skilled and objective mediator.

Nevertheless, mediation has its own shortcomings; it has failed in several international disputes. For example, the long history of mediation by many Arab states between Qatar and Bahrain ended with failure ⁽¹⁾. Also, before and after the Gulf war of 1991, many mediators tried to resolve the dispute between the two Arab states (Kuwait / Iraq). Many Arabs were moved to mediate extensively between both countries after the Iraqi civilians had suffered daily because of the harmful sanction that was imposed by the international community on Iraq. Arab mediators had hoped that the sanctions would be broken gradually had both countries conciliated their disputes. However, all the efforts exerted ended with failure and created the conditions for a second war. In relation to the Israeli-Palestinian case, Camp David (2000) is another “recent” example of the shortcomings of the mediation approach used by the Clinton administration.

Mediation is different from both negotiation and arbitration; it is an attempt by a third party to help the disputed parties in finding a solution to their problem. Concerned countries offer their services as mediators between two other states since they feel that the continuance of the dispute between these two states would harm the mediating country’s national interest. These types of mediators feel the dire need for intervening to help the disputing parties because they have invested interests (ulterior motives) in both states and they do not want to jeopardize their relationship with either one of them. When one of the disputed parties asks a third party to intervene, it explains its position and ideas about the disputes and expects the mediator to adopt these ideas when offering them to the adverse party. In other words, it is asking the mediator to understand their position while negotiating with the other side; this, however, cannot take place unless the mediator is convinced that these ideas can establish a common ground for launching the mediation process.

(1) Qatar and Bahrain’s border dispute over the islands Hawar & zabra.

According to Saeb Erekat, in his book *Al Hayat Mufawadat* [Life is Negotiations], if both parties agree on mediation, the process should comprise the followings: First, the mediator should ask for a meeting in a neutral place where the mediator starts with a speech or leaflet that explains the goals, common interests, benefits, hopes, and the resulting incentives from reaching an agreement. Second, each party will be given time to present his case based on the rule that each party has the right to speak where the other party must listen to what is being said. Third, the mediator opens the discussion between the disputed parties while he has to remain wise, patient, and fair while he facilitates the discussion. In case of complications, the mediator has to intervene while he is remaining neutral between the parties. If it gets too complicated, the mediator has to see each party separately; he may offer some ideas in order to help each party overcoming the obstacles. This can be done by suggesting some methods or styles that will protect their demands without insulting or causing the other party to be angry. Fourth, the mediator must present what he thinks is suitable for a common agenda that both parties agree upon. After preparing this agenda that includes the points of agreements and differences, the disputed parties start suggesting ideas or giving alternative solutions. The work continues on a written agreement that may include the differences and the ways of resolving them, then the team of negotiation returns for consulting after agreeing on setting a date to meet again for continuing decisions. At this stage, the mediator goes back and forth between the parties until he feels the possibility of reaching an agreement and invites both parties for a joint meeting. In this meeting, ideas and positions are presented by both parties and they eventually reach a final agreement. Finally, both parties agree to set the date of announcing the agreement to the public⁽¹⁾.

In sum, the main factor behind the success of the mediator is his ability to remain neutral, objective, and fair while dealing with the both parties. The mediator should be able to find solutions when negotiations are in deadlock and he has always to be careful from being misunderstood by one of the parties; misunderstanding leads automatically to misjudging. The most common reason behind the failure of any mediation is when one of the parties feels that the mediator is supporting one party's position against the other. Jimmy Carter in Camp David 1979, and George Mitchell in the Good Friday Agreement, gave the impression to all involved disputing parties that they were not, in anyway, adopting one party's position while

(1) Saeb Erekat. *Al Hayat Mufawadat [Life is Negotiations]*, (Palestine, Nablus: Jama't al-Najah al-Wataniyyeh, 2008), pp.47-51.

abandoning the other. Therefore, their mediations in these particular cases are considered elite examples of “successful mediation” in recent history.

2.1.3. Third Party:

Since the Oslo accords, the Palestinians have relied on a third party to mediate between them and the Israelis hoping that they will eventually resolve the conflict. This conflict has been handled by different mediators and as a matter of fact, it was a third party who had helped in creating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ⁽¹⁾. The Palestinians will always refer to the British government’s role in causing their catastrophe (*Nakbah*) in 1947-1948 by supporting the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine or the failures of the United Nation to support them in ending the Israeli occupation. The biased role of the United States with Israel has created bitter feelings toward such third parties. Despite this fact, the Palestinian Authority remains hopeful that a third party, such as the U.S., will assume a balanced position and affect a change in the situation.

The Palestinians started looking for a powerful country in order to establish a power balance with the Israelis, so they looked for support from former Soviet Union (USSR). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the sole super power, therefore; the Palestinians do not have any other alternative but to seek the U.S. and international public support to help in resolving their cause. In this conflict in which one of the disputed parties does not have much leverage, they seek for the fairness and the legality of their case, facing an adversarial party who is more powerful in both economic and military force, a third party mediator is the only mechanism to balance the course of negotiations, and help prevent the dictation of terms by the stronger party upon the weaker party.

However, the ability of the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator is put to the test by the history of its friendly relations with Israel. The U.S. was the first country to acknowledge the State of Israel in 1948; it built a strong relationship with Israel as “a strategic ally”. In 1975, the U.S. decided to boycott the PLO; it labeled the organization a “terrorist organization”. This boycott lasted till 1988 when the U.S. administration under Ronald Reagan administration decided to revive its stalled relationship with the PLO. The affects

(1) British Government through announcing Balfour Declaration.

of this boycott still contribute to shaping a disfigured image of the Palestinians in which successive U.S. administrations have yet to move beyond this perception of the Palestinians while dealing with the conflict.

2.2. Peaceful Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Negotiation is an approach that is actually incorporated in all approaches to conflict resolution. The difference among the approaches listed in article 33 in the United Nation Charter is not always clear. For example, arbitration is known as a form of litigation where the mediating party is given power to impose judgment. The judgment is binding and therefore would be enforceable. In arbitration, the arbiter (arbitrator) mediates through negotiation to reach conciliation between the two parties, and after listening to both arguments, he will have to come up with a decision that is to be binding and irreversible. Once the parties agreed to submit the case to an arbitrator, his judgment will be enforceable. Even though the disagreeing party (losing party) to the judgment has the right to appeal, the appellate court does not usually revoke the arbiter's judgment. In most cases, the higher court affirms the decision unless the arbiter has exceeded his limits or authority just as any judge who works at court of law. Furthermore, the arbiter is authorized to call witnesses or visit sites outside the hearing room.

The main difference between arbitration and adjudication is that the later is slower, more expensive, and more adversarial. In short, the arbiter starts indirectly as a negotiator who tries to mediate between the two disputed parties in order to reach a conciliation phase between them, if he fails, he is entitled to give his final opinion to be considered as a legal judgment. Mediation coupled with arbitration became very popular; there are many courts all over the world using arbitration as a procedure to resolve legal disputes.

Conciliation is another alternative dispute resolution. Some regard conciliation as a specific type of mediation rather than being a whole separate approach. The mediator meets with the adversaries separately in an attempt to resolve their differences. The main goal is to conciliate by seeking concessions, and the conciliator, usually, tries to guide the discussion in a way that optimizes the parties' needs. If the mediator succeeds in negotiation to reach an agreement or an understanding between the two parties, he will ask

for a written commitment signed by both parties at which it becomes a legally binding contract before the court of law. Conciliation helps to end fighting and transform the dispute into a lasting resolution; without conciliation, the fight can break out again as one can see what had happened in the tragic beginning of the second *Intifada* (uprising). Despite the Oslo agreement, the parties made little progress toward achieving a stable peace and Palestinian frustration boiled over into a new and bloodier round of violence. There were no serious attempts of conciliation offered by the third party and that is why the region had the second *Intifada*.

During the process of conciliating, the role of the conciliator is to assist each of the disputed parties to develop a list of their objectives and demands. The conciliator then asks each of the parties to prioritize their own list, from most to least important, and then encourages them to ignore the least important while focusing on the most important for each party in turn. The disputed parties rarely have compatible priorities on all objectives (their list of objectives would be different or opposing). The conciliator should quickly build a string of success and help the parties in creating an atmosphere of trust which would be the task of the conciliator to continue developing. If he succeeds in gaining the trust of both parties, his next step would be to establish the trust between the disputed parties. This is the first stage in getting the parties closer to each other in which he may become able to convince them into making concessions on some of their important demands. Christopher Moore believes that the conciliator should have a positive psychological relationship with both disputing parties. He explained:

“Conciliation is essentially an applied psychological tactic aimed at correcting perceptions, reducing unreasonable fears, and improving communication to an extent that permits reasonable fears and improving communication to an extent that permits reasonable discussion to take place and in fact makes rational bargaining possible....Conciliation is the psychological component of mediation, in which the third party attempts to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that promotes positive relationships and is conducive to productive negotiations”⁽¹⁾.

Thus, conciliation cannot be separated from mediation as a completely independent approach. At the same time, mediation will not succeed and be practiced efficiently if the

(1) Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 2003), p.166.

mediator is not being, at the beginning, a skillful conciliator. This is an example of the overlap between the different methods of third party conflict resolution.

James Schellenberg separated the approaches to conflict resolution according to each one's function; he has listed five approaches:

“The forms of conflict resolution are as diverse as the forms of social conflict. At first glance, therefore, it may appear hopeless to generalize about the practice of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, we can identify a limited set of approaches usually applied to the resolution of conflicts. These may be summarized as follows:

1. Coercion or forcing parties in conflict to a particular conclusion.
2. Negotiation and bargaining, or involving the parties in the process of the discussion which seeks to bring them into voluntary agreement.
3. Adjudication or using the power of the state and its legal system to provide an authoritative conclusion.
4. Mediation or using a third party to help the conflicting parties come to mutually satisfactory agreement.
5. Arbitration or using a third party to decide, through prior mutual consent, the issues in dispute.

Although the possibilities of further variation in approaches to conflict resolution (including combinations of the above forms) are endless, most practitioners emphasize one or another of these five approaches”⁽¹⁾.

As noted earlier, the main emphasis, in this study, will be on mediation, and at a later stage will be on mediation coupled with arbitration (Mediation/ Arbitration).

2.2.1. Definition and History of Mediation:

Mediation is an old method used by the ancient Greeks and advocated by almost all religions. According to Christopher W. Moore, mediation has a long history in almost all cultures of the world. The Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, and many other cultures have “exertive and effective traditions of mediation practice”⁽²⁾. Moore explains

(1) James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice*, (New York: State University of New York press. 19996), p.13.

(2) Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.20.

that in biblical times, in Jewish communities both religious and political leaders practiced mediation to resolve civil and religious differences. This tradition was carried over to Christian communities who saw Christ as the supreme mediator. Similarly, Islam practiced mediation and it became very commonly used throughout the Moslem World. Moore states that Islamic cultures have a long tradition of mediation; many disputes were resolved through community meetings of elders in which participants discussed and debated and finally mediated to resolve the conflict. Moore explains:

“In urban areas, local custom (*urf*) became codified into *shari*’a law, which was interpreted and applied by a specialized intermediary, or [*quadi*].a [*quadi*] might interpret his role as that of a conciliator, attempting to preserve a social harmony by reaching an agreed upon solution to a dispute, rather than applying the strict letter of law”⁽¹⁾.

As such mediation is not a new phenomenon and its modern application is supported by historical precedents.

According to article 33 in the United Nation charter, mediation is one of the main approaches of conflict resolution:

- “1.The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means”.

Even though mediation has originated in ancient cultures, and it has never been abandoned completely by some cultures, it has recently become widely used all over the world. As a matter of fact, the Arabs in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine think of it as an efficient method of settling disputes; they believe for example, that mediation is more objective and fair than litigation. Moore indicated that:

“At a later stage, the Jewish community had their Rabbis playing a vital role in mediating or adjudicating disputes between members of their faith in Spain, North Africa, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe, the Turkish Empire, and the Middle East. Mediation also spread out to reach the Americans, Canadians, and the Chinese. Mediation also grew in the American and other

(1) Ibid.,p.21.

colonies, and ultimately in the United States and Canada, where religious sects such as the Puritans and Quakers, and Chinese and Jewish ethnic groups developed alternative procedures for dispute resolution that were of an informal and voluntary nature”⁽¹⁾.

He added that mediation is not confined to the Western culture; actually it may be used more widely in non-Western countries. It is used now, in Japan, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, Western Europe, and Arabia. As for the mediation process in the Arab world, Moore explains:

“A society in which conflicts are frequent must develop mechanisms for settling differences which, if allowed to get out of hand, can destroy the entire social fabric. In the Arab world, mediation on the tribal and the village level has for centuries been the traditional method of settling disputes, and the same method has in modern times, been adapted for settling political and military issues within and between Arab States”⁽²⁾.

In the Arab region, the mediator usually comes from a special well-regarded family with a high status; large and extended family elders or representatives usually are the mediators. They are well respected among their societies and known for being impartial even if they are related in some way to one of the disputed parties. In Palestine, the politicians often mediate in family and civil disputes. The late Faisal Husseini (a well known Palestinian politician) mediated in countless civil and family disputes within the Palestinian community. Some Palestinians in Jerusalem have labeled him the “Prince of Jerusalem” for the significant efforts he exerted in settling Jerusalemites’ civil and political differences.

2.2.2. Mediator’s Competence:

The competence of the mediator is a basic requirement for success. Many analysts have referred either the success or the failure of international reconciliation agreements to the competence of the mediator. The mediator plays an important role in encouraging or even pushing the parties, indirectly, to reach an agreement. This of course depends on the mediator’s skills, behavior and mainly on his neutrality. Bill Clinton was very frustrated when the negotiations at Camp David in 2000, in which he was actively involved as the main

(1) Moore. Op.cit. p.23.

(2) Ibid. p. 40.

mediator, failed. He was concerned that failure of the negotiations would be interpreted as a sign of his weakness as a mediator. Observers said that he genuinely tried to close a deal (peace agreement) between the Israelis and the Palestinians in his last few months in the White House. According to political analysts, Clinton was attempting to mark a personal position in history by solving the long-standing and complicated dispute. However, Clinton's efforts failed and the situation in the region was exacerbated in which both sides engaged in very violent armed battles during the second *Intifada*. It is important to understand that failed mediation may have lasting implications beyond the immediate failure. Dr. Beverly Potter explained that if the conflict is poorly handled it will lead to more conflict: "Emotional outbursts and cutting remarks have a way of lingering in people's minds. Dwelling on words said in anger, people are offended. Soon a new dispute has emerged which, if handled poorly, will probably generate more ill will" ⁽¹⁾.

In discussing the nature of mediation, James Schellenberg defined the mediator as a third party who should help disputed parties to come to a mutually satisfactory resolution of their conflict. The followings are some of the characteristics of mediation listed by Schellenberg:

1. Mediation is assisted negotiation. The mediator's role is to facilitate negotiation between parties who have difficulty in resolving a conflict on their own.
2. *The mediator is a neutral third party.* The mediator avoids taking sides in attempting to move the parties toward agreement.
3. *Mediation is voluntary.* Although mediation is sometimes initiated by court orders (and thus not fully voluntary in this respect), continuing in mediation is voluntary for the parties, and no agreement is reached that is not mutually accepted.
4. *Disputants retain responsibility.* The mediator may guide the negotiations, but responsibility for any decisions of substance always remains in the hands of the disputants.
5. *Mediation is private and confidential.* What goes on in mediation sessions is not expected to be shared with others. Sessions are conducted in a private place, and there is no official record of what is discussed.
6. *There are no sanctions for failure to reach an agreement.* If agreements are voluntary, it must be also acceptable not to agree. When agreement is not reached, no blame for this is cast upon either party" ⁽²⁾.

(1) Dr. Beverly Potter, *From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute*, (California: Ronin publishing Inc., 1996), p.5.

(2) Schellenberg, *op.cit.* p.182.

There are limits and restrictions to the mediator's authority: a mediator does not have the power of decision making as the judge in the court of law. He cannot enforce or impose his decision on the disputed parties. This is what distinguishes the mediator from the arbiter who is empowered to make a decision for the parties since he had attained a prior agreement by the disputants. As such a mediator's role is different from or a judge who is empowered by the law to make a decision that would be enforceable upon the disputed parties. According to Christopher Moore:

“The mediator on the other hand, works to reconcile the competing interest of the two parties. The mediator tasks are to assist the parties in examining their interests and needs, to help them negotiate an exchange of promises, and to redefine their relationship in a way that will be mutually satisfactory and will meet their standards of fairness”⁽¹⁾.

Mediators may encounter difficult cases where it would be impossible for them to succeed. No matter how hard the mediator tries, sometimes he will not be able to broker an agreement. In this case, the mediator may decide to do nothing since he tried all possible means to get the disputed parties closer or to get them together on reaching an agreement. Mediators with some authority however, may be able to succeed but they need to be very careful while making a judgment:

“When you are the person in authority, you might issue a directive. Issuing a directive under these conditions is generally the most likely alternative. But you must make sure you don't jump the gun. After several failed attempts to get the disputants to agree on a plan, you may have to take on the role of King Solomon and decide on a solution yourself. In some cases, when you do give a directive and thereby become King Solomon, you must be very wise and very observant because it is your responsibility to figure out how to resolve or lessen this dispute. The key is to issue a directive that will cause a change”⁽²⁾.

Kenneth Kersey described how it is difficult for the mediator to speculate what actually goes on the disputants' minds. He said:

(1) Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.18.

(2) Dr. Beverly Potter, *From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute*. (California: Ronin publishing Inc., 1996), p.146.

“It is impossible to give a universally accurate account of what transpires in mediation since the process occurs across so many domains of conflict and since mediators often strive for quite contrasting goals, ranging from settling the substantive issue narrowly defined to accomplishing broad relational, psychological, or social objectives”⁽¹⁾.

William Ury illustrated methods of conflict resolution based upon the basic human needs, stating:

“In searching for the basic interests behind a declared position, look particularly for those bedrock concerns which motivate all people. If you can take care of such basic needs, you increase the chance both of reaching agreement and, if an agreement is reached, of the other side’s keeping to it. Basic human needs include: Security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition, and control over one’s life”⁽²⁾.

Moore has also given some instruction for the mediators to take into consideration while dealing with disputed parties. He listed several responsibilities that mediators should carry:

“Among the responsibilities that the intermediary has to the parties are:

1. An obligation to remain impartial and maintain freedom from “favoritism or bias either by word or by action, and a commitment to serve all parties as opposed to a single party”.
2. Assurance of informed consent to guarantee the participants understand “the nature of the process, the procedures, the particular role of the neutral, and the parties’ relationship to the neutral”
3. Disclosure of the limits, if any, of confidentiality, and commitment to hold conferences once given.
4. Avoidance of conflict of interest or its appearance.
5. Implementation of the process in a timely manner.
6. Assistance in conducting a process and a settlement that they will hold as their own, and in which the neutral “has no vested interest”⁽³⁾.

(1) For more information see: Mediation by Kenneth Kressel in Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and practice*, (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.,2000), p. 528.

(2) William Ury, *Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation*. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) , p.48.

(3) Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*. (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), pp.448-449.

2.2.3. Behavior and Style:

In discussing the mediator's skills, behavior, and personality, many scholars and analysts have stressed on the fact that neutrality is a basic and important characteristic in which mediators should maintain. Being a biased mediator is a roadmap that leads to failure. The main requirement for gaining the disputed parties' trust is through convincing both of his neutrality. Gaining their trust is a major step toward succeeding in advancing the negotiations. If one of the parties is doubtful of the straightforwardness and the honesty of the mediator, the whole negotiation process would be very exhausting and useless for all participants.

The process of mediation can transform into a dangerous situation where it empowers the strong party at the expense of the weak. Because of the informality of mediation and the seeking of conciliation between the opposite point of views, and because of the absence of the procedural rules and regulations, mediation as a process may open the chance for coercion and manipulation by the stronger party. By comparing mediation with other lawful procedures, one can find that mediation has produced many unfair results. The mediators were biased in favor of the strong party without any reasonable justification. Since the process gives mediators a strategic authority in controlling the negotiations, it gives them the opportunity to be biased. This kind of impartiality may control and limit the choices of the weak party to determine his demands and lower his expectations of attaining a just and fair settlement ⁽¹⁾.

George Mitchell, a former Senate Minority leader from Maine, who, as mentioned earlier, successfully brokered the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, is a good example that supports the hypothesis concerning the importance of the role of the mediator. Mitchell possessed the personal and professional skills necessary to mediate an agreement. Besides being neutral, he very well commanded the skill of listening. Patience was another characteristic that Mitchell exhibited while working with both parties in Northern Ireland. Connie McDougall, in her article "Leadership That Unites" wrote:

(1) Robert A. Bush and Joseph P. Folger, *The promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994).

“George Mitchell did the impossible. As chairman of the peace negotiations, he made the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland a reality, a feat that has been recognized by his nomination for the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize.

George Mitchell is someone who exhibits both qualities. He is a master at bringing together people of diverse points of view and finding a solution to conflict. We desperately need leaders like Mitchell, leaders who bring the hope that comes with unity..... Certainly chairing the Northern Ireland peace negotiations was tough, and serving 15 years in the U.S. Senate, finally as majority leader, posed its own challenges. Mitchell explains his determination this way: It's simple. I have a desire to be of help when I can be. ...He found that the ability to listen was a great advantage in the talks. "We don't often truly listen to each other. It takes concentration," Mitchell says. "I also tried to encourage them to see each other as I saw them: as fellow human beings with the same aspirations”⁽¹⁾.

Mitchell currently serves in the administration of President Barak Obama as a Special Envoy to the Middle East; he is currently working to “jump start” the peace process in order to revive stalled peace talks. Mitchell is not new to serving as an official envoy/mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He was previously dispatched by the former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 to serve as an official mediator between Palestine and Israel after the outbreak of the second *intifada*. His famous report (Mitchell Report) investigated the reasons behind the *intifada* and what steps should be taken to end the violence. The report included recommendations for confidence-building measures for each side.

The Palestinians often get disappointed with the biased positions taken by the U.S. during mediation between them and the Israelis, however; they did not feel the same after reading the results of Mitchell Report. They have expressed some satisfaction with the objectivity that Mitchell had practiced during the investigation. They are hoping that Mitchell’s new involvement will end up with a fair comparison and will give President Obama a clearer image about the Palestinians and their position toward ending the conflict.

2.2.4. Successful Model (Qatar vs. Bahrain):

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has resolved the long lasting dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over their borders (the Borders Dispute). It is interesting that both parties were pleased with the decision; not accusing the court of being

(1) <http://www.spu.edu/uc/Response/spr2K/leadership.html> . *Leadership that Unites*, February 09, 2007.

biased or unfair. They both agreed previously to take their case to ICJ for arbitration; therefore, they both felt that their case was settled fairly through arbitration where it would not have the same reaction had it come through litigation:

“The court itself characterized the case of Qatar v. Bahrain as the longest case in its history. So far it is the only case of a Gulf boundary dispute which has been resolved through the ICJ rather than through mediation, arbitration, or negotiation.....But decide the case it did, in the process drawing a maritime boundary (as requested by the parties) and settling, apparently, all the outstanding territorial issues. Almost immediately Qatar and Bahrain both began praising the decision, though in each case some territorial claim it had long characterized as non-negotiable had been overridden (Bahrain,s claim to Zubara, Qatar’s to the Hawars). As noted in the introduction, there appeared to be an almost visible sense of relief on the two sides, for the court had cut the Gordian knot which has long been the main point of contention between the two Gulf neighbors. Although Bahrain quickly invited foreign companies to begin oil exploration in the Hawar Islands, there was none of the protest from Qatar which would have been expected a few weeks earlier from the same announcement”⁽¹⁾.

Unfortunately, these methods of resolving disputes were not followed in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. The Iraqi regime chose completely a different approach (military attack and occupation) and it has led the Iraqi nation to a real disaster. The Iraq vs. Kuwait borders’ dispute is not as complicated as was the case of Qatar vs. Bahrain but more violent. Besides, there was no enough time in the Iraq-Kuwait case, allotted for mediators, conciliators or arbitrators to contribute in resolving the conflict. Ultimately, none of these conflict resolution procedures function effectively if one of the disputed parties takes a very firm position, or insists that the issue is closed as in the Israeli position toward the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Refugees issue.

2.3 Literature Review

The mediator’s styles, behavior, and neutrality, play a very important role in either reaching a settlement or failing while sponsoring the negotiations. It is almost impossible for the mediator to be absolutely impartial or direct and straightforward. Jimmy Carter, who is known for his excellent abilities in brokering successful agreements between

(1) For full text on The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute,see: *The World Court Decision (part 1 &2)* at <http://www.theestimate.com/public/040601.html> .

disputing parties, had to sometimes be manipulative in dealing with both Anwar Sadat and Menahem Begin at Camp David in 1979. Israelis accused Carter of not being neutral because he had a better personal relationship with Sadat than with Begin. Even though this close relationship with Sadat was confirmed by Carter on more than one occasion, Carter admitted that he had manipulated Sadat at some stages during the negotiation:

“Carter admits to a bit of manipulation in order to help confirm an early agreement: The only serious problem was his desire to delete the entire paragraph on Jerusalem. I knew that the Israelis wanted the same thing, but I confess that I did not tell Sadat. I reserved this concession just in case I needed some bargaining points later on”⁽¹⁾.

Trusting the mediator and believing in his neutrality, as mentioned earlier, is a very essential need. According to Noam Chomsky the U.S. has failed to play this role. He accused the U.S. administration (the mediator in Camp David 1979 and Camp David 2000) of being a “Leading terrorist State”. He gave a list of examples supporting his claim such as: the U.S. role in drawing Russia into “Afghan trap”, the Nicaragua case, U.S. support for Turkey’s crushing of its own Kurdish population, the destruction of the *Al-Shifa* pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, and the contrasting U.S. policies toward Iraq and Israel’s military occupation. If Chomsky’s analysis is true, it would be impossible to have a “comprehensive and just” peaceful political settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians with the U.S. as a mediator⁽²⁾.

Many scholars and political analysts reacted to the failure of Camp David 2000, however their explanation and analysis were different; the narrative of the Israeli accompanied with the Americans was very different from the Palestinian version of telling the story of what exactly took place in the negotiations at Camp David 2000. Itmar Rabonivich summarized these different narratives into four main types. He explained in his paper (The Failure of Camp David: Four Narratives) that these different narratives can be grouped into four categories that reflect the mindset embedded in each group’s thinking. Rabonivich divided these categories as follows: First, the orthodox “represented by the pronouncements made by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak, Shlomo Ben Ami and Dennis Ross. These are the most distinctive representations of what I call the

(1) James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 19996), p.180.

(2) Noam Chomsky, *9-11*. (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), pp: 39-54.

Israeli/American orthodoxy”⁽¹⁾. The second category is a revisionist counterclaim represented by Robert Mally and Hussein Agha who generally denied most of the main points made up by the orthodox narrative. The third category is the deterministic narrative that argues that there was no need for negotiations since the summit was bound to collapse anyway. This group is made of a mixture of the community of academics, experts and former officials led by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger claimed that no attempt to settle the disputes between the Israelis and the Arabs can succeed. Kissinger explained that the “minimum Arab demands have never met the minimum Israeli demands. There is a gap there that cannot be breached, unless one wishes to compromise Israel’s security and future. Therefore, there is no point in trying”⁽²⁾. The fourth narrative is called by Rabinovich an “eclectic in nature”. According to Rabinovich, this group appears in books and statements describing:

“The events of Camp David in a way that does not present a specific clear-cut thesis. One example of a narrative of this type is the book by Gilaed Sher , *Within Touching Distance*, Sherdoes not seek to be overly critical. He presents an informative, detailed description of how the talks evolved and how they collapsed, but in his narrative there is no finger-pointing or overarching themes”⁽³⁾.

As for finger-pointing and playing the “Blaming Game”, Muhammed S. Dajani explained that all involved parties in the negotiations (Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans) blamed each other for the failure of the summit. Dajani explains that Israelis claim their government offered the Palestinians maximum concessions but were rejected. Palestinians were offered:

“96% of the West Bank; complete withdrawal from the Gaza strip; establishment of a Palestinian state, creation of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, some kind of sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif; sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem’s Old City; the dismantling of part of the settlements; the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees to the state of Palestine; and some territorial waters in the Dead Sea”⁽⁴⁾.

(1) Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, *The Camp David Summit-What Went Wrong?*, (Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p.15.

(2) Ibid., p.16.

(3) Ibid., p.17.

(4) Ibid., p.86.

On the other hand, The Palestinians justified their refusal to what Israel had offered by accusing both Israelis and Americans of not being genuine in settling the dispute fairly.

“The Palestinian counter version was that the Israelis offer at Camp David fell short of matching the Palestinian historic concession of recognizing the State of Israel writhen 78% of the territory of Mandatory Palestine.... Palestinians could not accept an arrangement that divided Palestinian territories into four cantons separated by Israeli areas and hindering Palestinian passage” ⁽¹⁾.

Dajani added that the mediator himself joined the “Blaming Game” since President Clinton put most of the blame on Arafat even though he promised Arafat not to do so, had the summit failed. Clinton considered Arafat in particular to be the main factor behind the failure of the summit.

(1) Ibid., p.86.

Chapter Three

U.S. Role in the Middle East

3.1 Introduction

The United States is considered as one of the most powerful countries in economic, military, and technological strength. It has been and continues to compete with Russia, China, and sometimes with Europe in leading the world politically and morally. It has adopted a foreign policy that will enable the increase of its power while attempting to weaken the power of its competitors⁽¹⁾.

What makes the study of this chapter significant, is discussing the Arab failure in influencing the direction of the U.S. policy especially when compared with the success of Israel's influence on the formation of the U.S. foreign policy. In this section, the U.S. perception of the Arab and Moslem states and the main factors that lie behind this biased position of the U.S. against the Arab countries, in general, and the Palestinians in particular are identified.

This chapter deals also with the United States foreign policy and the U.S. use of foreign financial aid, as a pillar of its foreign strategy. The U.S. uses donations and endowments as a peaceful approach to strengthen allegiances and induce compliance to other U.S. policies. Several studies have been made investigating the U.S. international relations especially on the nature of its foreign financial aid; and its discrete purposes (hidden agenda). This chapter provides a definition of U.S. diplomacy in general and international financial aid in particular. The different types of U.S. foreign policy strategies are discussed, and this chapter has a brief comparison between the different foreign policy strategists in the U.S. administrations. President James Monroe, President Woodrow Wilson, President Eisenhower, President Nixon, Kissinger, and Dr. Brzezinski's strategies are used as relevant examples.

(1) For more information see: Marshall Plan.

3.2 History of American Diplomacy

The fifth American President James Monroe (1758-1831) initiated the idea of intervening in international disputes. Monroe's Doctrine became the new United States' foreign policy toward the new political order which was developing on both continents. Approximately one hundred years after James Monroe, President Woodrow Wilson made it clear in his famous Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918) that the U.S. wanted to establish a world order in which people can live peacefully and where all nations have the right to determine their own institutions (self-determination).

Wilson stressed that all ordinary people like to live in peace and harmony, enjoying a democratic ruling system. He outlined the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities; people, whether they are strong or weak have the right to live on equal terms and safety with one another. Kathleen Christison described Wilson as one of the few American presidents who will be always referred to as the true strategists in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Many political leaders in the Middle East refer to his famous term (self-determination) when discussing the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Christison further asserted that “Wilson will always be best remembered for his doctrine of (self-determination) as part of his fourteen points in 1918”¹. Also, the famous term (Wilsonian), set by President Woodrow Wilson, became a guiding principle to be followed in the institution of American foreign policy. In relation to the main hypothesis of this thesis, it is interesting to know that the first academic Jew was appointed to the faculty by Wilson when he was the president of Princeton University. Also, the first Jewish judge was appointed in New Jersey Supreme Court when Wilson was the governor of New Jersey (1910-1912). Finally the first Jewish U.S. Supreme Court justice (Louis Brandeis) was appointed in (1916) by Wilson when he was the president of the U.S. (1913- 1921). In short, Woodrow Wilson formed the true legacy of the American foreign policy and its foreign national interest⁽²⁾.

(1) Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on Middle East Policy*, (California: University of California press. 1999), pp: 26-27.

(2) For more information see: Appendix.

3.3 U.S. Mediation between Israel and the Arabs

In 1947, the Palestinian case became the core conflict that influenced negatively the U.S.-Arab relations. American President Harry S. Truman acknowledged and recognized the Israeli state within minutes after the declaration of its establishment on May 15, 1948. Truman supported his position by claiming that he was always sympathetic with the suffering of the Jews in Europe, and the Balfour declaration was compatible with the “noble policy” of Woodrow Wilson, especially in relation to the right of self-determination. According to the diaries of Colonel William Eddy (commissioner in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia), President Truman was very interested in giving in to the Zionist demands in Palestine. Colonel Eddy tried to warn him of the Arabs' outraged reaction, but President Truman replied that he is running for a second term for presidency and he was not aware of the Arabs' influential voting power compared to that of the Jews⁽¹⁾.

In short, Harry Truman marked the first public announcement of the U.S. biased position. He needed the support of the Jewish vote for the second term election; therefore, he had to be very supportive of the establishment of the Israeli state. When challenged by some members of the State Department, he replied: “I’m sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents”⁽²⁾.

The American President Dwight D. Eisenhower had some frictions with the Egyptian president Nasser in 1956, but he differed slightly from Truman when dealing with the Israel-Arab conflict. The friction between the U.S. and Israel started when Israel joined Britain and France in conquering Sinai on October 29, 1956 because Egyptian President Nasser took control of the Suez Canal zone away from the British and French companies which owned it. This war against Egypt had angered the Eisenhower administration; the U.S. condemned the aggression and worked extensively on insuring the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Egyptian territories. Israel, led by Ben-Gurion, ignored the U.S. outraged reaction and refused to withdraw his military forces. The U.S. was worried about

(1) Nizam Sharabi. *Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin [America And The Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World]* (London: Riyadh al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 1990).

(2) Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crises: The Presidency of Harry Truman, 1945-1948*. (New York: W. Norton, 1977), p.322.

widening the political gap between them and the Arabs since there was an alternative hostile competitor (USSR) seeking the containment of the Arab countries. The USSR threatened that it would support Egypt by using its military force which succeeded in worrying the U.S. engaging in a wider war; the last thing President Eisenhower wanted was a wider war over Suez. Also, the U.S. attempted to eliminate entirely the French and British historical super power in the Middle East; therefore, Eisenhower tried to maintain an organized peaceful world order pursued by the U.S. Finally, President Eisenhower pressured Britain, France and Israel into agreeing to a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal from Egypt.

As for the Israeli-U.S. relationship in that period, it was marked as the first serious friction taking place between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. represented by its Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned Israel harshly in his speech at the United Nations Assembly accusing the Israeli government of committing a huge error by breaching the United Nations Charter. The U.S. threatened to suspend the military and economic aid for Israel until it would have obeyed the international laws set by the United Nation Resolutions; Eisenhower threatened Israel with severe boycotts if Israel did not respect such international resolutions. It was not a new position taken by Eisenhower against Israel; he also suspended the American aid when Israel, in 1953, attempted to convert the Jordanian water into Israeli water. Israel committed to the requests of the United Nations. This Israeli commitment became a precedent in the history of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

After the 1967 War, and during the Nixon administration, the relationship with the Arabs was limited due to the lack of knowledge about the Palestinian situation. The Palestinians had not tried enough to make a positive impression; on the contrary, they adopted international terrorism such as: hijacking TWA airplanes and the civil war (in the early 1970s) with Jordan ruled by King Hussein (Royal Hashemite Family is a good friend of U.S.). These violent acts very much worsened the Palestinians' position, and the international community's negative perception of the Palestinians was exacerbated. In addition, Henry Kissinger, similar to Nixon, was uninformed about the Palestinians and their cause. The Arabs and the Palestinians themselves harmed their position with the rhetoric they were using in that era. Christison explained:

“Disregard of all the Arabs, including the Palestinians, was inevitable in the atmosphere prevailing after the 1967 war. The fiery rhetoric of militant Arabs and their lurid threats against Israel had cast them as pariahs, as had the belligerent declaration of the Arab heads of state shortly after the war that there would be no recognition of Israel, no negotiation, and no peace agreement. The fact that six Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with the United States during the war, as well as their increasing their alliance with Soviet Union, the cold war enemy, increased the Arabs' isolation from Americans and the sense they were all alien. The Palestinians' resort to terrorism in the late 1960's added greatly to this alienation. At a time when popular support for Israel was exploding, the Arabs had clearly, in the minds of Americans, placed themselves on the wrong side”⁽¹⁾.

In short, Nixon and Kissinger focused on their foreign policy (foreign national interest) towards the Soviet Union and how they could check their influence. The United States did not care about the Middle East except when it was related to the U.S. advantage; they viewed some of the main Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria as pro-Soviets who adopted a strategic policy in the region which called for the destruction of Israel. The Nixon administration, for example, declared its position clearly in the October War; it did not pretend to be neutral during this war. Four war ships, including the aircraft carrier (Independence), were ordered to move from Athens to the eastern Mediterranean in order to help Israel if needed. When the Israeli losses were heavier than what Israel and the U.S. had expected, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger (U.S. Secretary of State) sprang to rescue Israel. They supported Israel by mounting an air lift of jets and electronic gear that helped Israel to continue the fight with the indication that it may win the war against the Arabs. Kissinger had no difficulty winning the backing of Nixon in directing the American policy toward the Middle East and specifically towards the unequivocal support for the Israelis⁽²⁾.

Another important U.S. foreign policy strategist who contributed effectively in shaping the U.S. biased position against the Palestinians is Zbigniew Brzezinski. President Carter selected Brzezinski, who is originally from Poland and became a U.S. citizen in 1958, for the position of the National Security Advisor (NSA) because he wanted an assertive intellectual at his side to provide him with day-to-day advice and guidance on foreign policy decisions. He is known, among politicians, to be one of the most skilled people in

(1) Christison, op.cit., p.124.

(2) Frank C. Sakran, *Palestine, Still a Dilemm*, (Pennsylvania: Whitmore Pub. Co. 1976), pp: 94-95.

predicting the political future of several countries; he predicted the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Brzezinski has been given much credit for helping Jimmy Carter in brokering the successful agreement between Israel and Egypt (1979). The negotiations ended up with signing and ratifying of the Camp David Treaty in (1981). Since this agreement was signed, there has not been one single aggressive action, worth mentioning, that had occurred to violate the agreement from the Egyptian side. Israel attacked Lebanon, heavily, twice (1982, 2006) without any violent reaction from Egypt. These two incursions to Lebanon by Israel were considered as the real tests of the commitments by the Egyptians towards their peaceful agreement with Israel. Israeli heavy attack and the killing of many civilians in Gaza in January, 2009, and the controversial position that was taken by Egypt towards this war is another example of the fruits of Camp David (1979). Both Brzezinski and Carter are proud of this achievement. There are more U.S. foreign national interest strategists such as James Baker and others, but those, mentioned above, are to be considered most important ones in the recent history of the U.S. foreign policy.

3.4 U.S. National interest in the Region

The correlation between strengthening Israel and serving the U.S. national interest in the Middle East was quite high from the perspective of several U.S. policy strategists (Kissinger and others). The understanding is basically simple; having Israel as a strong ally in the region would protect U.S. interests from the danger of the former Soviet Union. The United States traditionally defined its national interest in the Middle East by the containment of the Soviet Union expansion and the continuous flow of oil to the West. The containment principle was followed as a means of preventing the change of the super powers' balance, guaranteeing the freedom and the security for the West reaching the oil region, securing the arrival of "American Made" products to the region's markets, and establishing the opportunities for more U.S. investments. Therefore, it would have been unwise not to support Israel especially for the sake of keeping it as an alert guard who would protect U.S. regional interests. In other words, Israel would be the strategic power source for the United States.

Most of the American Presidents, from the second half of the twentieth century till present (2010), have frequently stressed on the rhetoric that Israel is the stable and the eternal ally of the U.S., and that U.S. will exert its best efforts to keep this strong bond from being broken. Nevertheless, several disputes have arisen between both countries especially during the period of Ronald Reagan's presidency term (1981-1989). Reagan was not pleased with the policies of Israel and found out that Israel had breached, more than once, the agreement with U.S. concerning the Palestinian cause and its neighboring Arab countries such as Lebanon. The dispute between Israel and Reagan Administration arose over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; Israel promised that its mission in Lebanon would be very limited (crossing only 25 miles in the Lebanese territories for the sake of protecting the Galilee area), but ended up in areas next to Beirut (capital). The American politicians were trying to strengthen their relations with the Lebanese government at that time because they were concerned with the undesired fact that Lebanon would become a country dominated by the Syrians who were under the influence of the Soviet Union. The 1980s were the worst period for both countries in terms of compromising on their interests. U.S.-Israeli relations deteriorated in those years to the lowest point since the establishment of the state of Israel. Israel was not abiding and complying with U.S. demands and the U.S. was concerned about its own interests in the region. The primary concern of the U.S was not to lose the loyalty of friendly Arab countries considering that the other Super Power (former Soviet Union) was interested in establishing stronger relationships with the Middle East ⁽¹⁾.

The U.S. has had eleven presidents since the establishment of the State of Israel till present (Barack Obama's current presidency). History has shown that every president has unequivocally supported Israel, and was unfair towards the Palestinians. Shimon Peres (current President of Israel) said in one of his speeches, that even President Abraham Lincoln once promised his Jewish doctor, Isachar Zacharie, to support the establishment of a Jewish state. Although this fact is disputed, it is widely accepted that one of Lincoln's acquaintances did indeed tell him about an idea to establish a state for the Jews in the "Land of Israel", and Lincoln replied that the option was worthy of consideration. He added incidentally that he had respect for the Jews; his podiatrist was Jewish ⁽²⁾.

(1) Christison, op.cit. pp: 280-283.

(2) Haaretz: Article by Tom Segev, *Did Abraham Lincoln Support the Creation of a Jewish State? Last update-02/27/2009.*

Continually, American Presidents have exhibited high levels of support toward Israel, which has led many political analysts and researchers to tackle this controversial question, who controls whom? The main unresolved issue is whether the special U.S.-Israeli relation was the result of pressure imposed on the U.S. by interest groups or a U.S. foreign policy strategy. Some argue that U.S. foreign policy is controlled by internal pressure groups such as AIPAC, while others think it is matter of strategic economic interest. Chomsky for example, had pointed out that the role of AIPAC has been exaggerated for being considered as the main power that controls the American politicians. James Petras agreed with Noam Chomsky's on this particular issue:

- “1. The pro-Israel Lobby is just like any other lobby; it has no special influence or place in US politics.
2. The power of the groups backing the Israel Lobby is no more powerful than other influential pressure groups.
3. The Lobby's agenda succeeds because it coincides with the interests of the US state.
4. The Lobby's weakness is demonstrated by the fact that Israel is “merely a tool” of US empire-building to be used when needed and otherwise marginalized.
5. The major forces shaping US Middle policy are "big oil" and the "military –industrial complex", neither of which is connected to the pro Israel- Lobby.
6. The interests of the US generally coincide with the interests of Israel”⁽¹⁾.

The discussion of the Israeli-U.S. special relationship will be, in this section, about two main points:

1. Is it a strategic U.S. interest?
2. Is it the result of the influence of the pressure groups spear-headed by AIPAC?

The United States support of Israel is excessive; the size of the U.S. supports, political, economic, military, and diplomatically, exceeds any normal support established between two traditional political systems. It is usually known that any super power supports its ally in order to keep it strong, so the supported country will do its part in protecting the donor country's interests. The U.S. has offered unlimited support for Israel, but Israel was involved, several times, in operations that contradict and were harmful to the U.S. interests in the region .This kind of a relation hindered the U.S. from the containment of the

(1) James Petras, *The Power of Israel in the United States*. (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2006), p.169.

Soviets' influence and did not allow them to access Middle East markets effectively. In reference to the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship, Jimmy Carter explained that, according to the law, Israel violated legally the agreement between the two countries; he said that the "use of American weapons violated a legal requirement that armaments sold by us be used only for Israeli defense against an attack"⁽¹⁾.

It has been said by several U.S. political leaders that Israel and the U.S. share many ethical, cultural, and moral values; they resemble each other when it comes to their democratic and political systems. However, there are several indications that this hypothesis is not accurate. For instance, the U.S. constitution states clearly the equity before the law (nobody is above the law) and equal opportunities for all (pursuit of happiness), pluralism, and that citizenry in the United States is not based on religion, race, or political orientation. Israel, however, does not have a constitution yet, and its general concept is mainly based on the understanding that it will be a Jewish state that follows Jewish religious values and instructions while applying the social rules on its citizenry.

Freedom of speech for Palestinians is highly controlled, and freedom of the press is limited. King Hussein of Jordan criticized U.S. political leaders including American Senator Edward Kennedy when he said that Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East region. King Hussein wondered how Israel can be considered a democratic state when it sends its armed troopers to shoot Palestinian students inside their schools or colleges simply because they demonstrated against the Occupation. The Israeli army has more than once attacked Palestinian universities and arrested many of the students because of their peaceful demonstrations. Most of Palestinian universities were frequently closed by the Israeli government and many houses were demolished after ordering their owners to leave without taking their belongings. This democratic state takes a child from his Jewish mother simply because she was married to a Palestinian person!!⁽²⁾.

The Israeli scholar Avi Shlaim who served in the Israeli Army in the mid-1960s raised his concern about the legitimacy of Israel as a democratic state. Because of his critical and bold views about the Israeli occupation, he is considered one of the "new historians" who

(1) Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid*, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc. 2006), p.44.

(2) Nizam Sharabi, *Amerika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin* [*America and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century*], (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 1990), pp: 642-643.

is frequently labeled as “anti-Zionist” as well as the rest of the scholars who dare to criticize the practices of the Israeli governments such as: Noam Chomsky, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and Uri Milstein. In his article “How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe”, Avi Shlaim came to the conclusion after the assault by Israel on Gaza in December 2008-January 2009 that Israel has never tried to promote democracy on the Arab side. He wrote:

“Israel likes to portray itself as an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism. Yet Israel has never in its entire history done anything to promote democracy on the Arab side and has done a great deal to undermine it. Israel has a long history of secret collaboration with reactionary Arab regimes to suppress Palestinian nationalism. Despite all the handicaps, the Palestinian people succeeded in building the only genuine democracy in the Arab world with the possible exception of Lebanon. In January 2006, free and fair elections for the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority brought to power a Hamas-led government. Israel, however, refused to recognize the democratically elected government, claiming that Hamas is purely and simply a terrorist organization” ⁽¹⁾.

In general, many political analysts refer this special kind of relations to different reason; mainly to the role of “pressure groups” in the U.S. such as the American Israel Public Committee (AIPAC). Initially, these pressure groups succeeded in worrying the U.S. people about the constant threat and the danger of the Soviets, thus presenting Israel as a necessary ally. The role of AIPAC and other interested groups have served to forward Israel interests in the U.S. at the expense of an accurate perception of Arab states and Palestinian people.

AIPAC is very active in trying to dominate student activities at American universities since they are increasingly worried about the direct contact between the Americans and Palestinian and other Arab students. In the 1980s they established “student leadership committees”, whose main role was to formulate an obstacle to any activity that might harm Israel’s image on American university campuses. AIPAC’s main argument is that what benefits the Israelis will automatically benefit the Americans. They have always stressed on the idea of “What is good for Israel will be good for the U.S. national interest”, and they

(1) For more information see: *How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe* by Avi Shlaim at <http://www.guardian.co.uk:80/world/2009/jan/07/gaza-israel-palestine>. Accessed on: January, 8, 2009.

have succeeded in transforming these ideas into the main principles of the U.S. Policy towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AIPAC is registered as a domestic organization and not as a foreign one even though there was enough evidence in 1963 (Fulbright Case Hearing) that would indict it as a foreign diplomatic agency. There have been many incidents in the U.S. where AIPAC has played an important role in directing the U.S. foreign policy. There were several trials held in U.S. courts concerning the suspicious role of AIPAC in cooperating illegally with the Israeli Intelligence Agency⁽¹⁾.

The strongest weapon that AIPAC employs, as mentioned earlier, is the use of the Anti-Semitism rhetoric by accusing whoever criticizes Israel of being Anti-Semitic. Such a tactic has worked efficiently for them as most of American people attempt to avoid such an accusation. Since many have strong sympathy and sad feelings toward the Holocaust, they worry about this particular type of accusation more than worrying about not being supported financially by AIPAC. The election system process in the U.S. is another leading factor that helps AIPAC in playing a very important role in determining the results of the American political elections. For example the percentages of the American people who are eligible to vote are 70 % (70 persons of each hundred). Only 60% percent of the 70% are registered to vote (42 persons), however; the people who actually participate in voting are about 50% (21 persons). It just needs 11 persons (Half + 1) to win the election. So, even though the Jewish community is only about 3% of the American people , the results of their participation in the American election is about the same of the African-Americans' election results who form around 11 percent of the American public⁽²⁾.

AIPAC controls the American "democratic elections" through the financial support for some American nominees and the extensive attendance and participation in the preliminary elections. The participation of the Jewish vote is carefully planned and effectively contributes in choosing the right candidate for them and for Israel; the Jewish community is basically known for their active participation in the voting and they take this matter very seriously. Both Republicans and Democrats try their best to attain the Jewish votes, and to achieve this, they must promise to support Israel. Some American journalists have considered AIPAC as the main force that influences the American foreign policy in

(1) Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 1989), pp: 320-322.

(2) Janice Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, (London: Pluto Press. 2005), p.21

the Middle East. For example, the *New York Times*, one of the main newspapers in U.S., described AIPAC as a major force in shaping United States policy in the Middle East:

“The article stated that: the organization has gained power to influence a presidential candidate's choice of staff, to block practically any arms sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst for intimate military relations between the Pentagon and the Israeli army. Its leading officials are consulted by State Department and White House policy makers, by senators and generals” the organization has gained power to influence a presidential candidate's choice of staff , to block practically any arms sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst”⁽¹⁾.

As for the U.S.-Arab relations, Arabs, in general, and Palestinians in particular, wonder why and how the U.S. has been adopting such a Middle East foreign policy. The traditional U.S. policy strongly favors meeting the Israeli needs and interests while it constantly obstructs the Palestinians from exercising their fundamental rights such as democracy, and social and economic development. In other words, people in the Middle East do not understand the contradiction of the United States which always presents the image of itself as a nation that promotes freedom, democracy, and human rights while it is practicing the opposite when dealing with the Arabs.

Sharabi explained that many American leaders believe that Israel forms a strategic military base on all three levels (ground, sea, & air). This, of course, would strengthen the American dominance over the Middle East, and Israel would be used by the Americans as the safe guard of their national interests⁽²⁾. Many other researchers do agree with Sharabi on this assumption such as Rubenberg (1989), Janice Terry (2005), and Kathleen Christison who said that: “Arabs essentially played no part, in which they were politically invisible, patronized, disdained or ignored altogether”⁽³⁾.

When the U.S. Middle East policy started after WWI, the number of Arabs in the United States was limited, and they had not formed any influential interest group to advance their interests among U.S. policy makers. In contrast, the Zionist lobby was

(1) For more information see: *AIPAC: A Major Force in Washington*, by: Shipler, David K. (New York Times, July 06, 1987).

(2) Nizam Sharabi. *Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin America And The Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 1990), p.740.

(3) Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on Middle East Policy*, (California: University of California press, 1999), p.26.

growing rapidly by taking advantage of both the predominant orientalist mind-set of the U.S. public and policy makers and the growing Jewish constituency in the United States. In general, most of the analysts drew the same conclusion that Israel is the undisputed strategic ally for the Americans in the region. The general impression taken by the American politicians is based on previous political positions given by some Arab leaders and the shallow information provided by some pro-Israel White House staff. Janice Terry has concluded that many of the American presidents rely so much on the information about the Arab rulers given by the White House staff. Anwar Sadat, for example, was introduced to Jimmy Carter who knew more information about Sadat's attachment to his smoking pipe than about his political positions (at the beginning of their acquaintance). In comparison with the way the Israeli leaders are described and introduced to the American presidents, one can find that the Arabs are far away from understanding the "political game".

Most of the Arab-American relations were controlled by the individual interest of each country and not by presenting their case as one united and collective demand. For example, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt were and still are very loyal to the U.S. regardless of the hostile treatment of the Palestinians. According to Janice Terry, even though Saudi Arabia was known for its high rank religious position among the Arab-Moslem world, it was the only Arab country that was dealing with Israeli experts and companies during the boycott period (1970s) ⁽¹⁾. Egypt is the second country in the world, after Israel, in receiving the American financial aid Jordan has been and is still considered as one of the devoted allies to the U.S among the rest of the Arab states. Kuwait is very grateful to the U.S because of the military support that Kuwait received during the Gulf War; Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990, but the occupation did not last long after U.S. military intervention.

On the other hand, those analysts, themselves, suggest that it is not impossible for other Arab countries to change this negative attitude which was being taken by the U.S. against them for a very long time. The organized efforts, which the Arabs didn't have, will be the main "magic recipe" for this goal to be achieved. The Arab community in the U.S. has tried to establish cultural and social associations but has avoided establishing economical and political ones. After 1967 war, most Arab-Americans felt the dire need to establish some political organizations, especially since their perception of the ugly defeat deepened

(1) Janice Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, (London: Pluto Press. 2005).

their feeling of isolation (being different from the majority of the Americans who were happy about the defeat of the Arabs). Therefore, some Arab intellectuals met and decided to establish the Arab American Universities Graduates (AAUG) as an educational, cultural and charity association⁽¹⁾.

In the beginning of the 1970s, the National Arab American Association (NAAA) was established as an Arab lobby concentrated on defending the Arab cause before both the U.S. Congress and their political officials. More Arab associations were later established, such as the American-Arab Anti Discrimination committee (AAADC, 1980), and the Arab-American Institute (AAI, 1985) in order to defend the civil rights of the Arabs and to educate the Arab-Americans about the significance of their contribution in the U.S. elections. After more than twenty five years of work, those associations have not harvested tangible achievements and this is due to the following factors: First, most of the Arab-American community stayed far away from being involved in American politics. Second, the Arab community in the U.S. is not educated enough about the importance of donations for political causes, and they have always failed in establishing or choosing a skillful political committee to represent them efficiently in the political arena and in U.S. election campaigns. Third, the civil war in Lebanon and the Arabs ignorance of the importance of uniting on one political position towards the U.S. has weakened their position. Fourth, some Arab countries that were interested in political work in the U.S. hired Americans over Arab-Americans. Arab states have not supported Arab-Americans and they ignored the fact that those Arab-Americans can be of a better use for them than the completely strangers to their culture and needs. In other words, those Arab countries have neglected the educated, cultured, and skilled Arab-Americans in particular. Finally, the Arab countries have neglected their U.S. political supporters (sympathizers) and did not encourage them to continue in fighting for the Arab rights and interests⁽²⁾.

In addition, Arab diplomacy is very traditional and classical when contacting the American officials; they cannot establish some pressure channels outside the official frame in which they can influence effectively U.S. decision making. Saudi Arabia has tried establishing some connections outside the frame of its embassy (among the American-Saudi oil companies), but this was a very small effort in comparison with the enormous

(1) Muhammed A. Rabie, *Sunu' el-Siyasa al-Amrikiyyeh wal-Arab* [The Making of the American Policy and Arabs], (Amman: Manshourat Dar el-Kaemel-Samed 1990), p.224.

(2) Ibid.

achievements of the other lobbies such as AIPAC, which has worked against the will and the desire of the Arabs. Egypt has tried to create a civil relationship with the Americans but its efforts stayed very limited. The Arab League tried also to present the Palestinian-Israeli case but it remained ineffective; it relied on one single person (former ambassador Dr. Clovis Maksoud) to argue the case using his own personal experience and judgment instead of referring to an organized plan issued by the League.

The question is what the Arabs should do in order to change this weak and unsatisfactory position. It is not a secret that Arabs have not had a significant role in the decision-making of the U.S. foreign policy. This, however, does not mean that they cannot have an important role in the future since the nature of American society and its leaders are open to new constructive ideas and relationships.

3.5 Foreign Assistance: Incentives and pressures

The U.S. has spent billions of dollars on financial assistance to foreign countries. Helping poorer countries has become one of the permanent pillars of the U.S. foreign policy. It donated to Palestine \$ 550 million U.S. dollars at the international conference held in Paris (December, 2007) and \$ 900 million at the international conference held in Egypt (February, 2009). These donations were given mainly for the sake of helping the Palestinian Authority (PA). Countries that have benefited from U.S. foreign aid vary in their race, religion, and political views. Most Arab countries that benefit from foreign financial aid are very loyal to the U.S. However, many Arabs think of such governments as puppet regimes since they witness the extreme bias toward Israel e.g. Gaza War (2009), but always endorse the U.S. role as the only fair mediator. This type of foreign policy towards Arab states is doomed to failure because of the dissatisfaction with such a discriminating policy. Therefore, the Foreign Financial Aid approach by U.S. does not always function successfully; in complicated situations such as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the issue of helping the Palestinian community is definitely questionable by many Palestinians. Furthermore, the U.S. considers itself as a nation that respects the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights while its policy towards the Palestinian cause undermines the credibility of these “American values”. Since the end of WWII, the U.S.

position has been clearly viewed, not only by some Arab states, but also by many other countries such as Russia or China, as pro-Israel and against the “Arab-Moslem world”.

Providing foreign aid supports U.S. strategic interests and offers many veiled benefits of U.S. policy. For example, it is a little known fact that 80% of U.S. foreign assistance is spent in the United States. Many Americans (farmers, truckers, assembly line workers, software developers) depend on U.S. foreign assistance and benefit from this kind of assistance; if the U.S. administration cuts foreign financial assistance off, it would be cutting off the jobs of millions of their people ⁽¹⁾. U.S. economic strategists believe that the continuation of helping foreign countries is necessary to ensure U.S. prosperity. As mentioned above, a significant portion of foreign aids is reinvested into the American economy, creating both U.S. domestic jobs, and foreign dependency not only on U.S. aid, but on U.S. manufactured products ⁽²⁾.

As for the foreign financial aid policy, the U.S. is determined to continue this policy as a way of approaching diplomatically other countries. Because of the dissatisfaction about the foreign assistance structures that had been applied since the days of Marshal Plan, there was a dire need to reorganize these unsuccessful programs. Even though there was a big success in improving the American foreign relations with the European countries, it was not enough, according to American strategists, and such a policy has still not achieved its final goals. Therefore, the U.S. attempted to improve its methods of aiding financially other poorer countries:

“On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the U.S. foreign assistance programs; including separating military and non-military aid.....on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID become the first U.S. foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. Freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organization, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world” ⁽³⁾.

(1) See: *Protecting America's Future: The Role of Foreign Assistance*, (March, 2000).

(2) For more information about the role of U.S. foreign aid in the American economy, see *The Congressional Report Service*, (2008).

(3) See: *USAID Boycott of Target* at: www.fpiif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0205aidboycott_body.html. (December, 23, 2008).

The publicly announced goals of USAID program in the Palestinian Occupied Territories are to promote stability in the region and to help establishing the ground work for a final and “just” peaceful settlement. This settlement will lead to a two state solution (Israel and Palestine) living side by side as good neighbors. The other claimed objective is to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians. This can be done, according to USAID, by addressing the basic needs such as food, health, water and waste purification, education, and economy. In addition, USAID is designed to assist Palestinian political development and “Democratic Reform”, focusing on the rule of law, and their ruined infrastructure. According to the report in “For the Record”, USAID has focused extensively on its activities in Palestine after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993.

“Prior to the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the Palestinians, USAID’s program in the Occupied Territories focused on community service work. After the Oslo process began, this program expanded “considerably” from \$10 or \$15 million a year to \$75 million a year. USAID has tried to “support some of the specific provisions outlined in the [Oslo] Accords” by, for example, providing assistance to the 1996 Palestinian elections and offering job training and housing. USAID began implementing a five year strategy in 1996, focusing on three key areas: 1) economic development, with the primary goal of “strengthen[ing] private structures”; “democratic governance,” such as supporting the elections, the Palestinian Legislative Council, civil society organizations, and so forth; and 3) water and waste purification. This last area has been the largest “by far,” contended Garber. In Gaza, USAID has helped develop a waste water treatment plant and build infrastructure for water distribution. In the West Bank, it has assisted Palestinian development of the Eastern Aquifer and the creation of major water reservoirs in Bethlehem and Hal Hul”⁽¹⁾.

However, many Palestinians think of USAID as the extended arm of the CIA; their perception of this organization is that it is being more harmful than useful to them. But the extensive efforts made by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in promoting the Tenet Plan proposed by George Tenet (former Head of the CIA) have indicated that some Palestinians are comfortable with the “American intervention” in their internal affairs. People who are comfortable with USAID programs justify their satisfaction by suggesting that the average Palestinian needs the financial aid in order to improve living conditions. They do not envisage any harm in getting the aid as long as it does not jeopardize their national aspiration. They compare their acceptance of the financial aids from Saudi Arabia or Jordan where they do not believe that those countries have helped in facilitating the

(1) For more information see: *Assisting Palestinian Development: Current Challenges* by: Larry Garber at <http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/pubs/20010222fr.html> (November 09, 2008).

Palestinian struggle more than what U.S.A. has done. As a matter of fact, Syria with *Tel Al Zater*, Jordan with Black September, Egypt with Camp David 1979, is a clear indicator that U.S.A. is no different from any other Arab country in their relations with the Palestinians.

The U.S. has offered a generous program for the sake of developing the economy and the living status of the Palestinians. The followings are some USAID Program Budget Analysis (1993-2002):

“Following the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993, the U.S. government provided \$375 million between 1993 and 1998 through USAID to implement a program of development in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1999, the regular USAID operating year budget was maintained at \$75 million and in 2000 its level increased to \$85 million. In 2000, the U.S. Congress appropriated an additional \$400 million to USAID West Bank and Gaza to facilitate the implementation of the Wye River Accords. In 2001, USAID West Bank/Gaza's operating year budget remained at approximately \$85 million. USAID funding for the West Bank and Gaza between 1993 and 2001 totals approximately \$1 billion. Of this amount, \$540 million had been obligated through September 2000 and approximately \$460 million will be obligated by September 30, 2002. Using the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation's (MOPIC) comparative data, the U.S. is, by far, the highest disbursing bilateral donor in the West Bank and Gaza”⁽¹⁾.

Yet many Palestinians still question the actual reasons behind USAID programs in their region, and there is a growing trend toward boycotting these American programs. Palestinians who were promised of financial aid by the U.S. government were deprived of such assistance under *Hamas* leadership. Even though the *Hamas* led- government was elected democratically and under the supervision of Europeans and some Americans (Jimmy Carter), all American aid projects were frozen. Hundreds of millions of dollars were held from the Palestinian Authority which is responsible for the development of the infrastructure and the public sector (teachers, nurses, and public sector workers). There was an international sanction of the *Hamas* led-government, led by the Americans, which caused very critical conditions for the Palestinians. The halt aid led to enormous deterioration in the areas of sanitation, environment, water, health, education, and “Democracy Building”. The U.S. Congress claimed that the aim of the freeze was to ensure that no money goes to “terrorists”; USAID is controlled and limited by the U.S.

(1) see: United States Aid to the Palestinians at www.usaidgov/wbg/budget (November 14, 2008).

Congress. According to Gershon Baskin, “The U.S. Congress: prohibits funding anything in the Palestinian territories that might benefit *Hamas* or members of *Hamas*, or people affiliated with *Hamas*, or anyone who looks like *Hamas*”⁽¹⁾.

The term “Democracy”, unfortunately, is defined differently by the U.S. from its “traditional definition” when applying the same to Arab regimes; its determination whether one Arab state is practicing democracy or not is based on which Arab political party wins the election. What happened in Algeria in 1990⁽²⁾, and what took place in the last Palestinian parliament election⁽³⁾ verifies the incongruity of how the Americans define the term “Democracy”. As a result, some Arabs such as the Saudis, Sudanese, Syrians, Palestinians, and the Egyptians, consider the use of slogans of “Sovereignty of the law and human rights violation” as inconsistent to U.S. active policy.

3.6 Analysis

The transfer of the foreign policy role from the Congress to the American presidents started under Nixon’s Presidency in 1970s where his Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger) became one of the prominent key players in shaping the American foreign policy. Kissinger was known for his bias with Israel, while he had a hostile attitude towards the Arabs. Similarly, when Jimmy Carter was the President, he relied mainly on his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (his previous mentor) who was also known for being pro-Israel. Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush were not, with some slight variation, familiar with the details of the conflict in the Middle East. Those presidents, except may be for Jimmy Carter, were acting as managers when dealing with the crises in the Middle East and they relied mostly on their advisors and foreign policy strategists who were pro-Israel for doing “the job”.

U.S. foreign policy supports democratic governments abroad and they have been trying for, the last five decades, to apply this policy in the Arab World. Brzezinski, for

(1) For more information see: US sanctions on Palestinian Territories taking their toll, (Correspondents Report <http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2006/s1764725> ,October 15, 2006).

(2) The Algerian Islamic movement made its mark in 1990 election(gaining control of some 800 local government offices across the country). It carries the name: Islamic Salvation front(I.S.F.).

(3) (Hamas movement winning a surprise victory in parliamentary election on Jan.25, 2006).

example, believes that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the core of international conflict and the reason behind the instability of political systems in many parts of the world. He claims that if Arab governments in general, and the Palestinians, in particular, become “democratic countries”, the conflict with the Israelis would have a better chance to be resolved. According to U.S. strategists, democratic systems usually do not believe in violence as the only approach to solving disputes or resolving conflicts. Democratic governments only resort to violence after exhausting all peaceful efforts. Further, a democratic country would become naturally, at least, a friend of the United States if not one of its allies.

It may become difficult sometimes for the United States to promote democracy in all Arab states since some parties abuse the democratic system by participating in it for only one purpose; that is to get to the power of ruling. What happened in Algeria in the early 1990s led the United States to reconsider their perspective of "democratic elections" and its universal applicability. Where and how it should be applied became the main concern of the U.S. foreign policy strategists; when one political party wants to change the legislations in order to maintain power for itself (monopoly), the whole purpose of exporting democracy will be defeated. This explains the "strong relationship" that the United States has with several Arab states which do not adopt democratic methods in their ruling system. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are to be considered as strong allies of the U.S. According to Haaretz newspaper, Hillary Clinton proposed that: “The American nuclear umbrella [is] extended to other countries in the region, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, if they agree to relinquish their own nuclear ambitions”⁽¹⁾.

Palestinians, have been harmed severely by the negative positions the U.S. has taken against them in resolving the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. Understanding the special relationship between the U.S. and the Israelis, and the power of the American Jewish Lobby with its influence on the U.S. foreign policy makes the Palestinians suspicious about any help they may get from the United States. George Mitchell, the current U.S. envoy has stressed:

“Striking economic peace between Israel and the Palestinians, without diplomatic efforts, would not succeed, explaining that diplomatic and economic efforts "must be parallel, not sequential.

(1) Haaretz: an Article about Hillary Clinton. December 11, 2008 Kislev 14, 5769.

You can't have economic development when you're shutting the door in the face of any diplomatic development" ⁽¹⁾.

Some Palestinians do not even agree with the U.S. definition of the term "Democracy". They accuse U.S. administrations of hypocrisy and contradiction while dealing with the terms of "democracy, human rights and justice". If the U.S. does not balance its financial aid and fair role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, its value will simply disappear because it will have outlived its usefulness ⁽²⁾.

There should not be a high expectation for a change in the U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the near future. Both former presidential candidates Republican John McCain and Democratic Hilary Clinton in and President Barack Obama have all made very similar statements concerning the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hilary Clinton threatened that she would defend the security of Israel and would harm any party who might think of fighting Israel. Barack Obama announced his absolute support for Israel and did not distinguish between resistance vs. terrorism, and John McCain announced that Jerusalem would be the eternal united capital for Israel. The new political appointments by Barack Obama such as Hillary Clinton and Ram Emanuel are another sign of the very strong (unbreakable) bond between Israel and the U.S. Barak Obama has chosen Hilary Clinton who is pro-Israel to be his Secretary of State in his current administration. This position is the highest rank in the U.S. foreign policy and would be the most important position that deals with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The role of AIPAC in influencing American foreign policy is a serious matter that needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing such a policy. The ignorance of Arab diplomats and the original hate towards the Arab and the Moslem world in general helps AIPAC in convincing the Americans that Israel is a "democratic country", and that it is the only reliable ally for the U.S. in the Middle East. The financial support provided to American politicians by AIPAC and the constant interference in the work of the committees in the American Congress leads to the conclusion that U.S. foreign policy is influenced by internal pressure groups. It would be unreasonable to ignore the power of

(1) Natasha Mozogoyaya. *George Mitchell*. Israel: Haaretz Newspaper. February 19, 2009.

(2) Noam Chomsky. *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*. (New York: Metropolitan books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 2006).

AIPAC in the United States and the important role of AIPAC in influencing the decision-makers of the American foreign policy. As an example:

“In 1992, AIPAC President David Steiner had to resign when he was tape recorded boasting about his political influence in obtaining aid for Israel. Steiner claimed that he had met with (the Bush U.S. secretary of State) Jim Baker and I cut a deal with him. I got, besides the \$ 3 billion, you know they're looking for the Jewish votes, and I'll tell him whatever he wants to hear...Besides the \$ 10 billion in loan guarantees which was a fabulous thing, \$ 3 billion in foreign, in military aid, and I got almost a billion dollars in other goodies that the people don't even know about. Steiner also claimed to be "negotiating" with the incoming Clinton administration over who Clinton would appoint as a Secretary of State and Secretary of the National Security Agency. Steiner stated that AIPAC had a dozen people in [the Clinton] campaign, in the headquartersand they're all going to get big jobs”⁽¹⁾.

Nonetheless, recognizing the importance of the role of AIPAC does not necessarily mean that it completely controls U.S. foreign policy. Israel is being used merely as a tool serving the U.S. national interests. In the mid- 1980's Israel and its supporters in the United States were hoping that the Reagan's administration would not sell the AWAX aircraft planes to Saudi Arabia but they failed in doing so; the Saudis have finally bought those planes. In 1991, President George H. Bush put enormous pressure on the Israelis to attend the Madrid Peace Conference against their desire; they could not refuse and they were forced to come to the peace conference. In the same era, the U.S. threatened to stall the \$ 10 billion dollars loans that was set to be offered for Israel if it did not freeze settlements; Israel agreed to this demand because it direly needed the loan. In the years 2000 and 2005, the U.S. forced Israel not to go through with the arms deal that Israel had prepared with China. Further, Israel has been asking for a long time for the release of its agent who was convicted of spying on the U.S. for Israel but has faced a constant U.S. refusal. Therefore, it would not be rational to determine that the role of AIPAC is the only reason behind the hostile U.S. attitude towards the Arabs or the Palestinians. Noam Chomsky has stressed several times; the whole issue is because of the "Big Oil"⁽²⁾. So, it is a mixture of several different factors that influence the U.S. foreign policy and not a sole

(1) For more information see: *Washington Report on Middle East Affair*, December/January, 1992/1993, p.69.

(2) Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, (New York: Metropolitan books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2006) .

one. It would be inaccurate to determine that only one of the mentioned above is the real or major factor; it is very important to be familiar with the real U.S. political environment.

Chapter Four

Case Study 1: Camp David Summit (1979)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the 1979 summit by investigating several variables that influenced the process of the negotiations. It will analyze those variables in terms of the circumstances, the environment, the regional dynamic, and the nature of the mediators' character. The chapter will focus on the main factors that influenced the outcomes of this summit. The prior agreements to the convention had played a very important role in preparing both sides to negotiate peacefully their demands and needs. Thus, the first section of this chapter will discuss the main agreements that took place before the final summit is held.

4.2. Rogers Plan

Three years after the 1967 war, which ended with overwhelming victory of Israel against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the U.S. exerted extensive efforts by to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. The Rogers Plan was an American peace plan for the Middle East proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The plan called for frame work to achieve an end to hostilities in the region caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. This proposal was originally proposed on December 9, 1969 in a speech at an Adult Education conference, but was formally announced on June 19, 1970. The plan arose after the failure of Jarring Mission that was set to negotiate plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 ⁽¹⁾. The UN had previously failed to arbitrate the tensions between Egypt and Israel, so the Soviet Union approached the U.S. administration (President Nixon) proposing a peaceful settlement in the Middle East with the two countries (U.S. & Soviets) as mediators. The U.S. would seek Israel's support while the former Soviet Union would work with Egypt. The plan had 10 points and it included several principles: an Israeli withdrawal to the international borders with Egypt, removing Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh

(1) Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Jarring had tried in the past to promote a peace process between Israel and Egypt. Jarring suggested renewing the ceasefire between the two countries. Israel rejected the plan while Egypt agreed to negotiations.

from Israeli sovereignty, securing safe passage for Israeli ships through Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and maintaining Jerusalem as a unified city run by the three main religions. These principles were to be implemented through negotiations between Egypt and Israel. So the main point was calling for an agreement signed by both sides (Israel and Egypt) ending the state of war; prohibiting any act that may jeopardize the state of peace between them, and demilitarizing the areas which were to be negotiated upon⁽¹⁾.

As for Egypt, it had gained respite to consolidate its missile defense after a huge damage from the war, and Nasser had hoped to open a line of communications with the U.S. to avoid the annoying growing Egyptian reliance on the former Soviet Union. The State Department was concerned about the interference of their competitor (the former Soviet Union) and was trying to degrade the Russians role in the conflict. Henry Kissinger had some differences with Rogers since he did not want to involve the Soviets or their Arab friendly countries hoped that the U.S. would become the sole mediator and the main resource for resolving this conflict. The third Rogers plan, which was proposed for an interim agreement across the Canal, was rejected by Israel within hours after it was submitted for approval. Israel's main concern was that the plan lacked any reference to future possibilities of conducting a peace agreement. Egypt's willingness to accept the plan helped to bring more American pressure on Israel. President Richard Nixon assured the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that the agreement would not harm Israel's characteristic as a Jewish state, and the U.S. would guarantee the sovereignty and the security of Israel, as well as the current balance of power. The Israeli government gave its basic consent to the plan; according to many researchers, this consent was an indication of setting the future opportunity for peaceful negotiations and reaching a final agreement. Aaron Miller, in his book *"The Too Much Promised Land"* explained that Henry Kissinger supported the idea of Israel negotiating peace with the Arabs: "Kissinger saw little merit in trying to impose a settlement only to convince the Arabs that America was best dealt with extortion. Kissinger recalled that the prerequisite to effective Middle East diplomacy was to reduce the Soviet influence so that progress could not be ascribed to its pressures"⁽²⁾.

(1) For more information see: Rogers Plan, at: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php . April 22, 2008.

(2) Aaron Miller, *The Too Much Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York; Bantam dell, a division of Random House Inc., 2008), p.133.

Rogers's efforts were continually countered by the opposite efforts from Kissinger who played a major role in causing the Rogers Plan to fail. According to Rubenberg, even though the U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers was officially in charge of the Middle East affairs, Henry Kissinger was always causing Rogers and his staff's initiatives to fail. There were two opposite positions in that period in the U.S. concerning the conflict in the Middle East. Even though Rogers's position was supported by the agreement of the international community, Kissinger was able to dominate Middle East affairs in that period; his policy trend continued to represent the U.S. foreign policy towards the conflict till present days with some adjustments after the 1973 War⁽¹⁾.

The dispute between William Rogers and Henry Kissinger was one of the main characteristics of President Nixon's term. Kissinger, who was of Jewish descent, was in agreement with Richard Nixon about his perspective towards the world system and the case of the Soviets. He supported Nixon by declaring that the U.S. must be the strongest nation in order to be successful in diplomacy. Kissinger succeeded in having the President's approval to handle foreign affairs policy. He followed a clearly biased policy against the Arabs, justifying it by claiming that Arabs are pro-Soviet while Israel is the only democratic country in the region and it is the strongest and the closest ally for the U.S. in the Middle East. Therefore, he opposed strongly Rogers Plan that was based on Resolution 242 which called for applying the principle of "lands for peace"⁽²⁾.

As mentioned earlier, Kissinger used the pretext of containing the former Soviet Union's role in the region to hinder the progress of the peaceful negotiation between Israel and Egypt. Thus, Rogers declared the failure of the plan in 1970. President Nixon did not have any pro-Arab internal pressure then, so he had more room to be partial and not objective as an American President who was mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Kissinger was naturally supported by the pro-Israel interest groups who were accused any American administration that tried to be more balanced of "selling out Israel for having the Arab oil"⁽³⁾. Even though the Rogers plan failed in that era, its provisions were adopted by the Egyptians and Anwar Sadat stood by these principles in his negotiations with the

(1) Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press., 1989), p.134.

(2) For more information see: *Roger Plan* at: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php. April 22, 2008.

(3) Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: U.S.A.; Israel, and the Palestinians*. (Boston MA: South End Press. 1999).

Israelis under the patronage of the United States. In general, Rogers Plan definitely paved the way to Camp David in 1979, since it got both Israelis and Egyptians used to seeking peaceful solutions.

4.3. October War (Yom Kippur War)

The fourth Arab-Israeli war started on October 6, 1973 on Yom Kippur (the holiest day of the Jewish calendar), when the Syrian and the Egyptian armies, supported by some other Arab states (troops and finance), jointly attacked Israeli military locations along with the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. Israel was caught off guard; therefore, it suffered severe losses. The goals of the Egyptians from the war were limited; they wanted to regain some of the lands occupied by the Israelis in 1967 and to send a statement to both the Israelis and the Americans that the 1967 status quo was not longer tolerable. The war lasted for 18 days until the Israelis abided by the third cease fire agreement that was declared by the United Nations. Even though the Egyptians and the Syrians were defeated in the field (Israel held an additional 165 square miles from Syria, and had encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the west bank of the Suez Canal), it was still a symbolic victory for the Arabs. They succeeded in surprising the Israeli forces and they managed to change the previous portrayed image of the Arabs and their terrible military defeat in 1967. Further, the war was important for the Arabs in general since the oil embargo was used by the Arab states for the first time as a political weapon (Saudi Arabia led the Arab world in an oil embargo against the Western nations especially the United States). This powerful and unprecedented position of the Arabs enabled Egypt to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel. According to Jimmy Carter, “The 1973 war introduced major changes in the character of the Middle East. The effective performance of the Egyptian and the Syrian armies increased the stature of both President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria” ⁽¹⁾.

The Israeli Army leadership encouraged confidence among the Israelis that it would be almost impossible for their defense line to be penetrated by any army. However, its quick collapse in the 1973 War changed the balance of the Israeli power and transformed their perspective about the ability of keeping occupied lands under their control. In other words, it is true that Israel managed to occupy lands quickly, but the capability of keeping these

(1) Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid*. (New York: Simon & Schuster ,Inc., 2006), p.37

lands became the hard fact that Israel had to face. Hence, the Israeli public became more psychologically prepared to abandon Egypt's occupied Sinai. According to William Zartman, this is a necessary phase for parties to make concessions and look for peaceful solutions ⁽¹⁾.

4.4 Kilometer 101 Agreement (1973)

The kilometer 101 agreement was marked as the first agreement after the war between the Israelis and the Egyptians in 1973; it was signed on November 11, 1973 by Egypt's Major General Mohamed Abdel Ghani el Gamasi and Israel's Major General Aharon Yariv, in the presence of the commander of the U.N. forces, Major General Ensio Siilasvuo of Finland. It was the first official agreement between Israel and an Arab country since the signature of the 1949 armistice agreements. The negotiators from both sides met at the United Nations checkpoint "Kilometer 101" in an effort to work out the details of the Suez ceasefire. The agreement with its six points formed the basis for the Sinai agreement that was signed in 1974. The negotiations continued between the Egyptians and the Israelis military officers about the implementation of these six points ⁽²⁾.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was the mastermind of this agreement; his marathon trips, referred to as "shuttle diplomacy", to Israel and Egypt from the 5th to the 11th of November, 1973, were made in the hopes that his efforts would consummate the agreement; the agreement was eventually signed. Five of the six points in Kissinger's ceasefire package had already been achieved. Nonetheless, the agreement failed because Sadat asked to drop the point in which Israel asked for both armies to withdraw to the lines of the ceasefire set on October 22, 1973. The ambiguous Kissinger plan left the issue of the "disengagement and separation of forces" unsettled; the Egyptians were worried that withdrawing their forces based on the Israeli demands would mean that they gained nothing in the October war. In other words, the Egyptians did not want to lose the new territory and the prestige that had been regained in the war. Therefore, the Egyptians insisted that the Israeli forces withdraw to the position held on October 22 before they surrounded the city of Suez and trapped the Egyptian Third Army. Kissinger, after not being able to succeed in keeping this agreement effective, and further because of Russian

(1) William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

(2) For more information see: *Kilometer 101*, at:

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html> . April 08,2009.

pressure, he stressed on holding the Geneva Convention according to the U.N. resolution 338.

Immediately following the war, Israel signed two separate agreements with the Egyptians and the Syrians. These two agreements were considered important for U.S. foreign policy decision makers since they believed such agreements would eventually lead to resolution of the conflict in the region. More importantly, signing of the agreements improved the chances of having a broader peaceful settlement between the Egyptians and Israelis. Henry Kissinger assumed that such a peaceful settlement would serve the U.S. national interest by providing stability in the region and would contain the spread of Russian influence in the Middle East; it would leave the U.S. as the only dominant power in the region ⁽¹⁾.

4.5 Geneva Convention

Based on the request of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East conference opened in Geneva. The Geneva Conference hosted by the United Nations but under the sponsorship of the Soviets and the U.S. was initially supposed to be held on December 18, 1973. Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Israel were asked to participate in the conference. Henry Kissinger was aware that the conference would not resolve the main problems, but he thought that such a conference would give him enough time to practice his diplomacy indirectly. He also believed that it was important, psychologically, that the Arabs and the Israelis meet together to establish a tangible precedent of negotiation. Egypt was the only country among the other Arab states that preferred to attend but Israel firmly opposed such a conference. Israel required several conditions to be met before it would participate in such a conference; the main concern of Israel was not to expand the list of the participants to include the PLO. The U.S. had to reaffirm that it would use its veto power in case the PLO attempted to attend; this left the Arabs with mixed feelings (anger and dissatisfaction) about the role of the U.S. in making such concessions to the Israelis since the Palestinian case is very central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. All Arab states believed that the Palestinian problem was the crux of the Middle East conflict; no genuine and lasting peace can be established without solving the Palestinian problem.

(1) Ibid.

At the Geneva Conference, Israel refused to sit in the same room with the Syrians, because Syria had refused to provide the Red Cross with a list of captured Israeli soldiers. On the other hand, Syria, too, refused to attend the conference; this refusal helped Kissinger by not having the responsibility of discussing the Israeli conditions with the Syrians. Syria was demanding a disengagement and separation of forces plan as a prior demand to sit with the Israelis. The Syrians were not satisfied with the separate agreement that took place between the Egyptians and the Israelis on the Egyptian front leaving the Syrian front without a similar agreement. This was a serious threat for the Egyptian-Syrian alliance and to the Syrian interests especially due to the fact that President Assad became suspicious about the secret arrangements that may have been made between Henry Kissinger and Anwar Sadat. Kissinger successfully managed to plant this seed of suspicion and ill intentions between these two Arab countries in this critical period, and he left no excuse for Israeli refusal to attend the conference. Israel attended the conference; it was held on Oct.21, 1973; however, the conference ended with a failure. Kissinger, however, succeeded in removing the Palestinian case from all political forums and was able to prevent the PLO from participating in the diplomatic process ⁽¹⁾. This Conference may not be a model for successful negotiations, but it had contributed in getting both Arabs and Israelis used to seek peaceful negotiations under the supervision of the United Nations rather than resorting to wars.

4.6 Disengagement and Separation of Forces (Sinai Agreement)

After the Geneva Convention, Kissinger was eager to move forward toward making further agreement between the Israelis and the Egyptians concerning the separation of their troops. Israel offered, after the reelection of Golda Meir, a plan that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the west bank of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, Israel demanded for ending the war between the two countries, and the reopening of the Suez Canal for passage of Israeli ships and freight. Kissinger then directed his energies and efforts toward achieving bilateral rather than comprehensive agreements. After months of what has been called “shuttle diplomacy, he successfully coordinated troop disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement called for Israeli

(1) Cheryl Rubenberg. Op.cit.pp:166-173.

withdrawal from parts of Sinai, exchange of prisoners of war, and an end to the Arab oil Embargo ⁽¹⁾.

The Sinai Agreement reflected that the Israelis and the Americans have common national interests. The agreement was basically an Israeli plan but adopted by the U.S. and agreed upon by the Egyptians. The Egyptians were not aware that this plan is actually an Israeli one. According to Sadat, the Egyptians viewed a transformation in U.S. foreign policy where it became more neutral toward the Middle East; Sadat publicly declared that the U.S. adopted a new policy showing objectivity as a third party (mediator). However; the Palestinians were frustrated with these results as they felt abandoned by some Arab countries. They felt that the Arab countries were willing to make peace with the Israelis in order to gain back their occupied territories at the cost of the Palestinians and their case ⁽²⁾.

4.7 Step-by-Step Approach (Kissinger)

The Step -by -Step approach failed in terms of the American national interest in the Middle East. It was set basically to avoid the pressure on Israel so it will be more cooperative in establishing a genuine peaceful settlement but resulted in a division within the Arab World. After the October War and several agreements about the separations of military forces, the U.S. felt that there was a strong opportunity to establish a peaceful settlement.

President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. These visits were made in an attempt to reflect the commitment of the U.S. toward finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the region. Henry Kissinger tried to avoid the collapse of his Step-by-Step approach especially after the Rabat Conference ⁽³⁾. He made five trips to the Middle East in order to promote his strategy; he was trying to prove that his approach to diplomacy was more fruitful than the reconvention in Geneva ⁽⁴⁾. He explained that armies

(1) Annual Report 2001:

ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/aidco_2001_annual_report_en.pdf

(2) Ibid.

(3) The 7th Arab summit which recognized, for the first time, the P.L.O. as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian People. It was held on October 26, 1974.

(4) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko concluded a Middle East tour of his own to press the Russian preference to return to Geneva.

had been pulled apart where the United Nation forces were stationed and some Israeli-occupied territory has been returned to Arab sovereignty. Kissinger's visits to the mentioned above countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel) were considered as the last chance to succeed in defeating the Russian efforts through the Soviet Foreign Minister Andri Gromyko, who was pressing for a multinational peace conference in Geneva. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had hoped that Kissinger might achieve further progress; nonetheless, after his meeting with Gromyko, he agreed on the resumption of the Geneva conference. Even some members of Israeli Prime Minister Yitshak Rabin's government, who preferred to negotiate with the Arabs through Kissinger, said that they would go to Geneva⁽¹⁾.

In the late 1970s, Israel witnessed internal political changes where the Labor party, which had dominated the Israeli governments since the establishment of Israel, lost in the elections to the Likud Party. This new change in the governing political party influenced the nature of the Israeli policy; Menachem Begin, who was considered one of the hawks in the extreme right wing of Israeli Likud party, became the Prime Minister of Israel. The concept of the "Undefeatable Army" that had been established after the overwhelming Israeli victory over the Arab armies in the Six-Day War⁽²⁾, started to be shaken among Israelis because of the quick collapse of the Israeli Defense line (Bar Lev Line) during the " Yom Kippur" War of 1973.

Egypt also experienced an internal political shift, since Anwar Sadat who became Egypt's President after Jamal Abdel Nasser, differed completely in his views with his predecessor about the nature of the country's coalitions and allies. President Nasser was well-known for his nationalist policies (Pan-Arabism or Nasserism). He advocated the concept of Arab unity based on their nationality, so he was able to touch the feelings and emotions of the entire Arab World. Nasser counted on the support of the former Soviets (USSR) and had very poor diplomatic relations with the U.S. He tried to cooperate with the U.S. through implementing the Rogers Plan, but the process was difficult, so he decided to be an exclusive ally to the former Soviet Union. As a result, Egyptian relations with the U.S. deteriorated. When Sadat came to power; he ignored the concept of Arab nationalism.

(1) Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*. (Illinois: University of Illinois Press., 1989).

(2) Israel captured West Bank & Gaza, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula all the way up to Suez Canal, and roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights within six days with light casualties in the Israeli Army.

Egypt was suffering from a very poor economy, so beside Sadat's recognition of the uselessness of the U.N. resolution 338 due to lack of agreement with the Syrian President (Hafez Assad) and the hope of building better relations with the U.S., he decided to accept the idea of sitting directly with the Israelis at the negotiating table ⁽¹⁾.

In other words, Anwar Sadat finally decided to prioritize the Egyptian national interests over the pan-Arab national interests. Sadat was convinced that he would be able to market such an idea among the Egyptian public. He concentrated on convincing Egyptian people that their national interest would be protected. He further advocated the idea of benefiting from the circumstances since the U.S. promised to provide more financial aid which would directly contribute to enhancing the weak-economy of Egypt. Finally, Sadat was able to win the agreement of the Egyptian public majority in pursuing his peaceful efforts. The approval of the public opinion was a major step for the Egyptian leader to go forward in making peace with the Israelis. According to Richard Hass, this is a major factor in influencing the leaders' decisions ⁽²⁾.

4.8 Sadat Peace Initiative (NO More War)

In his historic visit to Israel in November, 1977, President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat spoke at the Israeli Kenesset. He spoke with strength, but he acknowledged Israel's right to exist. Very few Israelis were expecting such an acknowledgement from an Arab leader. He and Menachem Begin had made a mutual pledge "No More War", except that Sadat made his promise conditional, that there would be no more war if Israel accepted a peace agreement that included the return of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The Israelis needed to respond creatively to Sadat's gesture; they needed to decide on what lands to return and what to keep; this was the first tough diplomatic challenge they had faced since 1967. However, according to recent history, one can say that the state of war between the two countries was ended with Sadat's visit to Israel. Both countries agreed at the end of Sadat's visit that they would continue discussing their disputes through dialogue and not through war. The continuation of the dialogue was hoped to pave the way towards

(1) Nizam Sharabi, *Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin [American and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World]*, (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 1990).

(2) Richard Hass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

successful negotiations in which they would lead to the signing of peace treaties with all the neighboring Arab States.

Both Israelis and Egyptians wanted to achieve serious direct dialogue about the ways of establishing peace in the Middle East. Sadat's visit and his pledge of "no more war" opened the door to such a dialogue, but "continuity" of the peaceful dialogue was the key word. They both hoped that peace eventually would be the result of this dialogue. Peace and security were the main two issues that Sadat pressed during his visit. Sadat intended to remove the psychological barrier that had dominated both nations; he was hoping that after this momentum and this new spirit, both countries would commit to solving their disputes, regardless of their complexity, through talks not through wars. Sadat claimed that most of his people were surveyed and that they supported him. It seems that Sadat's vision was compatible to what John Geer thought of this particular issue; Geer argues that public opinion surveys are critical factors in shaping the behavior of leaders and their foreign policy decision making ⁽¹⁾.

4.9 Official Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

The official Camp David negotiations started on September 5, 1978. President Jimmy Carter prepared himself by studying the conflict's main issues and the psychological analysis of both Sadat and Begin that was collected by experts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His study included comprehensive personal information about both of them: their history, their interests, their medical records, and how both of them became leaders of their people. It also contained information about their personal characteristics, political and religious beliefs, their relations with other countries' leaders, their weaknesses, their reactions under pressure, and their position in relation to the American President himself ⁽²⁾.

Carter brought the Bible with him because he thought that he would need it when discussing important issues with Begin. It seems that Carter wanted to be fully prepared and not fail in addressing any surprising situations. He further hoped that he had gained the

(1) John-G-Geer, *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls; A Theory of Democratic Leadership*, (New York: Columbia University Press. 1996).

(2) Nizam Sharabi, *Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin [American and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World]*, (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 1990).

trust of Sadat; he actually was able to do so since Sadat from the beginning of the negotiations had put almost all his trust in Carter. Sadat was accompanied by the ministers Muhammad Kamel, Butrus Ghali, Usam El-Baz, and Hasan Tuhami. Prime Minister Menahim Begin was accompanied by the Israeli ministers Moshe Dayan, Eizer Weizmann, and the Israeli attorney general Aharon Barak. President Jimmy Carter had with him Cyrus Vance, Harold Saunders, Roy Atherton, and Brzezinski. The first joint communiqué issued was concentrated mainly on praying to God for bringing hope and peace to the Holy Land that had gone through four wars, but was still not enjoying the blessing of peace⁽¹⁾.

At the beginning of the negotiation, Carter prepared a list with the points and the questions that should be discussed and dealt; he mentioned some points that were agreed upon by the three parties in principle. The main points that were agreed upon were:

1. Jerusalem would remain a united city where Christians, Muslims, and the Jews would be granted the freedom of practicing their prayer at their holy places.
2. Egypt would end its economic embargo with Israel; Israeli ships would be allowed to pass freely through Suez Canal.
3. Egypt would have full and undisputed sovereignty in Sinai.
4. Jordan and the Palestinians were to be main participants in the negotiation.
5. The implementation of the agreements would be done gradually in consecutive phases with well intentions⁽²⁾.

In contrast, there were some partially disputed points that were significantly important: U.N. Resolution 242 to be the basic reference for any peaceful settlement which Begin refused under the pretext that this solution would not be applicable in the West Bank. Having full diplomatic relations between the two countries was rejected by Sadat who refused this kind of relations with Israel. Sadat demanded that Israel end its military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, but Begin did not commit himself to this condition. There were many difficult points which Carter had to face to achieve a solution: the removal of all Israeli settlements and airports from Sinai, freezing the building of new settlements in the West Bank, the implementation of all parts of U.N. Resolution 242 in the

(1) Ibid.

(2) *Camp David 1979 Peace Agreements*, Amman: Dar el-Jalil. (1984).

West Bank, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, the Arabs rule of East Jerusalem, and what the nature of the final agreement would be ⁽¹⁾.

In general, the negotiations resulted in two main agreements between Egypt and Israel: the first agreement, which was signed on September 17, 1978, functioned as a frame work agreement that was mainly concerned with peace in the Middle East according to UN resolutions 338 and 242. This framework agreement comprised the basics for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and other neighboring Arab countries. Each neighboring country could negotiate its concerns with Israel separately based on this agreement in order to achieve peace. The main points of this agreement concerning the West Bank and Gaza were: first, the transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians (Autonomy) in West Bank and Gaza should be arranged with the Israeli government and must be completed within five years. Second, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan would agree on the methods of establishing the authority of the elected autonomous government in the West Bank and Gaza; this would be followed by a joint committee from Egypt, Jordan, and some Palestinians from the occupied territories. Third, after the establishment of this authority, the transition period (five years) would begin and the negotiation for final status of the West Bank and Gaza starts in the third year. Jordan and Israel would sign a peaceful treaty at the end of the five year transitional period ⁽²⁾.

As for the relations between Egypt and Israel, they had agreed on several issues ⁽³⁾, but the main ones are: first, both countries pledge not to resort to violence in resolving any remaining disputed issues, but to adopt peaceful approaches in accordance with Article 33 in the United Nation Charter. Second, both parties agree to negotiate with good will aiming at reaching a final agreement within three months from signing this framework agreement. Third, both countries would seek finding the chances to develop their economic situations for the sake of contributing in establishing the atmosphere of peace, cooperation, and friendship as their common goal. Fourth, the U.S. would be invited to participate in the negotiations concerning the issues of implementing and executing these agreements within a scheduled time frame. Finally, the Security Council would be asked to certify these agreements and would guarantee that none should violate their articles, and would ask both

(1) Caroline Lazo, *Jimmy Carter on the Road to Peace*, (New Jersey: Dillon Press, 1996).

(2) Ibid.

(3) There are more than 11 points (different issues) mentioned in this agreement.

countries to make their policies compatible with the conditions mentioned in the framework ⁽¹⁾.

The second major agreement issued on March 26, 1979 in three languages (Hebrew, Arabic, and English), is the final agreement between both countries. The English version was to be the only reference for interpretation in case of a new dispute. This peace treaty has nine articles ⁽²⁾, but the main points are: first, no more war between the two countries and peace would be established after signing the agreement. Second, Israel should withdraw all its military forces and its civilians from Sinai where Egypt would have the full exercise of its sovereignty up to the internationally recognized borders between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Third, both parties should commit to resolve all future disputes in a peaceful manner and would not practice any use of force against the other either directly or indirectly. Also, each party is responsible for prohibiting any act of threatening or incitement by their people who may organize or help in acting violently against the other party in any place. Fourth, for the sake of providing for maximum security, Egypt was not allowed to keep more than one division of Egyptian armed forces who will be stationed within an area lying around 50 kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. United Nation forces would be stationed there in order to monitor the situation (performing normal police functions) and none of the parties had the right to remove these forces unless they attain the full agreement from the United Nations with the approval of all five permanent members of the Security Council. Fifth, Israeli ships will have the right of free passage through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal. The strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways; they must be open to the whole international community beside the freedom of navigation and over flight ⁽³⁾. The success of Camp David Summit in 1979 indicates clearly how the role of U.S. as a mediator can be a very important and effective. If it was not for the extensive efforts of the U.S. President and his political strategists, this summit would not have succeeded. The U.S. imposed, indirectly a solution on both sides, and the achieved results were satisfactory to both of them.

(1) For more information see: *The Camp David Accords of 1979*:

http://www.jerusalemities.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm . Accessed on: May 30, 2008.

(2) The peace treaty has nine main articles but each article consists of three or more important points. The researcher recommends reading all the details of this agreement to have a comprehensive understanding.

(3) For more information see: *The Camp David Accords of 1979*:

http://www.jerusalemities.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm . Accessed on: May 30, 2008.

4.10 Conclusion

Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement on March, 26, 1979, under the U.S. patronage as a mediator. Since this peace agreement was signed, many political analysts agree that this treaty has succeeded in spite of all the challenges and obstacles that have threatened its survival. It has become the corner stone for stability and order in the region even though it has failed to normalize relations between the Israeli and Egyptian peoples. Hosni Mubarak has refused officially to visit Israel since he became the Egyptian president, but several Israeli political leaders have visited Egypt and maintain relations with the Egyptian government.

Israeli ministers, including defense and foreign affairs ministers, were happy and enthusiastic after holding meetings with President Mubarak in Cairo and some other places such as *Sharm El Seikh* and Alexandria. Egypt, which is the largest country in the Arab World, has an important role in granting the legitimacy of the political maneuvers of the regional players. Israel knows very well the political weight of Egypt and that is why it avoids any provocative statements or actions that might jeopardize the relationship between the two countries.

Chapter Five

Case Study 2: Camp David 2000

5.1 Introduction

The Camp David Summit 2000 between Israelis and Palestinians is considered to be the first major negotiation between the two parties since the 1993 Oslo accords. It focused on negotiating the final status issues remained as real obstacles to a final agreement: final borders and Israel's security concerns, Israeli settlements, the Right of Return for the Palestinian refugees, and the final status of Jerusalem. The Summit was ultimately unsuccessful; the results of Camp David 2000 and the reasons behind its failure have become one of the most controversial issues among researchers and political analysts.

The Summit started on July 11 and ended on July 25, 2000 during which representatives of the three participant parties (Israel, USA, and Palestinians) exerted their best efforts to succeed, but unfortunately were unable to do so. Both Israelis and Palestinians mutually blamed each other for the failure of the talks which the Israelis claimed that they made a generous offer; the Palestinians responded that they were not offered enough. Because of the U.S. reaction to the failure and President Clintons' own statements of blame aired on international news channels, most of the blame and criticisms for the failure of the summit were leveled at PA President Yasser Arafat. Nonetheless, a trilateral statement was issued that defined the agreed principles to guide future negotiations.

This section will present the historic circumstances that provided the environment for peace talks, and will discuss the drastic transformation in PLO rhetoric towards dealing with Israel. Several major events took place in the last two decades which influenced Palestinian political culture. These political events became major factors in transforming the policies of the Palestinian leadership and rhetoric from violent to peaceful. Further, this section will discuss, separately, several important factors that caused the failure of the negotiations.

5.2 1982 Lebanon war

The Lebanon War started in the first week of June, 1982, when Israel launched a full incursion (land, air, and sea) into Lebanese territories. Israel managed to occupy approximately one third of Lebanese territory ending up in areas next to Lebanon's capital, Beirut. The original plan, coordinated with the U.S. administration, called for Israeli troops to undertake a 25 mile incursion to wipe out PLO positions in Southern Lebanon. Israel managed to harm the Syrian army by destroying many of its military air forces and the Syrian military installations in Bekaa Valley. Also, Israel managed to destroy the military bases of the PLO in the south. The war lasted approximately 80 days (the longest and most controversial war) ⁽¹⁾, and after fierce battles in West Beirut, the PLO agreed to a withdrawal agreement, and its members moved on to Tunisia. The American Ambassador Philip Habib mediated a peaceful PLO force withdrawal from Lebanon and through his marathon diplomatic trips in the region; he managed to convince Israel to agree to permit the Palestinian forces to leave Beirut with only their personal weapons as a gesture of flexibility. However, this result was a major set-back for Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement (the dominant party in the PLO) since it became obvious that the shadow of "Armed Struggle" against Israel adopted by Fatah started to fade away and vanish ⁽²⁾.

Arafat and his troops were evacuated mainly to Tunisia as well as some other Arab countries, for example Yemen. As a result, Arafat realized that PLO policy had to change. He felt that Arab and the Soviet support was not enough to carry on. Arafat returned in 1983 to Tripoli (Lebanese city) in order to support the late Abu Jihad (second in charge in Fatah) who had not been expelled from Lebanon. On his way back to Tunisia he decided to stop by Egypt. He made a historical visit to the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Several Palestinian leaders were frustrated with Arafat's visit to Egypt. They accused him of violating the rules of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). By visiting Egypt, Arafat broke the siege imposed on Egypt by the Arab countries since 1978, and allowed several moderate Arab states to revive their diplomatic relations with Egypt. Furthermore, this

(1) There was, for the first time, a widespread debate within Israel about the War in Lebanon due to the high number of civilian casualties. In March 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously for a full troop withdrawal from Lebanon by July 2000.

(2) Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1989).

historic visit marked a transformation in the Palestinian rhetoric towards dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

5.3 Declaration of Independence Conference (Algiers Declaration) 1988

The Declaration of Independence written on Nov.15, 1988 by the Palestinian poet Mahout Darwish ⁽¹⁾, was an important event in the Palestinians' political life since their leadership, for the first time in Palestinian history, clearly recognized Israel's right to exist as a state in peace with the future independent Palestinian state. Furthermore, The Palestinian leadership rejected violence and terrorism by both Palestinians and those who attack Palestinians. They renounced terrorism as a means of fighting for their rights to solve the conflict. The PLO officially declared termination of their armed struggle and its goal of eliminating the State of Israel. They accepted the idea of living in a separate Palestinian state next to Israel rather than instead of it. The declaration recognized all United Nations resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically both UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from territories it occupied in the 1967 Six Day War, and on Palestinians to recognize Israel. Resolution 338, initially a resolution calling for a cease-fire in October War, called for immediate negotiations and all sides to seek "a just and durable peace in the Middle East" ⁽²⁾. These resolutions formed the foundation of post declaration of independence PLO policy.

In April 1989, the Palestinian Central Council appointed Arafat to be the President "Palestine". In May 1989 Arafat visited France to establish diplomatic relations with a western country; he announced, during this visit, that the provision related to the destruction of Israel in the Palestinian National Charter is null and void. The charter, which was formed and declared in 1964, and amended in 1968, had become an important symbol of Palestinian history. Thus, the cancellation of one of the main provisions (destruction of Israel) was a major step in transforming Palestinian political strategy. As for the U.S. role: were it not for the pressure applied by the Reagan administration on the Palestine

(1) Mahmoud Darwish was a Palestinian poet, essayist and political activist whose voice was among the most powerful in late 20th century Arab literature. He spoke for two generations of Palestinians mostly abandoned by the Arab world, and oppressed by Israel.

(2) For more information see: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, at: <http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/f/me081115e.htm> . October 17, 2008.

Liberation Organization, the Palestinian National Council would not have declared a cessation of the armed struggle against Israel and would not have adopted UN Resolution 242⁽¹⁾.

The Palestinian recognition of 242 Resolution opened the channel of communications between the U.S. and PLO after 13 years of a diplomatic impasse. As a result of this recognition, and primarily due to PLO renouncement of violence, the U.S. removed the PLO from the list of terrorist organizations. Although not officially recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the U.S. accepted the fact that the PLO represents the majority of the Palestinians. Therefore, the U.S. decided to communicate directly with the organization and exert pressure on Israel to start negotiating with the Palestinian leadership. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence helped warm relation with the incoming Bush administration. It was used by Secretary of State James Baker to steer Israelis toward the Madrid Peace conference of 1991 that took place few months after the Gulf War.

5.4 Gulf War (1990-1991)

The Gulf War (August 2, 1990-February 28, 1991), authorized by the United Nations, was launched to liberate Kuwait after Iraq's occupation in August 1990. The United Nations approved the formation of a military coalition force from 34 different nations. The majority of the international military forces were from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, and Egypt. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops was met with an immediate preparation for war by the U.S. and some allies such as Britain and Canada. The war against Iraq resulted in the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and was considered as a decisive victory for the coalition forces. In a move to destabilize the coalition by alienating the Arab members in the coalition, Iraq launched missiles against Israel in order to precipitate retaliation from Israel. Even though Israel had threatened to retaliate, it abided by the U.S. orders not to fall into the trap set by the Iraqis.

The Palestinians publicly supported Iraq during its war against Kuwait and even after Iraq's defeat. Several were seen on their rooftops cheering the Scud missiles launched by

(1) Ibid.

Iraq on Israel territories. Once the war began, the PLO Executive Committee reaffirmed its support for Iraq: "The Palestinian people stand firmly by Iraq's side." The following day, Arafat sent a message to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hailing Iraq's struggle against "American dictatorship" and describing Iraq as "the defender of the Arab nation, of Muslims and of free men everywhere"⁽¹⁾.

The PLO and Libya were the only members of the Arab League who opposed an Arab resolution calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza congratulated Saddam Hussein and referred to the occupation of Kuwait as the first step toward liberation from the Israeli occupation. Arafat was concerned about the mass U.S. troops heading to engage in a military conflict with Iraq. According to a Palestinian news paper, Arafat called this a "new crusade" that conveyed the gravest dangers and disasters for the Arab nation⁽²⁾.

Media coverage of Palestinians declaring their support for Saddam caused a significant international and regional loss of support for the Palestinian case, particularly by Arab Gulf countries. The Saudis and other Gulf states cut off financial aid that was vital to the existence of PLO. Despite the downfall of PLO status, its main concern continued to focus on the attainment of independence. After the invasion of Iraq, and during his post-tour of the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker expressed interest in receiving Palestinian political delegations. The PLO, earlier, presented a Step-by-Step strategy in order to achieve its nation's main goal of independent statehood. It needed the UN-protection and their role in safeguarding the Palestinian rights and lives. The 1987 *intifada* gained the support and the sympathy of the international community from its first day on December 9, 1987; it seemed that it became the most promising thing for the Palestinians to do⁽³⁾.

The U.S. asked their Arab allies to aid the Palestinians in an effort to encourage them pursuing in the peace talks. Economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza seriously deteriorated since the Gulf War. The Saudis and a number of Arab governments, including the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Egypt refused to pay taxes collected on Palestinian workers living in their borders to the PLO. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, spokesperson

(1) For more information see: *Gulf War 1990-1991*, France-Press Agency, February 26, 1991.

(2) East Jerusalem.: Sawt al-Sha'b Newspaper. September 4, 1990.

(3) Ibid.

for the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations, confirmed then that the United States had to keep its promise in helping to get the funds flowing again. Dr. Ashrawi hinted that continued Palestinian participation could hinge on whether the payments are delivered "It's at a very critical stage right now." Dr. Ashrawi said, referring to the aid pledge from Gulf States. "If it's not kept now, things could fall apart still"⁽¹⁾.

As for Israel, the Gulf War increased Israel's importance to the United States. Israel remained uninvolved, but had the American position become jeopardized, it would have had Israel as an ally. Israel also benefited from destroying the Iraqi's military capability that was forming a direct threat to the Israelis. The U.S.-led coalition succeeded in weakening one of the major regional enemies of Israel, this subsequently changed the power balance between Israel and the "Arab Armies". Israel became a stronger foe to the PLO, so the Palestinian leadership had to change its strategy by searching for more peaceful approaches to resolve their conflict. In 1990, Arafat announced that he was holding secret talks with the Israelis, and that they would attend the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference held under the patronage of both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. In addition, Secretary of State James Baker made several trips after the war to the Middle-East; these trips succeeded in producing this Conference in October 1991. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria as well as Palestinian delegations from the Occupied Territories participated in this conference. The war caused an increased Arab readiness to participate in such peaceful dialogue. By not retaliating against Iraq, Israel helped to bring these Arab countries to sit with the Israeli delegations at the same negotiating table.

5.5 Madrid Peace Conference 1991

On October 30, 1991, the Madrid Conference was hosted by Spain and lasted for three days. It was co-sponsored by the U.S. and USSR. This conference is considered by many researchers as the first serious attempt by the international community to start a peace process. It was, as mentioned earlier, the first time that Israelis and Palestinians started peaceful negotiations about the conflict. After the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker established the framework of objectives and, with the

(1) See: *U.S. Asked Saudis to Aid Palestinians*, Steven A. Holmes. Published on: April 29, 1993 at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/29/world/us-asked-saudis-to-aid-palestinians.html>.

approval of the former Soviet Union, sent a letter of invitation to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians. Due to Israeli objection, the Palestinian team was formed initially as a joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation, and the Palestinians had to be inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. This demand by Israel reflected the rejection of dealing with the PLO directly; however, the delegation was in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunisia. The Palestinian negotiating team was led by Dr. Haidar Abdel-Shafi, but counseled by an advisory committee that maintained contact with the PLO representatives. The PLO dispatched the Palestinian Jerusalemite resident Faisal Husseini to lead the unofficial “advisory delegation”. The main purpose of the conference was to serve as an opening forum for the participants. It had no power to impose solutions or making official agreements. However, according to Aaron Miller, the Madrid conference “was the first American-brokered success in the Middle East in twelve years”⁽¹⁾.

Immediately after the last day of the conference, bilateral talks were held in Madrid between Israel and each of the Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. Israel finally agreed to meet with the Palestinians separately from the Jordanians, and the multilateral talks commenced in 1992 in Moscow. The negotiations were important on a symbolic level even though there were not many practical results. There were several multilateral working groups that were convened to lay the ground work for cooperative regional projects such as arms control, water, environment, economic development, and the “intractable” conflict over Palestinian refugees. These bilateral talks were essentially halted by the surprising announcement of the Oslo Agreement in August 1993.

5.6 Oslo Accords 1993

After six months of secret talks in Oslo, both Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed in Washington the Oslo Accords. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government Arrangements issued on September 13, 1993 was a result of a long and complicated phase of secret negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The secret Channel started with Ahmad Qurei who received Mahmoud Abass’s approval in the early stages of the talks. After consulting with Arafat, Qurei attained the endorsement

(1) Aaron Miller, *The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York; Bantam dell, a division of Random House inc. 2008) p.195.

of Arafat who did not consider it a significant effort at the beginning. Arafat started to be more concerned about these secret talks after being informed that Rabin himself was aware of these efforts and was indirectly involved. Rabin was asking questions about the Palestinian position; this motivated Arafat to give the talks more significance⁽¹⁾.

This agreement became a prominent transformational point in the history of the “Palestinian Case”. Palestinians were granted autonomy in Jericho and Gaza, in exchange for recognition the state of Israel. The Norwegian government played the role of “the mediator” by sponsoring the negotiation process through hosting both parties, and attempting to facilitate between them. Norway tried to stay neutral, so it left the parties by themselves to negotiate their goals and demands, and it mainly did not interfere directly unless it was based on the parties’ request. The introduction of Oslo Accords states:

“The government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian –Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference), the“ Palestinian Delegation” representing the Palestinian people , agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process”⁽²⁾.

Both parties have agreed in regard to the resolution of the disputes on the following:

- ”1. Disputes arising out of the [application] or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee”⁽³⁾.

According to Galia Golan, the word “Oslo”, as a title, includes actually several agreements since those several various agreements formulate what is known as “The Oslo

(1) Al Quds Newspaper : November, 26, 2008, p.21.

(2) For more information see: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, at: <http://www.historycentral.com/Israel/Documents/Oslo.html>. Accessed on: January 17, 2007.

(3) For more information see the Declaration of Principles Agreement.

Accords”. She summarized the agreements that made up what is called “The Oslo Accords” as follows:

- “Letters of Mutual Recognition Between Israel and the PLO-9,10 September 1993
- Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreement (“Oslo I”)-13 September 1993
- [Paris] Protocol on Economic Relations-29 April 1994
- Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (“Cairo Agreement”)-4 May 1994
- Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities-29 August 1994 (additional agreement 28 August 1995)
- Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip(“Oslo II”)-28 September 1995
- Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron-15 January 1996
- Wye River Memorandum-23 October 1998
- Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum-4 September 1999”⁽¹⁾.

As a result of this agreement, many Palestinians returned to their homeland. This would not have happened if the Oslo negotiations had failed. After struggling against Israel for over a half century, the Oslo Accords at the time were perceived as the first step toward the Palestinian reclaiming of their home land and establishment of Palestinian statehood. The Oslo Accords basically aimed to set in motion a process that would end up gradually with a Permanent Status Agreement (PSA) between Israel and the PLO.

According to Oslo Accords, all issues, especially those that are particularly sensitive and problematic, were to be placed on the negotiating table. The Oslo Agreement represents the link between the era of conflict and the era of peace. However, the agreement failed to address several difficult issues, such as freezing the construction of the settlements, the refugees’ right of return, and the final status of Jerusalem. The period of the implementation of the agreement and the results of the negotiations on permanent status were supposed to represent the foundation for a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement. However, Ron Pundak explained that it would be inaccurate to conclude that the Oslo process and the options it offered for a permanent status agreement “were faulty

(1) Galia Golan, *Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement*, (New Jersey: Markus Weiner Publications, 2008), pp: 13-14.

by design”. The Oslo approach and its objective were not implemented as had been planned; therefore, Oslo Accords should not yet be discounted ⁽¹⁾.

In general, the Oslo process brought about an historical change in the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the peace agreement with Jordan and a process of recognizing Israel’s legitimacy by the Arab world. The process created an Israeli-Palestinian consensus on a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and on a process of reconciliation founded on a fair agreement and common future interests.

5.7 Wye River Memorandum of 1998

The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 represented the deterioration of Israeli peaceful policy. By Benjamin Netanyahu winning the election the following year, the right wing extremists in Israel who opposed the Oslo agreement became stronger. All negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians became difficult when the Israeli Likud Party rose to power in the Israeli government. Netanyahu was one of the primary Israeli opponents to “Oslo Agreement”. He considered it a disaster for Israel’s future. The new elected Israeli government led by Netanyahu expressed their perspective towards the peace process by demanding that the two sides should work on the principle of “Security of Israel for peace” instead of “land for peace”. They also pushed for the annulment of Oslo agreement, and the freeze of developing Palestinian autonomy. In short, Netanyahu adopted several “No’s”: 1. No Palestinian State. 2. No surrendering the Golan Heights. 3. No division of Jerusalem ⁽²⁾.

During the rule of the Likud party, the Israeli army killed and injured several Palestinians in 1996 (Jerusalem *Intifada*), delayed the redeployment of the Israeli armed forces from Hebron, and postponed the final status negotiations. After several belligerent actions by Netanyahu against the peace process, the U.S. had to intervene. Clinton invited both Arafat and Netanyahu for a meeting in order to resolve the dispute, but this small summit failed because of the Israeli refusal to commit to the implementation of the Oslo Agreement. The Hebron issue was resolved after several months of tough negotiations and

(1) Dr. Ron Pundak., “*From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?*” *Survival*: Vol.43.No.3, (Autumn 2001).

(2) Ahammed Qurie’, *Mufawatdat Oslo 1993[Oslo Negotiations1993]*, (Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el-Falestieniyeh, 2005).

extensive American efforts with the constant coordination of the Egyptian leadership. The Palestinians started to wonder about the objectivity of the U.S. as a mediator, since the nature and the details of the Hebron agreement reflected that Israel was dictating its demands to the U.S. who was accepting of the Israeli conditions. The U.S. abandoned the main principles of “Oslo Agreement” which was finalized under its patronage. Clinton declared, in a press conference, that the principle of land for peace is not accepted by Israel and the time had come to change it to the security of Israel for peace ⁽¹⁾.

Netanyahu took advantage of the letter that was sent by Secretary of State Warren Christopher assuring him of the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel. He continued the building of the Israeli settlements and made several political statements against the peace process. The Palestinian leadership became very frustrated with the Israeli policies, and believed that the U.S. was not acting as genuine mediator. The PA announced that it would freeze all diplomatic relations with the Israeli government after the Israeli government allowed the building of 6500 new apartments at “*Abu Ghnaim Mt.*” in Jerusalem.

The U.S. leadership became embarrassed by Netanyahu and his government’s actions; Clinton became more assertive with Netanyahu and asked him to join Arafat in another meeting. Based on the invitation of President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat held a Middle East summit in Maryland on October 23, 1998. Both sides signed a memorandum in a ceremony that was also attended by King Hussein of Jordan. This summit gave the impression that there would not be a full agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians on all the issues. Israel was concerned with security issues where the Palestinians were accused of allowing the use of illegal weapons while the PA was accusing Israel of not complying with the redeployment of its military forces in the occupied territories. Therefore, there was a need for a third party: the U.S. leadership asked the CIA to act as a monitor and arbiter on the security issues. The CIA was given the authority to report the contradictions between both sides about their interpretations of compliance. Both sides were accusing each other of not being in

(1) Ahammed Qurie’, *Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000 [Camp David Negotiations]*, (Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el-Falestieniyeh, 2007).

compliance with the timeline for implementation. Delays in implementation led to a new timetable implemented at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in 1999⁽¹⁾.

5.8. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999

The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed on September 4, 1999 in Egypt by Yasser Arafat and the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak under the patronage of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to full implementation of all previous agreements set forth by Oslo Agreement in 1993. This summit was held in an attempt to resolve all outstanding issues set in the Wye River agreement. The goal was to build a bridge between the completion of the interim period and the permanent final status negotiations.

This summit discussed the obligations of both parties in order to put the timetable of Wye agreement back on track. The Israeli government again asked the PA to commit to its agreement on suppressing terrorist acts and to control other Palestinian groups. Israel claimed that the PA had been ignoring and constantly violating their security obligations. The PA asked that the Israeli government must release the Palestinian prisoners as had been agreed upon, it also asked for the redeployment of the Israeli military forces which had been over due step according to the previous agreements. Both Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements were held based on the request of the third party (the mediator), which was the U.S. administration under Bill Clinton presidency. Clinton built a better understanding of the conflict during these consecutive summits and became more personally involved in the process. However, both summits were held as a result of the lack of a basic stage in conflict resolution that is “trust building”. Both sides lost the trust of each other and this is where the U.S. had to intervene frequently in an attempt to rebuild trust between the two parties. This deteriorating situation in the region raised Clinton’s concern about the stability and continuity of his diplomatic efforts that had led to Oslo Agreement. As the gap between Israelis and Palestinians widened, and Clinton’s

(1) Ibid.

presidency neared its end, Clinton made a final and inevitable push to establish Israeli-Palestinian peace⁽¹⁾.

5.9 Negotiations at Camp David (July 11-25, 2000)

Clinton planned, in consultation with the Israelis⁽²⁾, to invite both the Israelis and the Palestinians to hold a major summit that would allow them to tackle the most problematic but core issues in order to end the conflict. Clinton informed Yasser Arafat of his intention to hold the summit. Arafat advised Clinton of not expediting the negotiation process by suggesting that both sides hold preliminary negotiations but Clinton rejected Arafat's suggestion. Arafat warned and he reiterated his warning more than once that the time was not ripe to hold final and permanent status negotiation. Aaron Miller said that the U.S. administration faced a problem with Arafat in holding Camp David summit:

“Arafat did not want to come to the summit. He genuinely feared that Ehud Barak would set a trap that would force him to make a decision. Worse, he did not wish to be put in a position in which he would have to say no to the president on a substantive issue such as Jerusalem or refugees. At the same time, he did not want to say no to Clinton on process by actually refusing to show up at the summit meeting”⁽³⁾.

However, Clinton ignored Arafat's warnings and decided to officially invite the two sides to meet at Camp David; he announced his invitation to Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak on July 5, 2000. He informed Arafat that Barak had new initiatives and a surprising offer, which would be a rare opportunity for Palestinians. Even though the U.S. administration was well aware of the low level of the personal trust between Arafat and Barak, it insisted on holding the summit hoping that Barak would surprise the participants with his mysterious “generous offer” as he had promised⁽⁴⁾.

The U.S. leadership actually believed that there was something new to be offered by Barak and that there was a golden opportunity to reach a final agreement. Arafat received

(1) Ibid.

(2) Clinton called for the summit after he had been informed by Barak that he had new initiatives.

(3) Aaron Miller, *The Too Much Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York; Bantam, 2008), p.69.

(4) Ahammed Qurie', *Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000 [Camp David Negotiations]*, (Beirut: Mu'assasat el-Derasat el-Falestieniyeh.2007).

assurances from Clinton that no one in particular would be held responsible should the negotiations fail to reach an agreement. The U.S. also thought that the Palestinians' anger over the procrastination by the Israelis would vanish after reaching a satisfactory final agreement. The U.S. leadership chose to pressure Israel to accelerate their efforts in tackling the core and final issues instead of dealing with temporary issues. Many "stories" were written about what had happened in Camp David 2000, and many concluded that the Palestinians would not abandon their famous habit of "seizing the opportunity to miss an opportunity". The Israelis claim that they offered a historic, generous proposal, but "as usual" the Palestinian leadership turned it down. In short, only Arafat is to be blamed for the failure in reaching the final agreement at Camp David 2000 ⁽¹⁾.

The negotiations at this summit concentrated mainly on the most complicated problematic issues that were very important for both sides. The borders of a Palestinian state as well as the fate of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees, and the Israeli security concerns were the core issues that the two sides had to tackle at Camp David 2000 negotiations. Ahmad Qurei led the Palestinian committee that was formed to negotiate the issues of territory, security, and borders. The Palestinian delegations reaffirmed that the land and the borders issues do not actually need to be thoroughly discussed since UN resolutions 338 and 242 were very clear about these issues and they should form the basic common ground for both sides. Qurei pointed out that the only issues that needed to be discussed were the issues of the "possible" land swap and security measures. Besides, The Palestinian delegations were aware of the danger of keeping the Israeli settlements within their borders but under Israeli control (overlapped jurisdictions), so they demanded that any final settlement must guarantee that most of the Israeli settlements be within the borders of the state of Israel and not within the borders of the Palestinian state based on Resolution 242. The Israelis presented maps that require the annexation of more significant Palestinian lands without offering any land swap. Moreover, Israel asked to lease for a long term part of the lands that surround Jordan's Valley to be used by the Israelis as a "security zone" ⁽²⁾.

(1) Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, *Camp David and After: An Exchange (2.A Reply to Barak)*. The New York Review of Books: Vol 49, No10. (June 13, 2002).

(2) Ahammed Qurie', *Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000 [Camp David Negotiations]*, (Beirut: Mu'assasat el-Derasat el-Falestieniyeh.2007).

In short, after refusing to transfer some of the lands, demanding to lease other parts, claiming the need of keeping some parts for security reasons (Control, Lease, and Annexation), and demanding to hold on to the four largest settlement blocks of Modi'in, Ma'ali Adumim, Ariel, and Etzion, it is clear that Israel asking for the annexation of approximately an extra 25% of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. This, of course, does not include the Jerusalem area that, according to the Israelis, is not part of the West Bank, but it is part of the "No Man's Land" which was marked in the Armistice Agreements in 1948-1949. When Qurei rejected the Israeli claims and maps, Bill Clinton accused him of not being a straight and honest negotiator, and threatened to stop the negotiations and cancel the summit. According to Clayton E. Swisher, Barak's plan to hold on to these large settlements: "Would have functionally divided the Palestinian state into three noncontiguous sections, denying Palestinians the ability to exercise and enforce governmental and security functions, develop a coherent economic policy, or promote development opportunities"⁽¹⁾.

In general, the negotiations about all the basic issues continued at Camp David without any progress. Reaching an agreement on the Palestinian rights recognized as legitimate by the international community. In particular, the UN Resolution 242 (the basic ground for Madrid Conference and the main factor behind reaching Oslo agreements), was not possible to be carried out because of the Israeli strong rejecting stance towards these issues. The Palestinians sought for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on their understanding of Resolution 242, while the Israelis, as mentioned above, and interpreted it differently. The decision about this particular issue was the basic disagreement between both sides. Barak was determined not to withdraw to 1967 borders, not to dismantle the Israeli settlements established within the 1967 borders, not to give up parts of Jerusalem, and to demilitarizing the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat insisted on the full Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 areas including East Jerusalem, and recognizing of the right of return for Palestinian refugees⁽²⁾.

Clinton was always initiating "new ideas" but those ideas were very compatible with the Israeli proposals. Instead of being an honest broker, he was overly biased toward Israeli

(1) Clayton E. Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David*, (New York: Nation books. 2004), p.319.

(2) William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, (California: Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press, 2005).

demands and conditions. Arafat was offered from 90% to 96% of the West bank with the annexation of 1% to 3% in Israel territories; this would give the Palestinians the opportunity to establish their state on approximately 97% of the West Bank where Israel would be allowed to keep the main settlements with 80% of the Israeli settlers. This narrative contradicts the Palestinian claim of Israel annexing an extra 25% of the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

However, Gamal Helal (special Middle East coordinator and Arabic language interpreter for Clinton) was interviewed by Clayton Swisher on July 17, 2002; Helal described that one of the ideas discussed in his presence was about the idea of swapping territories. He said:

“Israel could annex areas where there are settlement blocks, and in exchange the Palestinians get some territories from Israel proper. Contiguity was an issue. But the Palestinians were willing to go around it conditional on Israeli flexibility- the land had to be equal in size and quality....The Palestinians showed flexibility that they would swap territories 1:1. However, the Israelis were not willing to go 1:1. They wanted a land grab of 1:6, 1:7, or 1:8”⁽¹⁾.

As for Jerusalem, it would be under both the Israeli and Palestinian jurisdiction and the refugees would have several choices, their acceptance in Israel would be decided by the Israeli government. The U.S. role, according to Dennis Ross, was conciliating between the symbolic needs for the Palestinians and the practical needs for the Israelis; he indicated that the U.S. was adopting the strategy of meeting the symbolic needs for the Palestinians while taking into consideration the true and legitimate security concerns of Israel ⁽²⁾.

Therefore, Arafat was pressured by the U.S. administration, especially on the fate of Jerusalem. The U.S. administration asked the Palestinian leadership to accept the division of Jerusalem. The U.S. used the pretext of the so-called “Legal Responsibilities” of administering Al Aqsa Mosque in the holy city between the two sides. “As all the issues came into focus, the status of the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount was identified as the most important, make-or-break point for both sides” ⁽³⁾. Gallia Golan agreed with Clayton

(1) Clayton E. Swisher. Op.cit.p.325.

(2) Dennis Ross, *The Missing peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for the Middle East Peace*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004).

(3) Clayton E.Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David*. (New York: Nation books, 2004), p.320.

Swisher on this particular issue: she, too, concluded that the issue of Jerusalem was the main reason behind the failure of Camp David 2000:

“In general, it could be said that the issue on which Camp David failed was (East) Jerusalem, and particularly the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. There was not necessarily agreement on all the other issues-refugees, borders, security-but two sides appeared to come quite close to agreement on these matters...with the Jerusalem issue was the one that prevented the drafting of a final agreement of any kind”⁽¹⁾.

Clinton persuaded Arafat to agree on the presented ideas suggesting that Arafat’s dreams would finally be achieved. He even promised to stand beside Arafat while raising the new Palestinian flag considering that this would be a historic moment in Arafat’s life ⁽²⁾. According to Quandt, Clinton had pursued his last effort to convince Arafat to become more flexible; however, Arafat, after few hours, responded that he could not agree on the settlements proposed by Clinton. On Tuesday, July 25, 2000 Clinton officially declared the end of the Summit and explained that Barak was more flexible and serious in achieving the goals than his Palestinian partner. On July 28, interviewed by the Israeli media (television) Clinton reaffirmed his support for Barak, and warned Arafat against declaring the State of Palestine. He even threatened to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem before the end of the year ⁽³⁾.

The Palestinians witnessed a new painful reality on a policy of increased U.S. pressure. They were suspicious about the whole process since they had felt that the offered plan was the result of a joint coordination between the U.S. and the Israelis. According to Qurei, Arafat had suspected this plan in advance when before going to Camp David; he told the U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright that negotiations would explode in the President’s face. The only reason behind Arafat joining the Israelis and the Americans in the summit was to avoid U.S. anger and frustration. The Americans failed to build better relations between Arafat and Barak due to Barak’s refusal. Even though the U.S. team refused to accept the Israelis demand by attacking Arafat on the international level, they

(1) Galia Golan. *Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement*. (New Jersey: Markus Weiner Publications, 2008), p.38.

(2) Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s Diaries 2003.

(3) William Quandt. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, (California: Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press, 2005).

finally abided to Barak's demands ⁽¹⁾. According to Swisher, when Barak was on the way home, returning from a short break visiting Antietam and Harper's Ferry, he expressed his ideas to Albright about how the summit should continue: "He wanted the President to force Arafat to accept his ideas before negotiations resumed. He said we should tell the Palestinians that the United States would sever contacts with them if they did not yield" ⁽²⁾.

The final result was that there was no such "a generous offer" presented by the Israelis. The Israelis kept protracting the discussion the core issues by being several steps away from proposing a true genuine offer. The ideas that were offered at Camp David were not even presented in a written form; all Israeli ideas were transferred orally and presented in general as "American or Israeli ideas". Barak himself refused to meet with Arafat in a basic meeting, to avoid Arafat's pursuance of writing down the Israeli concessions. Both Clinton and Barak persisted on pushing Arafat to accept these unwritten ideas as a basic framework for the general negotiations before getting involved in more detailed negotiations. The Palestinians exerted their efforts to the utmost in order to prove their point that they were cooperative and willing to reach a final agreement, but they were always portrayed as the reason behind not cooperating with the Barak's "enormous effort". They could not manage to convince the U.S. administration of their position since they did not cope with the "American ideas" or even put forward a "counter offer". This led to the frustration and anger of the U.S. President especially when Qurei refused to negotiate about the content of the Israeli maps. Qurei insisted that any agreements about the lands should be based on the 1967 borders ⁽³⁾.

Obviously, one can conclude that Camp David Summit in 2000 failed. The relations between the Palestinian leadership and Clinton's administration deteriorated to a very low level. Both sides exchanged accusations and pointed fingers at each other for being the cause of failed results. Arafat justified such a failure by accusing the U.S. of not acting as a fair and neutral mediator. According to the Palestinian leadership, the U.S. acted as a strong supporter of Israel against the Palestinians instead of playing its natural role as an honest broker.

(1) Ahammed Qurie', *Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-200[Camp David Negotiations]*, (Beirut: Mu'assasat el-Derasat el- Falestieniyeh, 2007).

(2) Clayton E. Swisher. *The Truth About Camp David*, (New York: Nation Books, 2004), p.317.

(3) Ahammed Qurie. *Op.cit.* p.345.

Chapter Six

Analysis and Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

To explore the differences between both case studies, this chapter divides this topic into two sections. The first section will offer a selective examination of what went wrong at Camp David 2000 and shed light on the Palestinian perspective to which Israelis and Westerners are not generally exposed. The second section compares the role of both American Presidents Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001), the U.S. objectives in the summits, and the experience, knowledge, skills, and behaviors of both presidents as mediators and direct brokers.

Clinton and his team failed to design an organized and comprehensive plan for the summit. The Palestinians were expecting from the U.S. a “surprising solution” for the conflict while the Americans were counting on Barak’s government to do “the honor”. Clinton was optimistic about pulling a final agreement off; however, his presidential term was close to end. It was inevitable for Clinton to seize this historic opportunity that could claim himself as the only American President able to solve this long-running conflict. Robert Malley described the U.S. behavior at the summit like the amusement ride bumper cars. When the Americans hit an obstacle, they would turn some other way and try something new and stay with their tactic for a couple days.

6.2 Analysis

Clinton did not act as professional and presidential mediator, and allowed his emotions to interfere with negotiations ⁽¹⁾. Clinton failed to understand that the Palestinian negotiating team was not truly ready to make final decisions that might be fateful to their leadership; besides that, the timing set for final negotiations had not prepared both

(1) Both Swisher and Qurie mentioned in their books how President Clinton shouted at Qurie and Arafat during the negotiations in the summit.

Palestinians and Israelis for attaining the full willingness of both communities to conclude a final agreement. Also, Clinton could have started these negotiations much earlier instead of waiting until the last months of his two terms (8 years) of presidency. Moreover, Clinton was not fully equipped with the correct and accurate information about the nature of Arafat's personality; he was not warned that cornering Arafat will produce an opposite result; if cornered, Arafat will commit actions against all the requirements of any successful negotiations. Clinton may have realized this fact, too late, when he witnessed Arafat's reaction to the siege, imposed on him by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, at his headquarters (*Muqata'h*) in Ramallah 2003.

As for Arafat, most Palestinians were proud of him for his steadfastness and "not giving in" to the pressure of the U.S. and Israel. On his arrival home to the Palestinian territories, Arafat was received by many Palestinians with a warm welcome and was praised as a true leader and a "genuine hero". Barak failed to understand the Palestinian perspective that Arafat had made a severe painful concession by agreeing to accept only 22% of all Palestine (Mandatory Palestine). The Palestinian leadership was abandoned by the regimes of Arab countries during the negotiations under the pretext of not having been consulted in the process of the decision making. Arafat was pressured by the fact that a decision about the fate of the Holy City of Jerusalem belongs to the "Moslem World", not only to the Palestinian leadership. It was a very heavy burden on the Palestinian leadership to make sensitive and important decisions that deal with Moslem and Christian issues such as the *Haram al-Sharif* and the Armenian Quarters, both of which the Israelis demanded to be under their sovereignty.

The Palestinian leadership had no trust in Barak who refused to implement the third redeployment of Israeli military forces, and who clearly stated his rejection of the Oslo Agreement. Aaron Miller talked about Barak's reaction when asked by Terje Larsen about his perspective towards "Oslo":

"The Norwegian peace intermediary Terje Larsen tells a story of being invited to the new prime minister's house shortly after Barak's election. "What are you going to do on the peace process?" Larsen asked Barak. "I will do the opposite of Oslo" came the reply." You see, Terje, we have a dog in front of us, and this dog is very ugly. Why is it ugly?" ...because it has an ugly tail. If we take the tail away, the dog would be beautiful. You Oslo people would chop the tail

off like salami. I will chop it off”..... “I’ll make peace with Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinians,” Barak concluded. “I will have the end of conflict, totally in one go”⁽¹⁾.

According to Qurei, the three parties involved (the U.S., Israel, Palestine) had not planned well for Camp David summit and were not fully prepared to engage in negotiations that would produce a permanent status agreement (PSA). Qurei explained that everybody liked to claim his role in successful agreements but no one admitted his role in causing the failure; therefore, it is naturally that the weaker party (Palestinians) would be blamed. He stated that U.S. leaders and Israelis relied on their traditional perception of the Palestinians; the Palestinian problem, according to them, is a product of violent and terrorist operations. This type of perception of the Palestinian community had contributed in setting Barak’s strategy of negotiating at Camp David. Since Barak refused to offer any written offers, the U.S. mediators were functioning as post office carriers, delivering messages between the two sides. The U.S. team was not acting as honest brokers; they claimed that many of the new ideas as their own proposals when they were, according to Qurei, Israeli ideas⁽²⁾.

Qurei has concluded that the failure of the summit was due to the following factors: The Israelis believed their own lie of a “Generous Offer”, but actually had not offered any tangible concessions on any of the core issues (Jerusalem, land, security, and refugees). As for the land issue, the Palestinians accepted 22% of Mandate Palestine where the U.N. Resolution 181 had offered them 46%. Barak had a problem with the “Oslo Accords”; he rejected its concept of a multi-phased strategy. He stressed an “all or nothing” approach even though the time was not ripe for final settlement; the level of the confidence-building between the two sides was extremely low. This “all or nothing” approach could have succeeded at Camp David had it been accompanied with a supportive environment of trust and hope for the Palestinians and their leadership. Barak was unable to develop a warm personal relation with Arafat as Peres had done when he became the prime minister of Israel after Rabin assassination. Not only did Barak ignore the value of a close personal relationship with Arafat, but he also refused to hold a one-on-one meeting with him; this political behavior was an enough reason for Arafat not to trust Barak. According to Dr.

(1) Aaron Miller, *The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*. (New York; Bantam, 2008) ,p.278.

(2) Ahammed Qurie’, *Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000* [Camp David Negotiations], (Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el- Falestieniyeh, 2007).

Pundak, Arafat was quoted as saying “Barak is worse than Netanyahu.” Barak also failed to build or even create a good relationship with Arafat’s deputy Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as an alternative to creating “chemistry” with Arafat. In other words, there was no relationship created which could have helped in bridging over “the difficulties and distrust which arose during negotiations”⁽¹⁾.

Furthermore, Barak encountered domestic difficulties. According to Dr. Ron Pundak, Barak’s domestic difficulties started after the elections when he did not establish an organized political team for the negotiations, professionals with enough experience, e.g. Shimon Peres; this move was made by Barak in order to build a coalition which he thought would support him in reaching a final agreement.

“He essentially excluded the Labor party leadership from the process and alienated his partners. In the end, the government was assembled just two days before the 45-day limit, leaving everyone except for Barak – who remained smiling – angry, suspicious and exhausted. He ruptured his relations with Uzi Baram and Ra’anah Cohen (two pillars of his party); appointed Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben Ami to positions (Justice and Internal Security) which did not match their qualifications and appointed Haim Ramon as a Minister of little importance in the Prime Minister’s Office. He also attempted to keep Peres out of the government. After forming the government, however, he was obliged to create a special position for Peres as Minister for Regional Cooperation. He tried to bypass Avrum Burg by nominating someone for the position of Chairman of the Knesset who had little chance of winning, and finally bestowed ministries of high socio-economic importance upon coalition partners instead of his own party. In response to problems that emerged from coalition negotiations, Barak replied that he could not be pressured or blackmailed. If he blinked now, he added, it would impair his ability to negotiate with President Assad.

With the establishment of the government, his course of action did not change. He managed to turn supporters into adversaries. He failed to resolve internal problems, addressing them only when they had reached a point when they could barely be solved. He handled the strike of the physically disabled and the teachers’ strike in a similar manner. Towards the Israeli-Arabs, of whom 95% had voted for him, he was condescending from the onset, establishing no framework for cooperation with the Arab parties or the Arab leadership on the municipal, social and religious levels. The problem was not one of a lack of will, honesty or vision, but rather the fact that Barak was the poorest of managers”⁽²⁾.

(1) Ron Pundak, “*From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?*” Survival: Vol.43.No.3, (Autumn 2001, pp:31-45).

(2) Ibid., p.11.

Barak wanted to annex another 8% out of the 22% for security measures which it would make it impossible for the Palestinians to have their viable contiguous independent state. Even though East Jerusalem is a part of the Palestinian lands occupied in 1967, Barak had offered a proposal that would annex all settlements surrounding the city, keeping the Jewish Quarter, the Wailing Wall, and part of the Armenian Quarter under the Israeli jurisdiction. The Western Wall and the underground of *Haram el-Sharif* / Temple Mount would stay under the Israeli jurisdiction. As for the issue of Palestinian refugees, Barak denied Israeli responsibility and rejected firmly their return to their homes. Finally, Barak made it impossible to reach a final agreement when he demanded significant restrictions on the movement of Palestinians within their own state. Under the pretext of security measures, Barak wanted to impose Israeli sovereignty over the borders, as well as establish Israeli security centers and stations in the West Bank ⁽¹⁾.

Both the Israeli Gilead Sher, who was expecting a stronger American intervention, and the Palestinian Yasser Abed Rabbo, agreed with Agha and Malley (2001) and Qurie (2007) on this issue; Gilead reveals that:

“There was no negotiations schedule. There was no timeline for the follow-up. There was no proposal or counter proposal, checking on the advancement or progress”, or the other words of Yasser Abed Rabbo from the other side: “It was a total chaos. Every day a different meeting, committee, and issue. We didn’t know what our aims were: to succeed, to fail, to escape” ⁽²⁾.

Both Hussein Agha and Robert Malley agreed with Qurei (2007) that it was easier to put all the blame on Arafat. The pro-Israel American media and the enormous Israeli propaganda had led to the wide encouraged belief among the international community that Barak had offered an unprecedented offer but that Arafat, instead of seizing such a rare opportunity, had decided to remain with his uncompromising no’s ⁽³⁾.

Finally, Clinton’s behavior in Camp David 2000 was clearly in contradiction with the characteristics of the conflict resolution approaches suggested earlier (Chapter Two) by Schellenberg especially point (6). It says: “.....when agreement is not reached, no blame for this is cast upon either party.” Clinton has put all the blame on Yasser Arafat, to an

(1) Ibid., pp.346-351.

(2) Aaron Miller. Op.cit. pp:300-301.

(3) Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, *Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors*. (The New York Review of Books :Vol.48,No.13. August 9,2001).

extent that he announced, in several occasions, that Arafat is the only one to blame in failing to consummate an agreement. Clinton claimed that Arafat was the main obstacle (obstructionist) who precluded reaching a final political settlement with the Israelis. Clinton jumped the gun on Arafat more than once during the negotiations; Arafat was reminded once by Madeline Albright (Former Secretary of State) that he was talking to the President of “the number one country” in the whole world, but Arafat reminded her that she was talking to the “Dean” of international liberation movements all over the world ⁽¹⁾. The dialogue between Clinton and Arafat deteriorated during the last few days of Camp David, where it seemed that the dispute had become between both Clinton vs. Arafat instead of Israelis vs. Palestinians. At the personal level, Clinton stopped conversations with Arafat accusing him of not being the “right leader” for the Palestinians. He severed contacts with Arafat and even tried to humiliate him when he had visited Israel by declaring publicly that he definitely would not visit Arafat. Arafat was at the time under siege in the Palestinian headquarters (*Muqatta’h*) in Ramallah; the above actions are not representative of a neutral mediator.

According to the Palestinian Diaries from Al-Hayat and Al- Ayyam news papers, Clinton and Arafat had more than once engaged in inappropriate discussions that would violate the usual protocol between two heads of states.

“In the sixth meeting Clinton told Arafat, “You are gambling with the cause and the future. Barak presented proposals but you take and put in your pockets” Similar attacks came from National Security Advisor Sandy Burger and Secretary Albright” Arafat replied: “I came here representing Arabs, Muslims, and Christians around the world, I came to make peace and won’t accept you or anyone else to put me down in history as a traitor, I invite you to my funeral because I have accepted to be a martyr since the start of the revolution and if I am weak now, someone will come in two years or five years to liberate Jerusalem and if you think that as a superpower you can punish us with sanctions, your sanctions will not work because we are a people who are already under punishment.” That night, Arafat asked the team to pack their bags. He was leaving the summit. Clinton then came and asked Arafat to stay. In the absence of Clinton, the Israelis would not come to another negotiating session. When Clinton returned, he asked to see Arafat, it was July 24. "I am deeply sorry, it seems that the Summit has come to a sad end, my heart is broken and my hopes in the peace process have been shattered. You have lost many chances, first in 1948 and then in 1974 and now you are destroying yourselves in 2000. You won’t have a Palestinian state and you won’t have friendships with any one you will

(1) Arafat talked more than once about this incident on different TV news channels in 2000 and 2001.

be alone in the region that isPresident Arafat interrupts, "Don't finish, I respect you very much and I realize that you are affected by the Israeli position, I have led my people's revolution and the siege of Beirut was easier on me than the siege of Camp David, the revolution is easier than peacemaking. We ask for peace but that peace won't be without a price, there can be no agreement without Jerusalem"⁽¹⁾.

According to the same Diaries, Clinton's temper was bursting with other Palestinian leaders, too, such as Ahmed Qurie. When Qurie rejected an Israeli map outlining the borders, Clinton became very furious at Qurie and asked him to produce his own map. Qurie responded calmly that his map is the (June 04, 1967) borders. Shlomo Ben Ami, who was an Israeli top negotiator during the July Camp David 2000, disagreed with Clinton on the issue of Arafat being the reason behind the failure of the negotiations. He said that Arafat was not to blame for the failure as Clinton had claimed. When Ben- Ami was asked whether Arafat was to blame, he answered:

Retrospectively, it is possible today to put things in perspective, and it would be a mistake to get into that box [of accusing Arafat for the failure]. [The failure was due to] an element that is much more rudimentary and it relates to the 1993 Oslo Agreement. When Arafat signed the Oslo Agreement in 1993, his understanding was that he would eventually get all of his demands. This is the whole story in a nutshell. But no one bothered to give us the heads up on this matter...why didn't they tell us beforehand: 'guys, its worthless to go for a summit since for us its either all or nothing'...my argument is that there is a problem with a mythological Palestinian leader and leadership that presupposes it has already made its concessions"⁽²⁾.

Finally, the timing, again, is a very crucial factor that must be taken into consideration when mediating in such a complicated case. When Clayton Swisher asked Jimmy Carter about what he would have told Clinton if his "advice had been sought", Carter replied:

"I think Clinton did the best he could after he had been in office seven years. My advice would have been to make major efforts the first six months, or first year, which he did finally at Camp David, instead of waiting seven years...I don't say in critical way, because he had a lot of other things. I think he made a genuine effort, and I think he did the best he could"⁽³⁾.

(1) See: Palestinian Diaries, Al-Hayat and Al-Ayyam. Accessed on: December 10,2008 at: http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/Camp%20David%20Diaries.htm.

(2) See; Shlomo Ben-Ami Diaries, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html . Accessed on: November 18, 2008.

(3) Clayton E. Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David*. New (York: Nation Books, 2004), p.355.

The former American President Jimmy Carter practiced a very different approach from Clinton while mediating in Camp David 1979. He successfully brokered an agreement between Egypt and Israel, in which both sides were satisfied with the results of the summit. Egypt gained the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, and Israel achieved security from one of its most powerful adversaries; it was a “win-win situation” for both countries. The question remains: why? Why did the first summit succeed while the second one failed even though both were mediated by the same country (U.S.A.)?

The research shows that there are several factors that existed in the late 1970s, but were not present in the year 2000. These factors contributed to the success of Camp David 1979. For instance, Israel needed to make peace with Egypt as a strategy to divide the Arabs unity regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it obviously managed to do so. Israel tried to exclude one of the three hostile fronts surrounding its borders; by reaching a permanent peace agreement with Egypt, Israel secured its borders from the most threatening neighboring Arab country. The American President Jimmy Carter indicated that Israel became the big winner from this summit; he said: “With the bilateral treaty, Israel removed Egypt’s considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East and thus it permitted itself renewed freedom to pursue the goals of a fervent and dedicated minority of its citizens to confiscate, settle, and fortify the occupied territories” ⁽¹⁾.

The Yom Kippur War (October War) was a major factor in changing the Israelis attitude towards dealing with Arab states especially with Egypt. On the other hand, the economy in Egypt was deteriorating; Sadat was looking for U.S. financial aid as a savior to his country’s weak economy. He felt that he should thaw his country’s relations with the U.S. after the long-running conflict between the two countries when Egypt was ruled by Nasser. After getting engaged in previous negotiations that produced several agreements such as 101 Kilometer Agreement and the Forces Disengagement Plan, both sides realized that they can win more through peaceful negotiations than resorting to wars. The “willingness” of the parties to search for a peaceful solution suggested by William Zartman applies very well on both Israel and Egypt. Both countries, especially Israel, felt that they would be in a worse situation if a peaceful agreement did not take place. Time is often the essence of succeeding or failing in any negotiations between adversaries. The prerequisites

(1) Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.52.

and conditions, set by various political analysts, to any successful negotiation were about the focus on time. The third party has to identify the precise moment when he can change the situation from conflict to conciliation. The situation in the region in 1979 was ripe, and the U.S. took advantage of this opportunity to successfully broker a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. It was different in the case of Camp David Summit in 2000, since Clinton forced the summit based on his timeline, not based on ripeness for peace.

In addition, Jimmy Carter used more diplomatic methods with Sadat than Clinton with Arafat. Carter built a strong personal relationship with Sadat and they became good friends, while Clinton resorted to a form of bullying, colonialist diplomacy that most third parties, including Britain, had long ago out-grown”⁽¹⁾. In an interview with Aaron Miller, Carter expressed his personal feelings about his relationship with the late Sadat, Miller explained:

“When I asked Carter about his relationship with Sadat, the flood gates opened: “Sadat had total trust in me. We were kind of like brothers.” After the official state dinner at the White House, Carter took Sadat to the residence, where his conversation convinced him that Sadat was “something of a soul mate. He and I began to develop a strategy.”...Sadat recalled that he found Carter to be a man who understood what he wanted, “a man impelled by the power of religious faith lofty values- a farmer like me.” Later Carter confides to his wife, Rosalynn, that his meeting with Sadat has been his “best day as President”⁽²⁾.

This kind of relationship and this level of trust between Carter and Sadat surely contributed to the success of the summit. Several researchers and political analysts have stressed the importance of the “Trust- Building” stage; Moore (2003), Carter (2006), Chomsky (2006), Lazo (1996), Hass (1990), Bush and Folger (1994), Fisher and Ury (1991), and Pappé (2006), have all agreed that gaining the trust of the mediator is a basic factor in the success of any type of negotiations. The traditional history of the psychological and ideological attitude of the Arabs toward the U.S. positions has been, till today, full of paranoia and distrust. This can, relatively, be the same case with the Western countries towards the Arab and the Moslem world. Both Carter and Sadat, however,

(1) Clayton E. Swisher. Op.cit.p.304.

(2) Aaron Miller, *The Too Much Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York; Bantam, 2008) p.165.

proved the opposite by bonding so strongly, even though they come from two extremely different cultures and two different religions (Christianity /Islam).

The level of trust between Carter and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was very low. However, this trust gap did not stop Begin from working with Carter; Carter thought of Begin as an honest person. According to Miller, Carter respected Begin even though he did not like him personally. Miller said that:

“Jody Powell believed that there was “a little bit of Begin in Carter and Carter in Begin.” Sam Lewis, whose ambassadorial duties included the difficult task of explaining Begin to Carter, believed that the president saw in Begin an honest man rough around the edges. Stuart Eisenstadt added that Carter empathized with Begin’s Holocaust background and that his primarily generous treatment of the Israeli leader made Begin more flexible than advertised” ⁽¹⁾.

President Jimmy Carter acted as a mature and professional mediator. He realized the importance of the impact of Holocaust on the Israelis in general and on Begin, in particular, since Begin had lost fifteen members of his immediate family in the Holocaust. Carter managed to transfer this rigid, tough, and stubborn personality into a flexible, understanding, and compromising man. Even though, Carter felt that Begin manipulated both him and Sadat during the negotiations on the settlement issue, he was satisfied generally with the outcome of the summit. Carter had some difficult times during the negotiations, but he was very determined and persistent on consummating a final peace agreement between the two sides:

“It seems extraordinary how many intense hours I spent cooped up in the small study at the end of the back hall at Aspen. Some of the most unpleasant experiences of my life occurred during these days. The drafting of the language to be used in the final agreement was one the problems that exhausted Carter running back and forth between the two parties adding and deleting some words based on their request.

At the last minute, however, there was a dispute over the language in which the Sinai issue was to be referred to the Keneset. After hurriedly meeting with both sides on this, Carter formulated a final revision on this issue. He then sent it to both parties with the instructions: “This is the exact language to be used. Do not use any other language on or off the record”. This was

(1) Ibid, p.177.

accepted by both sides, and Carter at last realized that the Camp David discussions had been a success”⁽¹⁾.

By referring to the basic characteristics of the mediator, mentioned earlier (Chapters two), Carter acted as a “professional mediator” while Clinton lacked the most basic requirements for such a skill. Even though, Carter was very patient and caring listener to both sides, he eventually had to impose his judgment when he asked both Sadat and Begin, as mentioned above, not to change or use any other language. After all, the mediator cannot succeed if he does not become more assertive and constructive third party. It is interesting to note that Carter became the U.S. President after he had campaigned as a supporter of Israel. In his first visit to Israel, he expressed his deep sympathy as a religious Christian with the Jewish state. He publicly opposed, more than once, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. He supported the campaign led by the pro-Israel lobbyists, who were fighting the Arab-boycott of Israel. Carter attained around 75% of the Jewish vote and more than 60% of the main Jewish donors and supporters for the Democratic Party in the U.S. election in 1976⁽²⁾. But, this did not change the fact that Carter became one of the prominent mediators, admired and respected for his honesty and objectivity. Aaron Miller expressed his admiration of Carter when he said: “Whatever his detractors say about him, he deserves enormous credit for what he accomplished then. The 1979 Egyptian -Israeli peace treaty was an accomplishment that remains unmatched by his presidential successors”⁽³⁾.

In addition, Carter remained active as an honest and firm mediator even after the end of his term as an American president, particularly when Israel attacked Lebanon in 1982, and he contributed effectively to ending the war. He said:

“I informed Prime Minister Menahem Begin that if Israel forces in Lebanon, I would have to notify Congress, as required by the law, that U.S. weapons were being used illegally in Lebanon, which would automatically cut off all military aid to Israel. Also, I instructed the State Department to prepare a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s attack. Israeli

(1) James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), p.181.

(2) Janice Terry, *U.S. Foreign policy in the Middle East*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005), p.189.

(3) Aaron Miller. *The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*. (New York; Bantam, 2008) p.190.

forces withdrew, and the United Nations troops came in to replace them in Southern Lebanon, adequate to restrain further PLO attacks on Israeli citizens”⁽¹⁾.

On the other hand, Clinton did not exert the extra effort to pursue making peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. On the contrary, he caused, indirectly, the hateful attitude by the Palestinians towards the U.S. and its biased positions. He strongly supported the Israeli government in blaming the Palestinian leadership, Arafat in particular, for obstructing both disputed parties from reaching a final agreement, despite having given Arafat an important promise: “I promise you that under no circumstances will I place the blame of failure on you”⁽²⁾. Clinton broke this promise; this has left a deep psychological impact on the Palestinians, in which they felt that the U.S., represented by President Clinton, was an extremely dishonest broker. Clinton supported the stronger party (Israelis) against the weak party (Palestinians) without any justification; this is what Folger and Bush warn against⁽³⁾. Nonetheless, the Palestinians are still hoping that the U.S. will eventually broker a deal that will settle their conflict by being more forceful toward Israel than it has in the past.

(1) Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006) p.44.

(2) Clayton E. Swisher, *The Truth about Camp David* (New York: Nations Books, 2004) p.226.

(3) See chapter 2, p.24.

Chapter Seven

The Study Analysis

7.1 Introduction

Based on this historic analytical study, and by comparing both case studies, the Arabs are partially blamed for failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arabs, in general, and the Palestinians in particular should have a more developed role in to change the long-standing biased position taken by the U.S. while dealing with the conflict. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section is about Arab-American relations and their perception of the concepts “fair, honest, neutral, and impartial”, while the second section discusses the role of Palestinian scholars.

As for American-Arab relations, Arabs can improve their diplomatic skills by building a better relationship with the United States. This will not be possible unless Arabs study the U.S. political system, and understand the structure, including its decision making process in the State Department. In an attempt to succeed in changing the U.S. hostile political trend towards the Arabs, Dr. Muhammad Rabie’ suggested that Arabs must do the following:

1. Focus on the common interests and values and the role of the Arab- Moslem Civilization in contributing to the progress of U.S. Civilization.
2. Become involved financially to contribute to the American election process, media, and cultural education.
3. Establish a research and studies center (institute) in Washington which will focus on the situation of the Arabs and the Arab-American relationship.
4. Educate and familiarize Americans about Arabs and the Moslems. This can be done through publishing books, producing documentary films, providing courses, giving lectures, having seminars for high school teachers and students, and reaching out to foreign press correspondents who work in the Western media.
5. Strengthen the relationship with American universities through lectures, writing articles, and supporting American professors who are known to be moderate or objective.
6. Provide incentives, such as financial rewards or partial scholarships, for students who conduct academic research that supports Arab culture and their cause.

7. Focus extensively on the media in general not only through publishing books but also through newspapers, magazines, internet, and television.
8. Support American politicians who sympathize with the Arabs and who push for finding a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, those politicians who are convinced of the fairness of the Arab demands who understand that leaving the conflict unsolved will harm long-term American national interest.
9. Direct the Arab-American institutes and associations in U.S.A., and the Arab embassies in creating a system in which they will reward friends and punish adversaries⁽¹⁾.

7.1.1. The Role of Palestinian “Scholars”:

The Palestinian scholars should be asking for a “Declaration of Culture”, as the Founding Fathers framed in the Declaration of Independence of the U.S. (1776). They should write their own history, shape their own culture, and the researcher believes that Palestinian scholars are capable of accomplishing such a task. They need to liberate themselves from being followers and have the self-esteem and confidence of their ability to be creative rather than imitators. It is about time for the Palestinian scholars to start thinking of new ways in order to create their own culture with a different rhetoric; as Abu-Nimah had put it: “Thinking the Unthinkable”⁽²⁾.

It is the role of educators to not simply recreate the work of other intellectuals but to initiate new ideas and progressive debate. An innovative thinker is a scholar who initiates new theories which will contribute to social and scientific development. The role he may take and the method he may adopt (make into an argument) while functioning as a thinker among his society is what really matters. There are many scholars who prefer to do the right thing, as opposed to just being merely a tool used by the powerful people; it's the scholar's responsibility to chose between being a parrot or a leader who may direct his people toward the right path.

(1) Muhammed A. Rabie', *Sunu' el-Siyasa al-Amrikiyyeh wal-Arab [The Making of American Policy and the Arabs]* (Amman: Dar el-Kaemel Press, 1990), pp: 227-228.

(2) Ali Abunimah, *One Country, A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse*, (New York: Metropolitan Books. 2006) p.161.

Thus, there should be an evolutionary development of Palestinian ways of thinking; the Palestinian community direly needs to adapt a mechanism of self-criticism. Self-criticism is valid and an important concept for any developing civilization; when one is unsatisfied with himself, it is the beginning of self-betterment and the search for alternatives. It is the transitional period of growth and evolution into new knowledge, and it is the beginning of knocking upon the doors of freedom⁽¹⁾.

7.2 Concluding Remarks

This study attempted to examine the U.S role as a mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The neutrality and the honesty of the U.S. were the main issues discussed. The study attempted to examine the successes and failures of the U.S. in applying the basic characteristics of a genuine mediator. Also, the study focused on peaceful approaches adopted by the international community for conflict resolution, according to Article 33 in the United Nations Charter. The goal behind focusing on these different approaches was to address the question about the efficiency of the mediation approach without combining it with other approaches, such as arbitration. The study discovered that mediation alone does not function efficiently in complicated cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however, it argued that if mediation was combined with arbitration, it will have greater chance for success, as in the case of the Qatar-Bahrain borders dispute.

After the analytical and historical studies of the U.S. history of mediation in the Middle-East, and after pointing out the main U.S. strategists and foreign policy decision makers, the study discovered that many significant policy makers who have shaped U.S. policy toward the Middle East, were either pro-Israel or sympathize with the Jewish community's concerns, while ignoring the Palestinians' perspectives. The study analyzed historically the role of the American presidents, starting from Woodrow Wilson till the former president George W. Bush, and argued that the U.S. relationship with the Arab and Moslem world has not, with slight variation, changed.

(1) The researcher thinks that Sari Nussaibeh, Edawrd Said, Rashid El Khaldi, Hanan Asrawi, Ziad Asali, and Mohammad S. Dajani are among the creative Palestinian scholars.

After analyzing the role of U.S. domestic pressure groups, mainly AIPAC, the study found that the unequivocal financial and military support for Israel did not only come as a result of this group's pressure, but also because of the U.S. national interests. It would not be accurate to give too much significance to the role of AIPAC; if this group actually dominated U.S. foreign policy, there would not be any dispute between AIPAC and U.S. administrations. In short, the role of AIPAC should not be exaggerated, regardless of its significant influence on the decision makers of the U.S. Foreign policy.

The U.S. built its own perspective of the two disputed sides based on its long-term national interests; the U.S. has perceived the Palestinians as a minority living under the jurisdiction of Israeli governments. All U.S. presidents, since Harry Truman presidency term, until George W. Bush, have not recognized the Palestinians' right of self-determination and their right to have an independent state. The majority of former U.S. presidents considered the Palestinian problem simply as a refugees' problem. Because of this, the U.S. asked the international community to be responsible for finding a humanitarian and just solution to this situation. However, even though Jimmy Carter, when he was the American president, did not recognize the Palestinian right to enjoy their independent state, he was the first American president who dealt with the Palestinians as a nation with inalienable rights. One can say that it was Jimmy Carter who changed the vocabulary of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the United States.

The strategic alliance between Israel and the U.S. is very strong and the bond between the two countries cannot be easily broken. There are several bases for this strategic alliance, such as the economic and geographic factors; the U.S. is more concerned about its long-term national interests, which cannot be well-protected unless it has Israel as one of its best allies in the Middle East region. This particular concern of the U.S. is more important than solving the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Further, the study found that the U.S. has not acted as an honest, neutral, and objective mediator while dealing with the Palestinian- Israeli conflict; instead it has acted to the benefit of their national interest.

The two summits of Camp David 2000 and 1979 have several features in common but the main one is that both of them were held under the U.S. patronage as a mediator. However, they differ completely in their results; Camp David 1979 agreement was successfully brokered where Camp David 2000 was a terrible failure as a result of

inexperienced and biased mediators; a failure of the mediation process that was practiced by the Clinton administration. In Camp David 1979 Jimmy Carter was described by some of both Israelis and Palestinians as a true facilitator where Bill Clinton in Camp David 2000 was described as a “lousy manager”; a mediator who lacked for the skill, knowledge, and experience of mediating efficiently in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ⁽¹⁾.

As for the Camp David 1979 agreement, Israel benefited largely because it removed the danger of war against a probable pan-Arab coalition and because the Sinai was transformed into a demilitarized buffer zone. Israel wants to maintain the military superiority over Egypt by monitoring the American military assistance to Egypt and by receiving more U.S. aid than any other country in the region. Israel also uses Egypt to influence the political decisions of the Palestinian leadership; it specifically approaches Egypt at time of crises, such as asking Egypt to use its influence while negotiating the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Egypt disagrees and, sometimes, tries to challenge Israel’s military superiority by protesting to the UN about Israel’s possessions of nuclear weapons. However, this type of disagreement between the two countries does not exceed the boundaries of what is called global “Power Games”; such disputes can occur between China and the U.S. or Japan and South Korea. No one can deny the fact that the Camp David agreement of 1979 has successfully survived, even though it has encountered several difficult challenges, particularly the two wars in Lebanon (1982, 2006), the two Gulf Wars (1990, 2003), and the two Palestinian *Intifadas* (1987, 2000). This Accord could be used as an inspiring lesson for people who want to devote themselves to a genuine and a solid peace agreement.

As for both Presidents (Carter and Clinton), Jimmy Carter’s administration did not have as many American Jewish staff members in his government as Bill Clinton did. Furthermore, several political agreements had preceded Camp David 1979 and they contributed to preparing the environment for brokerage of a successful treaty. The Rogers Plans, Kissinger’s policy (Step-by-Step), the Kilometer 101 Agreement, the opening of the

(1) Gilad Sher in his speech at the ceremony held in Tel Aviv (November,2007) for publishing Galia Golan’s book (Israel and Palestine).The researcher attended this ceremony in company with Professor Muhammad S. Dajani.

Swiss Canal, and Sadat's famous sentence "No More War", all contributed in establishing the concept of making peace between Egypt and Israel.

In conclusion, and by comparing and analyzing the two case studies (Camp David summits 1979 and 2000), the following summarizes the results of this study:

1. The U.S. has not played a neutral role while dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it has not acted as an honest mediator (broker).
2. Jimmy Carter was a very successful mediator, while Bill Clinton was not familiar with the conditions set by researchers and scholars for the successful mediation process.
3. The 1979 summit was held in a different time from Camp David 2000 (21 years apart), therefore, the circumstances differed in terms of the military and economic power of both the Israelis and the Arabs.
4. The role of AIPAC as a "pressure group" has been exaggerated.
5. The national interests of the U.S. are the State Department's main priority, so the decisions of its foreign policy are based on what benefits the U.S. long-term national interests.

7.3 Recommendations

After studying the role of the U.S. as the main mediator (broker) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the specific two case studies of Camp David I and Camp David II, and after analyzing the real factors that lie behind the deterioration of Arab-American relations, the researcher recommends the following:

1. Political criticism of U.S. policies should be selective; it must focus on explaining the issues that may harm America's national interests in the long-run. Most Americans are convinced of their political and social system; therefore, the criticism should come from within the system and not from the outside (internal and not external). The Americans are very sensitive about criticism from outsiders.

2. The Palestinians should unite to employ experienced people familiar with the culture, mentality, values, and ways of thinking of the American society, they should hire a team

whose members are educated and knowledgeable about the tools and the requirements of the decision making process in American foreign policy.

3. The Palestinian leaders should always consult with Palestinian experts on American affairs before engaging in negotiations with the Americans; such experts have the skill of using the proper language and style while communicating with the Americans. Professors Muhammed S. Dajani, Professor Munther S. Dajani, Professor Sari Nusseibeh, Dr. Rashid El-Khalidi, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, and Dr. Ziad Asali, would be best example for representing the Palestinians for such a mission.

4. It is necessary to offer assistance in organizing the Palestinian-American community in U.S.A. and to teach them the required information about the conflict in order to strengthen their ability to influence U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

5. Provide help for the Arab lobbies by facilitating meetings with American officials through their embassies, and move beyond internal quarrels to create a financial avenue for the support of the Arab lobbies, which frequently suffer from financial shortages.

6. Educate and prepare new generations to contribute actively in the voting process and political issues in the United States. Palestinian-American scholars, such as Dr. Rashid El-Khalidi, are counting on the young Arab and Moslem generation to make the actual change of the U.S. foreign policy. The possibility of the Palestinians being successful in strengthening their relationship with the West, in general, and the United States in particular would be better if the whole issue is investigated differently from what many analysts have done so far.

7. Coordinate the Arabs' political agenda and present a collective and united Arabian political position when addressing the United States and American politicians.

8. The Palestinians should learn how to give up the "Blaming Game" and start looking for more useful ways to present their case. This can be done by staying away from the constant negative criticism of the American political system and its foreign policy, regardless of its biased position with Israel and its hostile attitude towards the Palestinians. Attacking the Americans and their political values creates an instant hate reaction against the Palestinians, which benefits Israel.

9. The U.S. theatre and cinema have played a very important role in affecting and shaping the American perceptions of Arabs. Hollywood has always portrayed the Arabs as barbarians and savages, where it has shown the Israelis as victims who are surrounded by aggressive nations who will "toss them one day in the sea". Arabs should not

underestimate the influence of the cinema, and therefore, they must focus on this type of media to work in favor of the Arabs and their cause.

10. Focus on the moral violations of Israel and relate them to the American constitution and their Declaration of Independence (1776).

11. Send e-mails to both the senators and the house representatives on Capitol Hill explaining to them about the conflict from the Arabs' perspective, or complaining to them about the unfair positions that some of them take against the Arabs.

Finally, the Palestinians must cope with the fact that the U.S. has been and will continue to be the most influential mediator in the Middle East peace process. Palestinians should approach this conflict through the lens of the U.S. national interest. As such, Palestinians must adapt their mode of thinking and action to facilitate greater U.S. support.

Bibliography

I- Books:

1. Abunimah, A. (2006). **One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse**. New York: Metropolitan Books.
2. Albright, M. (2005). **Madam Secretary: A Memoir**. New York: Miramax Books.
3. Bush, R. and Folger, J. (1994). **The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition**. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
4. Bennis, PH. (2007). **Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict**. Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press.
5. Berry, J., Goldman .J. & others. (1992). **The Challenge of Democracy**. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
6. Burnes, J. (1965). **The deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America**. N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.
7. Carter, J. (2006). **Palestine Peace Not Apartheid**. New York: Simon& Scchuster, Inc.
8. Cohen, N. (2003). **The Americanization of Zionism 1897-1948**.New England: Brandeis University Press.
9. Chomsky, N. (1991). **Media Control**. New York; Seven Stories Press.
10. Chomsky, N. (1997). **Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda**. New York: Seven Stories Press.
11. Chomsky, N. (1999). **Fateful Triangle: U.S.A., Israel, and the Palestinians**. Boston, MA: South End Press.
12. Chomsky, N. (2002). **9-11**. New York: Seven Stories Press.
13. Chomsky, N. (2006). **Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy**. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC.
14. Christison, K. (1999). **Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy**. California: University of Californian Press.
15. Clinton, B. (2004). **My Life**. New York: Random House Inc.
16. Deutsch, M. (2000). **The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice**. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

17. Donovan, R. (1977). **Conflict and Crises: The presidency of Harry Truman, 1945-1948.** New York: W. Norton.
18. Enderlin. (2003). **Shattered Dreams: Failure of the Peace process in the Middle East, 1995-2002.** New York: Other Press.
19. Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1991). *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.* New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
20. Freedman, R. (1991). **The Intifada: It's Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers.** Miami: Florida International University Press.
21. Golan, G. (2008). **Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement.** New Jersey: Markus Weiner Publishers.
22. Geer, J. (1996). **From Tea leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership.** New York: Columbia University Press.
23. Hamid, M. (2007). **The Reluctant Fundamentalist.** Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Inc.
24. Hass, R. (1990). *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
25. Huntington, S. (1996) **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.**
26. Khalidi, R. (2006). **The Iron Cage.** Boston: Beacon Press.
27. Kissinger, H. (1995). **Henry Kissinger: The Diplomacy from the Called War till Present.** Amman: Al Ahliyyah for Distributing and Edition.
28. Kissinger, H. (2001). **Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century.** New York: Simon & Schuster.
29. Lazo, C. (1996) **Jimmy Carter: on the Road to Peace.** NJ, Parsippany: Dillon Press
30. Miller, A. (2008). **The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace.** New York: Bantam Dell, a division of Random House, Inc.
31. Moore, Ch. (2003). *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict.* San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jossy-Bass Publisher.
32. Nusseibeh, S. (2007). **Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life.** New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
33. Pappé, I. (2006). **A History of Modern Palestine.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. Pappé, I. (2006). **The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.** Oxford: One World Publications Limited.

35. Peleg, I. (1998). **The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.** Albany: State University of New York.
36. Petras, J. (2006). **The Power of Israel in the United States.** Atlanta: Clarity Press.
37. Potter, B. (1996). *From Conflict To Cooperation: How To Mediate A Dispute.* California: Ronin Publishing, Inc.
38. Quandt, W. (2005). **Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967.** California: Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press.
39. Ross, D. (2004). **The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace.** New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
40. Rubenberg, Ch. (1989). **Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination.** Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
41. Rubin, J. (2005). **Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography.** New York: Oxford University Press.
42. Sakran, F. (1976). **Palestine, Still a Dilemma.** Pennsylvania: Whitmore Pub. Co.
43. Schellenberg, J. (1996). *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice.* New York: State University of New York Press.
44. Shamir, Sh. and Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2005). **The Camp David Summit-What Went Wrong?** Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press.
45. Sharabi, N. (1990). London: Riad El-Rayyes books Ltd.
46. Slaikou, K. (1996). *When Push Comes To Shove: A Practical Guide to Mediating Disputes.* San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jossey-Bass Publisher.
47. Swisher, C. (2004). **The Truth about Camp David.** New York: Nations Books.
48. Terry, J. (2005). **U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East.** London: Pluto Press.
49. Tessler, Mark. (1994). **A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.** Indiana: Indiana University Press.
50. Tindall, G., and Shi, D. (1984). **America: A Narrative History.** 3rd Ed. Vol. II New York: W.W. Norton.
51. Urofsky, M. (1994). **Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy.** Washington: United States Information Agency.
52. Ury, W. (1993). *Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation.* New York: Bantam Books.
53. Winslade, J., and Monk, G. (2001). *Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution.* San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jossey-Bass Publisher.

54. Zartman, W. (1985). **Ripe for Resolution**. New York: Oxford University Press.

II- Articles and Papers

1. Agha, Hussein and Malley, Robert. **Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors**. The New York Review of Books: Vol. 48, No. 13. August 9, 2001.
2. Agha, Hussein and Malley, Robert. **Camp David and After: An Exchange (2.A Reply to Ehud Barak)**. The New York Review of Books: Vol.49, No.10. June 13, 2002.
3. Barak, Ehud and Morris, Benny. **Camp David and After-Continued**. The New York Review of Books: Vol.49, No.11. June 27, 2002.
4. Dr. Ron Pundak. **“From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?”** Survival: Vol.43.No.3, autumn 2001.
5. Grinstein, Gidi and Ross, Dennis. **Camp David: An Exchange**. The New York Review of Books: Vol.48. No.14. September 20, 2001.
6. Haaretz: **Hillary Clinton**. Thu. December 11, 2008 Kislev 14, 5769.
7. Haaretz: **“Did Abraham Lincoln support the creation of a Jewish State?”** Article by Tom Segev, last update-02/27/2009.
8. Haaretz: Article by Barak Ravid. **“Clinton: Israel's demolition of East Jerusalem homes harms peace efforts”** March 4, 2009.
9. Morris, Benny .**Camp David and After: An Exchange (An Interview with Ehud Barak)**. The New York Review of Books: V.49, No. 10. June 13,2002
10. **Israel Military Operation in Lebanon**. Washington Post, June 16, 1982
11. **AIPAC: A Major Force in Washington**. Article by Shipler, David K. New York Times, July 06, 1987.

III- Internet

- **How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe, Avi Shlaim, Oxford professor of international relations**

<http://www.guardian.co.uk:80/world/2009/jan/07/gaza-israel-palestine> (March 25, 2009).

- **Shlomo Ben-Ami Diaries**
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html> (February 19, 2007).
- **The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace**
<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7355>
 (New York Times: September 13, 2004).
- **Secretary of State Madeline Albright Diaries**
<http://search.loc.gov:8765/query.html?st=101&charset=utf-8&col=loc&qt=secretaries>
 (May 13, 2008).
- **1979 The Camp David Accords of 1979**
http://www.jerusalemmites.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm (May 30, 2008).
- **The Meaning of Resolution 242**
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/meaning_of_242.html (Sep.19, 2007).
- **Conflict Resolution: How to stop Fighting**
 (www.beyondintractability.org (February 7, 2008).
- **The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision: Part 2**
(April 6, 2001).
www.theestimate.com (October 10, 2007).
- **The Arab-Israeli Conflict**
<http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/f/me081115e.htm>
 (October 17, 2008)
- **(Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. September 13, 1993)**
 (<http://www.historycentral.com/Israel/Documents/Oslo.html>.
 (September 25, 2007).

- **Kilometer 101**

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html> (April 08, 2009).

- **USAID Boycott of Target**

http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0205aidboycott_body.html (December 19, 2008).

- **Rogers Plan**

http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php

(April, 22, 2008)

- **U.S. Asked Saudis to Aid Palestinians**

<http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/29/world/us-asked-saudis-to-aid-palestinians.html> (By Steven A. Holmes, Published: Thursday, April 29, 1993).

IV- Reports

1. Blechmann, B. **Protecting America's Future: the Role of Foreign Assistance.**

Washington: The Alliance for international Economic Development. (March 20, 2005).

2. Correspondent Report: **Transcript** (This transcript is from Correspondents Report, Sunday, 15 October, 2006).

3. **Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.** Address by Richard M. Nixon, Francisco, (July 29, 1967).

4. **The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreements in the International Law Perspective.**

Amman: Dar el-Jalil. (1984).

- **Arabic References**

1. Eriqat, S. (2008). **Al Hayat Mufawatdat.** Palestine, Nablus: Jama't Al-Najah al-Wataniyyeh.

2. Rabie, M. (1990) **Sunu' el-Siyasa al-Amrikiyyeh wal-Arab.** Jordan, Amman: Dar el-Kaemel Press.

3. Sharabi, N. (1990). **Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin** London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr.

4. Qurei, A. (2005). **Mufawatdat Oslo 1993**. Lebanon, Beirut: Mu'assasat el-Derasat el-Falestieniyyeh.

5. Qurei, A. ((2007). **Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000**. Lebanon, Beirut: Mu'assasat el-Derasat el- Falestieniyyeh.

Appendix

"I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Source: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/president_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points.